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Contemporary epistemologists are overwhelmingly focused on justification and related 
notions of epistemic normativity, such as responsibility. Yet, before we can evaluate whether 
a belief is justified or responsibly acquired, there is a deeper concern over whether such 
evaluations are apt, whether one is the appropriate target of responsibility ascriptions in 
general. I call this the question of epistemic competence. I examine two possible 
explanations for when one is the appropriate target of responsibility ascriptions—doxastic 
control and awareness. When an individual can control their beliefs and/or is aware of what 
they believe, they are epistemically competent. I argue that neither explanation is sufficient 
and perhaps not even necessary when it comes to competence. While we do exercise 
influence over what we believe using our cognitive abilities, we do not control our beliefs. 
Moreover, since we can rightly be held responsible for our beliefs even in cases where we 
formed a belief we were unaware we should not have, epistemic awareness likewise fails to 
adequately explain epistemic competence. Instead, I argue that what opens one up to 
epistemic responsibility is a constellation of cognitive abilities the exercise or manifestation 
of which is a kind of know-how. In particular, because the cognitive abilities in question—
the abilities to recognize and assess justifying reasons for belief—increase one’s reliability at 
achieving knowledge, to possess those abilities is to know how to know. 
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A common feature of our lives is that we evaluate each other (and ourselves). We 
evaluate each other based on our actions and our beliefs. We often think of actions as being 
careless or callous, good or bad, foolish or calculated. Likewise, we often think of beliefs as 
being stupid or brilliant or insightful, and individuals as being misguided or careful or 
slipshod in believing what they do. Sometimes our evaluations imply that an individual is 
culpable or blameworthy for their action or belief and sometimes our evaluations have 
broader implications such as those indicating traits of character. These evaluations suggest 
that we have (or have not) met relevant standards and as such we are subject to certain kinds 
of attitudes, judgments, and sanctions. Some of these attitudes and judgments we have 
towards others (and ourselves) are implicit (e.g., when I lose trust in a certain reporter upon 
learning that he unjustifiably manipulated some of the facts to support his interpretation of 
an event) and sometimes explicit (e.g., when I call someone out for an action they 
performed). We also modify our behavior based on both implicit and explicit responsibility 
ascriptions and judgments. Upon learning that a neighbor neglects keeping an eye on his 
children because he would rather watch television, I cease to allow my children to play at his 
house. Regulating our actions and beliefs according to standards and norms (implicit and 
explicit) is part of rational and social behavior (and perhaps part of what it means to be 




The kinds of evaluations of interest here are those that treat the individual as a 
participant in the practice of giving and asking for reasons. Sometimes these evaluations are 
apt and sometimes they are inapt: sometimes we are altogether exempt from them and 
sometimes we are excused (either partially or wholly) from being so evaluated. Now an 
individual might be exempt in different ways. She might simply not have done (believed) the 
thing for which she is being evaluated, in which case the same kind of evaluation may be 
appropriate if the individual had done (believed) it. Or, she might fail to be the appropriate 
target of the evaluation in general. In other words, she might be exempt from (particular 
kinds of) evaluation because she is not a (full) participant in the context of it; she may have 
done (believed) something but due to, say, lack of cognitive development fails to be the 
appropriate target of the evaluation.1  Young children are exempt from, e.g., responsibility 
for belief and action and not merely excused; responsibility ascriptions make no sense when 
directed at young children since they have not yet developed to the point where they are 
capable of recognizing and responding to the relevant norms. In exempting cases, 
evaluations are inappropriate in general. This is quite different from situations in which 
circumstances mitigate the evaluation(s) we direct at someone or where something absolves 
an individual of relevant participant evaluations. Here the individual may be the appropriate 
target of that kind of evaluation, in general, but due to extenuating circumstances she may be 
excused (either partially or wholly) in this particular instance. A journalist may incorrectly 
report data but only because the expert source misspoke. In which case, she would be 
absolved of accusations of carelessness. In other words, although she may be appropriately 
                                                 
1 More precisely, she might fail to be the target of certain kinds of evaluation. Presumably there will always be 
some kinds of evaluation aptly ascribed to an individual. For example, even if one is not the appropriate target 
of doxastic responsibility ascriptions, one might be the appropriate target of evaluations centered on action or 
cognitive faculties or on accuracy. The kinds of evaluations I am concerned with in this work are those that 
treat the individual as an epistemic participant in the context of evaluation. See §1.1b for further clarification on 




accused of carelessness in other situations, that accusation is not warranted here. Thus, 
whether an evaluation is appropriate—whether an individual is exempt or absolved from 
that evaluation—is a distinct question from whether it is justified or warranted—whether an 
individual is excused from that evaluation.   
What this brings to light is that warranted evaluations presuppose that those subject to 
them are the appropriate objects of such evaluations, that they are evaluable, in general. Put 
differently, it presupposes that it makes sense to direct those evaluations at them; or, 
alternatively, that they are normatively competent beings. Here and in what follows, I think 
of competence in a quasi-legal sense. Before an individual can stand trial she must be 
deemed competent to stand trial. This entails that she can participate in the trial and that she 
understands the charges brought against her. Likewise, before an individual can be the 
appropriate target of participant epistemic evaluations, she must be deemed (implicitly or 
explicitly) epistemically competent. Among other things, she must be able to understand the 
reasons for (against) a claim, how to evaluate those reasons and claims, and be minimally 
capable of adjusting her (degree of) belief in light of new reasons. Additionally, an individual 
might be competent in general or competent in a specific domain. To illustrate, consider the 
following cases:2 
 
Lunar skepticism: Walter is in his mid-twenties, graduated from college, and now 
works as a mid-level manager. In his spare time, Walter is an astronomy enthusiast.  
Recently, after watching a program on the history channel about the conspiracy 
behind the lunar landing, Walter has become an evangelist of sorts, denying humans 
have ever landed on the moon.   
 Emma is a five-year old, the daughter of one of Walter’s good friends. Emma 
loves the air and space museum and is fascinated by the moon. Her parents read to 
her all about the moon including stories about the lunar landing. One day when 
Walter was over for dinner, he became enthusiastic about his newfound skepticism 
                                                 
2 I shall simplify the discussion by focusing here on epistemic responsibility, but shall broaden the discussion to 




about the lunar landing and told Emma all about it. Now Emma tells everyone that 
the lunar landing was pretend. 
 
Train Schedule: Raymond, an autistic savant, is extremely reliable at remembering 
and calculating hundreds of items at once. His brother Charlie relies on Raymond’s 
memory of train tables for an extremely important meeting he must get to. 
Unfortunately, Raymond gives Charlie the normal operating times; unaware that 
today is a holiday.3 
 
Bipolar Belief: Thom suffers from bipolar disorder but has yet to be diagnosed. 
Paranoia presents in Thom’s manic states. He has just had his first manic break and 
believes that his wife is cheating on him and begins to accuse her forcefully while 
hurling terrible insults at her.  
 
 
In each of these cases, the individual who fails to be subject to responsibility judgments, 
attitudes, and sanctions fails to be subject to them because of something about him or 
herself rather than because of something he or she did. In the first two cases, Emma and 
Raymond are not the appropriate targets of responsibility ascriptions in general—i.e., they 
are not epistemically competent—whereas in the third case, we may suppose Thom is 
epistemically competent, in general, but his belief(s) about his wife’s supposed infidelity are 
somehow not relevantly connected to him. Thus, his epistemic competence is undermined in 
this instance and therefore Thom is absolved of any kind of negative evaluations for his 
belief about his wife’s supposed infidelity. Such absolution amounts to a kind of restricted 
exemption from negative evaluation; he is locally exempt due to his mental illness. 
 In each case, the subject exempt from responsibility is a paradigmatic example of 
someone without the right kind of agency or ownership over (the relevant) belief. Emma 
and Raymond—children and individuals with some kinds of mentally disability—clearly lack 
the appropriate relation to their beliefs. (It may be more appropriate to say that Emma and 
                                                 
3 Depending on how we fill in some details, Raymond may be excused or exempted. If Charlie incorrectly told 
Raymond that he needed normal operating times, then it seems that Raymond is excused. However, if 
Raymond was simply oblivious to this fact and Charlie did not incorrectly tell Raymond that it is normal 
operating hours, then it seems that Raymond is exempt. For my purposes, assume the latter. Thanks to Michael 




Raymond have belief-like states as opposed to full-blown belief, though my argument about 
competence will not turn on how one settles this issue.) The third case is suggestive of an 
epistemic analog to moral temporary insanity. When a person is temporarily insane they lose 
the appropriate contact with their actions such that they are exempt from moral 
responsibility.4 Likewise, Thom loses the appropriate contact with his beliefs regarding his 
wife’s infidelity.  
I have been speaking about responsibility, but there is no reason to restrict the idea of 
competence to responsibility ascriptions. We target individuals with a wide and varied array 
of evaluations and appraisals—people can be careless, careful, naïve, simple-minded, clever, 
open-minded, closed-minded, reliable, stupid, dogmatic, and the like—and for each of these 
evaluations before we can ask whether they are warranted we must first settle (at least tacitly) 
whether they are appropriate. This work proposes a theory of epistemic competence by 
answering the question, “under what conditions is an individual the appropriate target of 







In addition to the main line of argument about epistemic competence, two themes recur 
throughout. A central theme is that there are many different senses of responsibility and if 
we are not careful to distinguish them, we can either be led to substantive mistakes or fail to 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of temporary insanity, see Floch, Maurice. “Concept of Temporary Insanity Viewed by a 




see the importance of the issue altogether. For example, failure to mark the distinction 
between the sense of responsibility that implies one is accountable for a belief (acquisition) 
and the sense that implies that one is merely open to interpersonal epistemic assessment 
based on that belief (acquisition) has led to a dogged preoccupation with deontic accounts of 
justification to the exclusion of other forms of epistemic normativity. Beliefs are not only 
justified or unjustified; they are silly, stupid, insightful, etc., and people are careless, reckless, 
circumspect, open-minded, clever, and so on in their beliefs as well as their belief 
acquisitions and maintenance. This work focuses on the conditions an individual must meet 
to be the apt target of these broader types of assessment.  
In characterizing epistemic normativity in terms of the standards that beliefs have (not) 
met, it is easy to overlook an important feature of epistemic assessment. When we evaluate a 
belief as silly or careless, we are not in fact assessing the belief at all. Rather, we are assessing 
the individual based on having (or sometimes failing to have) that belief. This is not to elide 
the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. It is to suggest 
that even in recognizing that distinction we may fail to acknowledge features of the believing 
subject presupposed in being doxastically justified. For example, suppose Jane comes to 
believe that p based on sufficiently good reasons and/or evidence. As such, we recognize 
Jane is entitled to claim to know that p. Ordinarily, a theory of justification that recognizes 
the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification can stop there. However, 
suppose Jane is oblivious to the standards and norms governing claims to knowledge, due to 
some cognitive defect. Suppose further that Jane possesses the same reasons and evidence 
and believes based upon them, but were she presented with different (subpar) reasons and 
evidence she would have believed that p based on those reasons and evidence. Now, in 




just as entitled. Knowing what we do about her defect, though, we might simply maintain 
that she is not doxastically justified in her belief. Yet, to do so, we must now include in an 
account of doxastic justification an explanation of how being related to reasons and evidence 
in the right way justifies us in our beliefs.5 It is in an answer to the question of how we must 
be related to reasons and evidence in the right way that we find a place for cognitive character. 
Competent believers do not merely take in reasons and evidence and form beliefs, they can 
recognize norms, reflect on and evaluate their reasons and evidence, withhold belief if their 
reasons are lacking, modify their beliefs in light of new evidence, cultivate habits of clear 
thinking, train themselves to be circumspect in their assessment of reasons and evidence, 
and so forth. In this way, epistemic assessment is or presupposes a kind of character 
assessment. This point raises a second theme: virtue epistemology.  
 Beginning with Sosa's6 landmark paper suggesting that deep character traits of  the 
knower are epistemically significant, indeed central, many epistemologists have since argued 
that character matters in epistemology7 not only because one's intellectual character puts one 
in a better position to know things, but rather because one's intellectual character plays a 
constitutive role in whether one has knowledge at all. It is not difficult to see that giving 
intellectual virtue pride of  place in an account of  knowledge has implications beyond 
providing that account. For example, focus on intellectual virtue has resurrected Meno's 
                                                 
5 Note, this point applies to theories that argue for a distinction between propositional and doxastic 
justification (typically internalist theories) and those that argue that all justification is doxastic justification or 
well-foundedness (typically externalist theories). Thanks to Michael Williams for pushing me to clarify this. 
6 See Sosa, Ernest. “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.” 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (1980): 3–26. Reprinted in Sosa, Ernest. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays 
in Epistemology. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
7 Code, L. Epistemic Responsibility. (Providence: Brown University Press 1987);  
Zagzebski, L. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Greco, J. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments 
and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Greco, J. Achieving 




question, "what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief ?"8 Virtue 
epistemology has also played a central role in questioning whether knowledge is the only (or 
ultimate) epistemic good.9 
This work is meant to add to this character turn in epistemology in two important 
respects. First, because our everyday evaluation of  others is more nuanced than whether 
others are justified or entitled to believe what they do, the richness of  virtue and vice 
vocabulary finds a natural home in discussion of  the evaluations that implicate epistemic 
competence. People form beliefs in ways that are careful, considered, foolish, wise, 
commendable, laudable, dogmatic, stubborn, detestable, diligent, lazy, and so on. Our 
evaluations, both implicit and explicit, reflect this and as such a theory of  epistemic 
competence that possesses the resources to mirror or even explain why this is will rely on 
deep features of  the individual being evaluated. Those features may turn out to be epistemic 
analogues of  Aristotelian moral virtues—e.g., cultivated habits of  good thinking—or they 
may turn out to be virtues in a broader sense—e.g., epistemic faculties understood as 
virtues—or both. Regardless, it is important to note that my discussion of  epistemic 
competence shall display another epistemic dimension where intellectual character matters. 
Second, the fact that we can and do evaluate individuals based on doxastic omissions is 
puzzling until we recognize that omissions are reflective of  an individual's patterns of  
thought, cognitive abilities, and values. If  I form a belief  on the basis of  poor evidence that 
I should recognize as poor evidence but do not, it says something about what I value and 
how I think I should exercise my cognitive abilities. So not only does the recognition of  
intellectual character as epistemically significant open new avenues of  research into the rich 
                                                 
8 See Kvanvig, J. L. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) for a detailed discussion of  this issue. 
9 Zagzebki, L. Virtues of the Mind; and, “Epistemic Value Monism.” Ernest Sosa and His Critics. (Malden: John 




way we evaluate others, it also allows us to explain old problems like the apt evaluation of  
doxastic omissions.  
The term "virtue" carries with it needless theoretical baggage. I want to avoid 
misunderstandings about cognitive or intellectual virtues by instead restricting my discussion 
to cognitive abilities. In addition to obviating unnecessary complications, I have two 
additional reasons for preferring "abilities" over "virtues". First, it seems that we can be and 
are evaluated on the basis of  vices as well as failure to manifest our virtues. The positive 
connotation of  "virtue" can easily lend itself  to missing this important point. Further, when 
we do fail to manifest a virtue, it is not always because of  a vice. The kinds of  evaluations we 
engage in are not only aretaic or deontological. We would do well to remember this and to 
use terms that do not obviously or easily invite such confusions. 
Second, the use of  "virtue" instead of  the more evaluatively neutral "ability" does not 
easily translate into the discussion that follows. The central thesis of  this work is that an 
individual is competent if  and only if  she knows how to know. While intellectual virtue 
alludes to this, "ability" is more natural since when it comes to know-how, the watershed 






I propose to develop a theory of  epistemic competence as a kind of  ability-constituted 
know-how. Specifically, a subject is epistemically competent just in case she has the ability to 




i.e., justifying reasons. This belief  revision might come in the form of: wholesale rejection of  
a belief  in light of  new evidence; modification of  the belief  to fit new information; 
withholding the belief  until one has more reasons; a change in confidence (e.g., one might 
retain full belief  and yet become more open to the possibility that one might be wrong); 
etc.10 The argument proceeds in four distinct moves. First, I sharpen the competence 
question by distinguishing two senses of  responsibility and clarifying the kinds of  
evaluations that implicate epistemic competence. Second, I reject the intuitive idea that 
doxastic control and/or awareness underwrite the appropriateness of  evaluation, hence 
constitute epistemic competence. Third, I argue that some instances of  knowing how to  
are nothing more than instances of  having an ability to . Finally, I articulate and defend my 
theory of  epistemic competence as knowing how to know. 
 The first move takes place in chapter one. It is argued that before someone can be 
responsible—i.e., accountable—for a belief  she must first be the appropriate target of  
responsibility ascriptions in general. That is, she must be evaluable based on that belief. When 
an individual is evaluable in this way, she is open to person-level participant reactive 
attitudes—i.e., attitudes that treat that her as a participant in the epistemic community and 
not merely as system that hosts beliefs. These two senses of  responsibility—one that 
implicates accountability and one that implicates evaluability—allow us to clarify the 
competence question by focusing on the conditions for the appropriateness of  participant 
reactive attitudes in general. The concept of  epistemic competence as a kind of  grounds for 
evaluability is further sharpened by understanding exemption and excuse. When reactive 
attitudes are inappropriate, the individual is exempt from them. Intuitively, reactive attitudes 
                                                 




are appropriate when someone is aware of, understands, and is able to exercise some kind of  
control over what they believe.  
 I take up the task of  the second main move of  the argument in chapters two and three. 
There, I examine whether control (chapter two) and awareness (chapter three) underwrite 
the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes. Once we understand the nature and object of  
doxastic control and awareness, it becomes clear that neither doxastic control nor doxastic 
awareness is necessary for epistemic competence. On the one hand, we simply do not 
control our beliefs, but at best only indirectly influence them. On the other hand, the 
common practice of  evaluating others for their doxastic omissions undermines the putative 
necessity of  doxastic awareness for epistemic competence. Further, neither doxastic control 
nor doxastic awareness is sufficient to underwrite the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes. 
Since the focus of  this inquiry into epistemic competence is our actual practice of  evaluating 
others and we cannot, as a matter of  fact, exercise control over belief, the hypothetical ability 
to exercise control over our beliefs is explanatorily impotent. The argument against the 
sufficiency of  awareness for epistemic competence exploits the fact that awareness is merely 
passive. As such, mere awareness could not properly connect the believer to the belief  (or 
explain the failure to believe). The argument against control and awareness is not merely 
critical, however. The discussion reveals that we evaluate others on how they believe; 
epistemically competent individuals know how to know. This insight points to cognitive 
abilities.  
 The chief  obstacle to an account of  epistemic competence as a kind of  ability-
constituted know-how is the intellectualist contention that all know-how is constituted by or 
reducible to propositional knowledge. Chapter four argues that some instances of  know-how 




work. Following an articulation of  Ryle’s famous regress argument against intellectualist 
know-how, I develop three arguments that show even sophisticated versions of  
intellectualism cannot be right and that a modest anti-intellectualism—the view that some 
know-how is neither constituted by nor reducible to propositional knowledge—is motivated.  
Finally, in chapters five and six, I articulate and defend the central thesis of  the 
dissertation, viz., that an individual is epistemically competent if  and only if  she knows how 
to know. Adopting the notion of  guidance control from the work of  John Martin Fischer 
and Mark Ravizza, I argue that mere processes or capacities become abilities, and therefore 
cease to be mere processes or capacities, if  we can exercise guidance control over them. This 
entails that those capacities are reasons-responsive—capable of  being motivated by reasons 
that would justify their exercise/manifestation—and owned—such that the subject sees 
herself  as exercising/manifesting the capacity or sees herself  as doing something that entails 
the exercise/manifestation of  the capacity. 
Following an argument that some cognitive abilities can be (or are) instances of  know-
how, I present desiderata on a theory of  epistemic competence and proceed to argue that 
one is the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes if  and only if  one has a 
constellation of  cognitive abilities: the abilities to recognize, attend to, and assess reasons for 
belief  and the ability to revise belief  in light of  those reasons and that evidence. Together I 
call this constellation of  abilities the ability to believe for normative—justifying—reasons. 
Since I characterized epistemic competence as being the appropriate target of  epistemic 
reactive attitudes, it follows that having the ability to believe for normative reasons 
constitutes epistemic competence. What is left to show is that to have this ability is to know 
how to know. This is demonstrated by considering the object of  knowing how to know—




removing any of  the constellation of  abilities that constitute the ability to believe for 
normative reasons would cause one to be unreliable at attaining knowledge. It is argued that 
if  we removed any of  the abilities that make up the ability to believe for normative reasons 
we would indeed be unreliable at acquiring knowledge, at least mature human knowledge. 
Moreover, I examine whether there might be other abilities or conditions required to be 
reliable at attaining knowledge or being justified. I argue that the ability to believe for 
normative reasons fulfills the role of  those other putative abilities or conditions and 
conclude that one is epistemically competent if  and only if  one knows how to know. 
To shore up my argument, I conclude by highlighting virtues of  my account by briefly 
considering several of  the cases discussed throughout the work. There I show that an ability-
constituted account of  epistemic competence addresses intuitions about control and 
awareness since having an ability entails that one can exercise guidance control over it. While 
this is not a fully-fledged doxastic voluntarism, it has an affinity with it. In relegating control 
to our cognitive abilities—in particular the ability to recognize, assess reasons, and revise 
one's belief—my account has a place for control. Likewise, since guidance control requires 
ownership and the latter entails a kind of  awareness, my view satisfies intuitions about 
awareness as well. Finally, since the locus of  evaluation is the individual, not only are 
instances of  doxastic omission readily explained, but doxastic omissions present further 
reasons to adopt an ability-constituted account of  competence. It is precisely because 
omissions uncover features of  the believing subject such as patterns of  thought and/or 
values, that an agent-centered account of  competence, which maintains that such patterns of  
thought and/or values constitute the individual's cognitive agency, has to be right.  
Before we proceed to these issues, I should like to say something about the methodology 




are no guides to follow or interact with. Therefore, I proceed by way of  analogy. For 
example, when I discuss whether doxastic control underwrites the appropriateness of  
epistemic evaluation, I examine what role it plays in epistemic accountability. Having presented 
the relevant differences between epistemic evaluability and accountability in chapter one, I 
then ask how those differences affect the nature and role of  doxastic control. Additionally, I 
look to discussions on moral attributability—evaluability—and accountability to provide 
insight into my investigation of  epistemic competence, noting relevant differences along the 
way.  There are recognizable disadvantages to such an approach, but these are, I think, 
overshadowed by the rich conceptual resources, if  not just the vocabulary, of  these other 











Under what conditions are we the appropriate target of  epistemic evaluation? Call this the 
competence question. Restated, the competence question asks, "Under what conditions is 
one merely epistemically competent?" In this work, I attempt to answer this question by 
arguing that epistemic competence is a kind of  ability-constituted know-how. But, before I 
can properly argue for that thesis, much groundwork needs to be laid. Specifically, I must 
sharpen the competence question and reject some putative answers.  
To sharpen the competence question, I have two central tasks. First, to suggest that 
competence entails that one is the appropriate target of  evaluation is to imply there are 
conditions under which one is an inappropriate target of  evaluation as well as to imply there 
are conditions under which one is more than merely an appropriate target of  evaluation, 
perhaps the justified or warranted target of  evaluation. So, what sense of  "appropriate target" is 
at issue in the competence question? And how is that sense contrasted with the ways in 
which someone might be the inappropriate target or more than merely an appropriate target 
of  evaluation? Second, I must further clarify what kinds of  assessment are at issue. At the 
very least, I must provide some constraints on those assessments that offer guidelines as to 
how one might identify which evaluations are implicated in epistemic competence. With 




to the competence question. For it sometimes turns out that once we have made a question 
more explicit, the answer is ready at hand, or simply not of  interest. Why, then, does the 
competence question matter? Why does it matter philosophically (e.g., what work does it do 
to help us clarify or think through other problems?) and why does it matter practically (e.g., 
what, if  any, are the pragmatic implications of  an answer to it?)?  
The explanation of  the importance of  the competence question brings to the fore three 
concepts: ownership, control, and awareness. (These three concepts have played a central 
role in discussions of  doxastic and moral responsibility, which I have explained is an 
important resource in my discussion.) On quick reflection we can recognize their 
importance. Take any case of  putative responsibility and remove any one of  these features 
completely from the picture and the attribution of  responsibility begins to lose its intuitive 
plausibility. In the final section of  this chapter, I briefly discuss these concepts and the prima 
facie ways they may be relevant to epistemic competence; a crucial component of  the 
argument that follows through the rest of  this work depends on understanding that their 
explanatory relevance is determined by the role they play in cognitive agency and not in the 







1.1. Competence as Reactive Attributability 
                                                 
11 In chapter two, I focus on control, in chapter three, I examine awareness, and in chapters five and six I argue 





The idea that one can be the appropriate target of  evaluation12 implies that one might be the 
inappropriate target of  evaluation and that there might be something more than merely 
being the appropriate target of  evaluation. I want to argue that to be competent is to be 
open to evaluation in such a way that interpersonal or participant reactive attitudes—
attitudes ascribing, for example, insightfulness, stupidity, carelessness, blameworthiness, 
praise, etc.—are appropriate, in general. This is to suggest that competence is a kind or level 
of  responsibility. It is also to imply there are different kinds or levels of  responsibility. In 
particular, in claiming that to be competent is to be open to evaluation I am suggesting that 
there is a kind of  responsibility that goes beyond being merely open to evaluation, that there 
is something beyond being merely evaluable. And, by saying that evaluation is appropriate in 
general when directed at an individual I am not committed to whether in this particular case 
evaluation is warranted. Let us say that when a subject is open to participant reactive 
attitudes based on a belief, then that belief  is attributable to them in such a way that they are 
evaluable13 and that when a particular kind of  evaluation is warranted in a specific case, either 
in principle or in fact, then that subject is accountable for that belief.  
                                                 
12 I shall use “appropriate target of evaluation”, “openness to evaluation”, and “aptness of evaluation” 
interchangeably. I shall also use “evaluable” and its cognates to indicate openness to evaluation and the like. 
Hence, a subject who is evaluable is open to evaluation. 
13 The discussion in the rest of this section is heavily indebted to Fischer, John M., and Neal A. Tognazzini. 
“The Physiognomy of Responsibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82, no. 2 (2011): 381–417. Their 
discussion of  the concept of  reactive attributability—or just attributability—is the analogue for my use of  the 
concept of  evaluability. For detailed account of  many senses of  responsibility, I refer the reader to their paper 
(and to Watson, G. “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.” in Russell, P 
and Deery, O (eds.) The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 84-116, and Smith, A. M. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental 
Life.” Ethics 115, no. 2 (2005): 236–271.), though I leave out very many of  their analytical steps about 
responsibility. Moreover, their argument concerns moral responsibility for action and there are significant 
disanalogies between moral and epistemic responsibility. Relevant to the present section, actions are not 
intrinsically normative whereas beliefs, since they are (at least) tightly bound up with commitments and 
judgments, are. In chapter two, I argue that we cannot exercise control over belief  raising another important 
disanalogy with moral responsibility for action. Nevertheless, these important points notwithstanding, the 




 As it happens, an individual being evaluable for a belief  and an individual being 
accountable for a belief  overwhelmingly go together. But, being evaluable is conceptually or 
analytically prior to being accountable; it is what gets an individual into the accountability 
game.14 Just as we might think an individual subject to reactive attitudes based on his actions, 
in general, could nevertheless fail to be accountable in particular situations, we might think 
that an individual subject to reactive attitudes based on his beliefs, in general, could 
nevertheless fail to be accountable for any particular belief. Because the ways we evaluate 
individuals based on their beliefs varies significantly, we must be careful to circumscribe the 
sense of  “evaluability” at issue. While sharp demarcation is most likely beyond our grasp, we 
can bring it into clearer focus by pointing to examples (this section), discussing exemption 
from assessment (§1.2), and clarifying the nature of  participant reactive attitudes (§1.3).  
 To illustrate this, allow me to restate the three cases I raised in the introduction, as they 
will feature prominently throughout this work: 
 
Lunar skepticism: Walter is a college graduate in his mid-twenties who now works 
as a mid-level manager. In his spare time, Walter is an astronomy enthusiast.  
Recently, after watching a program on the history channel about the conspiracy 
behind the lunar landing, Walter has become an evangelist of  sorts denying humans 
have ever landed on the moon.   
 Emma is a five-year old, the daughter of  one of  Walter’s good friends. Emma 
loves the air and space museum and is fascinated by the moon. Her parents read to 
her all about the moon including stories about the lunar landing. One day when 
Walter was over for dinner, he became enthusiastic about his newfound skepticism 
about the lunar landing and told Emma all about it. Now Emma tells everyone that 
the lunar landing never happened. 
 
Train Schedule:  Raymond, an individual with savant syndrome, is extremely reliable 
at remembering and calculating hundreds of  items at once. His brother Charlie relies 
on Raymond’s memory of  train tables for an extremely important meeting he must 
                                                 




get to. Unfortunately, Raymond gives Charlie the normal operating times; unaware 
that today is a holiday.15 
 
Bipolar Belief: Thom suffers from bipolar disorder but has yet to be diagnosed. 
Paranoia presents in Thom’s manic states. He has just had his first manic break and 
believes that his wife is cheating on him and begins to accuse her forcefully while 
hurling terrible insults at her.  
 
 
These cases highlight the distinction between evaluability and accountability. The attitudes 
we have toward Emma and the judgments we direct at her are different in kind from those 
we have toward Walter. We might think Emma is being silly for telling others the lunar 
landing was fake, but we do not treat her as a full member in the epistemic community. 
Walter, on the other hand, we do treat as a full member. As such, we find his belief  absurd 
or stupid. Walter is accountable for his belief  (it’s formation and maintenance) whereas 
Emma is not. Moreover, Emma is not accountable because she is not evaluable. In a similar 
way, Raymond is not accountable for his beliefs because neither accountability judgments 
nor participant reactive attitudes make sense when directed at him. Notice, the issue is not 
one of  age since Raymond is a biological adult. Both Emma and Raymond lack some 
capacities or abilities that would render person-level evaluation apt. Lastly, Thom’s mental 
illness temporarily undermines his evaluability; Thom is, in some sense, temporarily insane. 
We shall return to these cases throughout the rest of  this work. For now, it is important to 
note that our actual practice of  evaluating others epistemically has two dimensions (or 
faces).16 
                                                 
15 Again, depending on how we fill in some details, Raymond may be excused or exempted. If Charlie 
incorrectly told Raymond that he needed normal operating times, then it seems that Raymond is excused. 
However, if Raymond was simply oblivious to this fact and Charlie did not incorrectly tell Raymond that it is 
normal operating hours, then it seems that Raymond is exempt. For my purposes, assume the latter. Thanks to 
Michael Williams for pointing out this ambiguity. 




 On the one hand, we often base responsibility judgments on whether and to what extent 
the individual behaved responsibly, i.e., behaved in such a way as to fulfill her doxastic or 
moral or practical obligations, broadly understood. Thus, sometimes one acts or believes 
responsibly or irresponsibly. On the other hand, when one fails to be responsible because 
one fails to be the appropriate target of  responsibility ascriptions, in general, one is not 
therefore irresponsible; in such a case, one is non-responsible.17 The distinction between 
evaluability and accountability corresponds to the sets of  distinctions between 
responsibility/irresponsibility and responsibility/non-responsibility. There are several 
important features of  this distinction that deserve some attention, but first let me state more 
formally just what the distinction is and offer some preliminary remarks about how we use 
these terms: 
 
Accountability (Responsible/Irresponsible): concerns the extent to which a subject 
has met or failed to meet normative requirements for belief  or action and whether 
responsibility ascriptions—more generally, reactive attitudes—are in principle, or in 
fact, warranted in a particular case. Hence, a subject S is accountable for a belief  that 
p iff  (i) S has met (or failed to meet) normative requirements for believing p and (ii) 
ascribing responsibility to S for p is in principle, or in fact, warranted. 
 
 
So accountability is focused on particular beliefs and particular evaluations. (We do also use 
accountability language in a more general way as well. I shall return to this shortly.) By 
contrast, evaluability is more general.  
  
Evaluability (Responsible/Non-Responsible): concerns whether normative 
requirements are apt for an individual and whether responsibility ascriptions make 
sense. Hence, a subject S is evaluable iff  (i) normative requirements are apt for S, and 
                                                 
17 Note that being non-responsible is not the same thing as not being responsible. In both cases, the individual 
would be exempt from responsibility judgments, but in the former the reason for exemption is that those 
judgments are inapt, in general. In the latter, the reason for exemption is that the individual did not do/believe 
what she is accused of doing/ believing. My thinking on this distinction is heavily in debt to countless 




(ii) responsibility ascriptions directed at S make sense.18 Or, again, a subject S is 
evaluable iff  S is the appropriate target of  participant reactive attitudes. 
 
 
In the introduction to this chapter, I presented the competence question as being concerned 
with the conditions under which an individual is subject to participant reactive attitudes. If 
the present distinction between accountability and evaluability is accurate, then an answer to 
the competence question will be an account of evaluability. To question whether an 
individual is accountable presupposes an answer as to whether she is subject to reactive 
attitudes; we could not meaningfully ask if  she discharged her epistemic obligations if  it 
would be inappropriate to suggest she has obligations. There are, however, putative reasons 
to question whether there is a distinction between evaluability and accountability or whether 
the concept of  evaluability does duty for competence.  
 Part of  the tendency to collapse accountability and evaluability arises, I think, from 
parsing the terms involved. For to maintain that one is accountable is to maintain that one 
can be held to (or able to give an) account. And what else could competence be other than 
being able to be held to (or able to give an) account? There is a related ambiguity with 
“competence” as well. Sometimes we use competence language to implicate responsibility in 
the accountability sense rather than in the evaluability sense. When the manager accuses her 
subordinate of  being incompetent she surely does not mean that reactive attitudes are 
inappropriately directed at the employee, but rather that the employee has fallen below a 
standard for which she bears accountability. None of  these worries about usage of  
responsibility language is trivial so I need to address them. 
 First, my distinction between accountability and evaluability is largely, though not wholly, 
terminological. The ambiguity in “accountability” between the general sense of  being able to 
                                                 





be held to (or to give an) account and the more particular sense of  being the warranted 
target of  reactive attitudes for a particular (set of) belief(s) invites confusion. While the 
former is quite close to my use of  “evaluability” above, it will keep things clearer if  we use 
“accountability” to refer to warranted responsibility ascriptions or evaluations in particular 
cases and “evaluability” to refer to whether or not normative standards and reactive attitudes 
appropriately apply. The distinction is not wholly terminological, however. There is some 
(perhaps minuscule) analytical space between being an apt target of, e.g., responsibility 
ascriptions for a belief  and being accountable for the belief. As bi-polar belief above 
illustrates, an individual might be appropriately targeted with reactive attitudes in general, 
even if  those attitudes fail to apply in particular cases. And as we shall see below there are 
many ways to be excused or exempted from epistemic evaluation and not all of  them 
undermine evaluability.  
 Second, the fact that we evaluate noncompetent beings (even rightly) does not entail that 
competence and evaluability, in my sense, come apart. The kind of  evaluability I am 
interested in is reactive evaluability. So, it does not concern merely being able to be evaluated, 
but rather to be evaluated as a participant member of  an epistemic community. The ways we 
evaluate others based on their beliefs falls on a continuum. On one end, we might evaluate, 
in particular ways, certain kinds of  animals each of  which fail to be subject to any kind of  
reactive attitudes; animals are not participants in epistemic practices and thus are not subject 
to the norms and standards that govern those practices. On the other end, we evaluate 
mature human knowers for their beliefs (including the acquisition and maintenance of  
belief). Along the continuum are children who are treated as initiates19 into social epistemic 
                                                 
19 See Williams, M. “Normative Naturalism,’ International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 No. 3 (2010): 355-375 




practices—individuals with whom we use participant reactive attitude language for the 
purpose of  training and guiding—teenagers who are perhaps minimally competent in some 
ways but still not fully competent knowers—individuals at whom we appropriately direct 
some reactive attitudes but not yet others—and mature human knowers.  
 Finally, the fact that we often use competence language to implicate accountability does 
not undermine the fact that we use competence language in a more general sense as well. 
This is true especially in cases of  mental aptitude. In some cases, before suspects can be tried 
for a crime they must be deemed competent. The purpose is to determine whether they have 
the mental facility to understand both what is happening around them when on trial (to 
participate in their defense) as well as what they did. Absent this, the trial is postponed until 
such time as they become competent or the charges are dropped according to the law. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, the sense of  competence I have in mind is close to this legal 
sense of  basic mental aptitude. To say that an individual is epistemically evaluable—
epistemically competent—is to say that she has met the requirements to participate in 
normative epistemic practices like providing reasons for belief  when challenged, recognizing 
whether a piece of  evidence is relevant, assessing her reasons to believe something, etc. If  an 
individual has not yet developed (or through some tragic event loses) such basic capacities 
and abilities, she is not evaluable. We would not say she is incompetent, but rather that she is 
not (yet) competent or no longer competent. In practice, however, one’s basic competence is 
often displayed in an individual’s competencies—skills and abilities.  
 We often settle the question of  basic competence by playing witness to an individual 
manifesting or exercising her capacities or abilities with proficiency. This is yet another 
reason why we can easily miss the point I am making in this section, viz., that accountability 
                                                                                                                                                 
211 for a discussion about language use and concept acquisition in children. She focuses on the master/novice 




is distinct from evaluability. Since one’s basic competence—implicating evaluability—does 
not easily peel off  from one’s competency—implicating accountability—the confusion over 
evaluability and accountability is readily understandable. Nevertheless, I have shown there is 
a distinction to be made and I shall argue that paying due attention to it provides resources 
for understanding and explaining important phenomena (e.g., pervasive intuitions about the 
role of  control and awareness in epistemic evaluation).   
 Apart from this use of  “competence” in a general sense, we use it to indicate we have 
met base requirements in specific domains. When we claim competence at some task or in 
some field, we indicate we have met conditions such that we are open to being evaluated 
based on that task or in that field. To avoid these confusions, going forward, I shall use 
“accountability” and “evaluability” as defined above. Moreover, since to meet the base 
requirements for competence is to be the appropriate subject of  participant reactive 
attitudes, competence just is evaluability. So, the task of  this work is to provide an account 
of  the conditions of  evaluability and in so doing an account of  epistemic competence.  
     Thus far, I have discussed evaluability and accountability by reference to responsibility 
ascriptions, but situating the discussion within the domain of  responsibility unduly 
constrains it. Just as it is perfectly reasonable to wonder whether, for example, virtue 
concepts appropriately apply to an individual, it is perfectly reasonable to question whether 
virtue concepts are warranted when ascribed to that individual in a particular case. As such, 
we should rather think of  evaluability and accountability as implicating not just responsibility 
ascriptions, but as implicating broadly positive and negative participant or reactive 
evaluation. For example, was the subject just/unjust in their action, stupid/intelligent in their 
belief, and so on. There is no clear way to reword the contrasts that implicate competence—




evaluations may be inapt because the individual is not competent or because she simply did 
not do what she is accused of  doing. While it is acceptable to ask whether an individual was 
careful or careless in their belief  formation (thus implicating accountability), to ask whether 
the individual was careful or non-careful is unacceptable. Instead, it makes sense to ask if  
ascriptions (positive and negative) even make sense. To illustrate, when we instruct young 
children to think carefully, e.g., when playing a memory game, we do not hold them to 
account when they fail to do so. The reason why is that they are in the process of  learning 
how to think carefully and it is not until they have this ability that genuinely calling their 
thinking careless is appropriate. What’s more, any evaluative language we seem to be using is 
pedagogical in nature; to say to a young child he should know better does not imply any 
genuine disapproval, but rather provides tacit apprentice-like instruction for the child to 
learn how to know better.20 
      Including other kinds of  epistemic evaluation and recognizing that not all utterances of  
evaluative terms imply genuine participant evaluation more accurately represents the various 
ways we target individuals with epistemic reactive attitudes and makes salient the fact that 
our practices are quite nuanced. Moreover, one’s context and interests will play a non-trivial 
role in whether an individual is aptly targeted with epistemic reactive attitudes. Hence, when 
attempting to articulate conditions of  epistemic competence we should not expect a hard 
and fast line between noncompetent and competent knowers. Indeed, since I shall argue that 
competence is constituted by the possession of  certain cognitive abilities and since 
individuals have varied levels of  proficiency in manifesting or exercising their abilities, it 
should come as no surprise that no hard line exists. The peripheral cases may never be 
settled wholly satisfactorily. Nor should we want peripheral cases to dictate the direction an 
                                                 




inquiry into epistemic competence should go. By focusing on the clear cases, we 
circumscribe an account of  epistemic competence to understanding our actual practice of  
evaluating others; what good would it do for us to provide an account of  evaluability for 
cases whose probability of  occurring are infinitesimally small? This is not to say that we 
cannot provide an account of  epistemic competence, however. It is only to say that in some 
(perhaps many) cases determining whether the conditions for competence have been met 
will not be without some controversy. Nevertheless, we are now in a better position to 
highlight important features and relations of  evaluability (competence) and accountability. 
 
 
a. Features of epistemic competence 
 
We have seen that there is a meaningful distinction between evaluability and accountability. I 
want briefly to discuss some important features of  the two concepts. The competence 
question—under what conditions is an individual the appropriate target of  participant 
reactive attitudes?—is distinct from the accountability question—under what conditions are 
we justified/warranted in targeting an individual with participant reactive attitudes for a 
particular (set of) belief(s)? As I suggested, an answer to the accountability question 
presupposes an answer to the competence question. We cannot meaningfully ask whether 
anyone is justified in, say, holding someone responsible for a belief  if  we have not at least 
tacitly settled whether responsibility ascriptions even apply to that individual. Consider an 
analogy to moral responsibility.21 One might argue that psychopaths are not accountable for 
their actions because they are unable to recognize and be moved by moral reasons. As such, 
                                                 
21 Fischer and Tognazzini, “Physiognomy” make a similar analogy but use it to illustrate how one might be 
subject to arateic attributability but not to reactive attributability. This distinction is not as important to the 




the kinds of  attitudes we typically direct at normal non-psychopathic individuals are 
inappropriate when directed at psychopaths. (To be sure, we remove the psychopath from 
society because she is dangerous. But this is a far cry from holding her responsible.) So the 
first important point to note is that accountability presupposes evaluability. To put the point 
differently, accountability judgments and attitudes are (partially) grounded in evaluability; a 
reactive attitude directed at an individual for a belief  they hold cannot be warranted unless 
such reactive attitudes are appropriate in general.  
 Next, there is a set of  distinctions that correspond to those implicated in the distinction 
between accountability and evaluability. Specifically, just as an individual might be 
responsible/irresponsible or responsible/non-responsible, an individual might be 
rational/irrational or rational/non-rational (a-rational). A young child is neither rational nor 
irrational: she is non-rational. More accurately, she is not yet rational since her lack of  
rationality is merely temporal unlike, say, a dog’s lack of  rationality. Assuming there is no 
severe form of  developmental impairment, young children become (at least minimally) 
rational creatures. Similarly, assuming there is no severe form of  developmental impairment, 
young children become competent believers and knowers. Whether the difference between 
accountability/evaluability and rationality/ (ir/a-)rationality is merely terminological or 
whether both sets of  distinctions refer to the same phenomena is not important for my 
purposes; pursuing that line of  inquiry would take us too far afield. It is enough to recognize 
that our practice of  evaluating others based on their beliefs presupposes we have met basic 
standards of  rationality or evaluability and this shows up in the ways we have modified terms 
to bring out subtle but substantial differences—the prefixes, ir, a-, non-, in-, and so on each 




responsibly just in case she meets some normative requirement on belief  or action, but 
whether she meets this presupposes that such requirements are apt.  
 Fourth, evaluability turns on features of  the subject apart from what they did and did 
not do. One way to think about this is that there must be something about the subject that 
makes her competent (perhaps she has measure of, or the right kind of, control over her 
belief  forming capacities or actions; perhaps she is responsive to reasons, perhaps she is 
aware of  the relevant norms, and so on). On the other hand, sometimes accountability turns 
on features of  the subject (e.g., when she has cultivated a certain kind of  character and it is 
the character that now renders her accountable), sometimes on something the subject did 
(e.g., deliberately ignored contradictory evidence), and sometimes on something the subject 
failed to do (e.g., weigh evidence appropriately, fact-check, consider the implications of  an 
action, etc.). Whether normative standards are apt is determined by features of  the agent, 
most notably whether the agent has the ability to meet those standards. But, whether she has 
met those standards is often determined using those capacities.22 Again, we tacitly settle the 
competence question in our actual practice of  evaluating individuals based on their 
manifestation or exercise of  capacities and abilities. 
 Finally, the issue of  accountability versus evaluability is fundamentally an issue of  
whether an individual is in the space of  reasons or whether a certain region within the space 
of  reasons is open to that individual. Non-competent individuals are non-responsible—non-
evaluable—because they fail to be in the space of  reasons, either locally or globally, 
temporarily or permanently. Accountability is a matter of  determining an individual’s 
                                                 
22 Difficulties arise in specifying the necessary capacities and in demarcating the possession versus the use of 
those capacities. What counts as using a capacity? Further, do we not think responsibility ascriptions 
appropriate in cases where the relevant capacity failed to function (the psychological equivalent of omissions)? 




“location” in the space of  reasons and evaluability is a matter of  determining whether an 
individual is in the (or a) space of  reasons at all.   
 These brief  remarks are meant to shore up the idea that there is a meaningful and useful 
distinction between accountability and evaluability. In the remainder of  this chapter I focus 
on just the notion of  epistemic evaluability—i.e., competence—and its importance. 
Specifically, in the remainder of  this section I clarify the meaning of  being subject to reactive 
attitudes. In the subsequent sections I indirectly home in on the concept of  competence by 
way of  a brief  discussion of  exemption and excuse. 
 
 
b. Epistemic reactive attitudes 
 
Openness to evaluation/being the appropriate target of  evaluation/being rationally 
accessible to attitudes are different ways of  saying that one has met the base conditions for 
epistemic competence according my characterization in §1.1. As such, to articulate and 
defend an account of  epistemic competence, I need to present a sufficiently clear idea of  
what it means to be open to evaluation. I shall have gone a long way towards that if  I first 
delineate the kinds of  evaluations to which a subject must be open. Following Strawson,23 I 
submit the evaluations that matter for competence are participant reactive attitudes. 
 The kinds of  evaluation(s) we are interested in when dealing with whether an individual 
is evaluable are the kinds that treat the subject as involved in her belief  formation; it is 
something about the subject herself  (and not just a system or process hosted in that subject) 
that explains why she believes thusly and also makes it appropriate to use those beliefs in an 
                                                 
23 Strawson, P.F. “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1-25 reprinted in 




evaluation of  her. They are not the kinds of  evaluations we use when we treat others merely 
as belief-forming systems—e.g., the kinds we use in determining whether a faculty or 
capacity is functioning properly, or the kinds we use when we attempt to understand how a 
particular (set of) process(es) work(s).  
 Strawson’s work on moral responsibility provides a helpful way of  thinking about the 
distinction between these two kinds of  evaluation as between objective and participant 
attitudes.24 When we treat others objectively, we treat them, “perhaps, as an object of  social 
policy; as a subject … to be managed or handled or cured or trained … though [we] may talk 
with [them], even negotiate with [them], [we] cannot reason with [them] … [we] can at most 
pretend … to reason”25 with them. There is a kind of  evaluation of  an individual or of  their 
beliefs that is objective in this way, but this is not the kind relevant to epistemic competence. 
To evaluate a subject in this way is to treat them as an object or a system that has beliefs as 
opposed to evaluating them in such a way as to treat them as a believer. When we treat a 
subject as a believer, by contrast, we see them as the locus of  evaluation; we treat the subject, 
and not the system, as an object of  approbation or disapprobation, praise or blame, etc. In 
this way, we treat the believer as participating in epistemic practices. And as participant, we 
treat them as capable of  recognizing norms, assessing their beliefs and belief-forming 
practices, and revising their beliefs and practices accordingly. It is evaluations of  these kinds 
an individual is open to when an individual is evaluable in the sense that implicates epistemic 
competence. Thus, in asking under what conditions is an individual epistemically competent, 
we are asking whether she is subject to the attitudes and judgments that treat her as a 
                                                 
24 See Strawson, P.F. “Freedom” for more on the distinction between participant reactive attitudes and 
objective reactive attitudes. I am interested in a more general sense of assessment of which reactive attitudes 
are but one part.  Some of the attitudes we have towards others’ beliefs are similar to or identical with what 
Strawson has in mind, e.g., my resentment at your belief that I am untrustworthy. But, there are other attitudes 
and judgments we deploy in our responsibility ascriptions in the doxastic realm, e.g., whether your belief is 
proportioned to the evidence, whether it is true, whether it is rational, etc. 




member (either sufficiently or fully) of  the epistemic community. Let us call such evaluations 
and judgments epistemic reactive attitudes. 
 The kinds of  evaluations that imply epistemic competence are the kinds involved in 
being the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes, the kinds that imply an individual 
is not exempt from epistemic evaluation. And, the kind of  evaluability relevant to epistemic 
competence is reactive or participant evaluability. (On a related note, epistemic competence 
likewise implies openness to questions and challenges. In particular, epistemically competent 
subjects can reasonably be expected to answer, “how do you know?” and “why do you think 
that?” kinds of  questions.)26 When an individual fails to be open to reactive attitudes, then 





1.2. Exemption and Excuse 
The notion of  competence might further be elucidated indirectly by thinking about 
exemption and excuse. Excusing conditions “cancel or qualify the appearance of  
noncompliance with the basic demand,”27 and exempting conditions “show that the agent, 
temporarily or permanently, globally or locally, is appropriately exempted from the basic 
demand in the first place.”28 An individual can be exempt in different ways, including by 
being noncompetent. So we can indirectly get at competence by carving off  the ways an 
individual can be exempt from evaluation apart from failing to be subject to epistemic 
                                                 
26 See Williams, Problems of Knowledge, Ch. 13. 
27 Watson, “ Limits of Evil,” 122. 




reactive attitudes, in general. Most obviously, an individual is exempt if  she does not believe 
what she is accused of  believing. If  I overhear someone saying hateful, racist things, but then 
find out she is just practicing for an audition later that day, any judgments or attitudes I 
directed at her for being racist miss the mark. She does not believe what I thought she did 
and so is exempt.29  
 A different way in which a subject may be exempt from evaluation arises when there is 
merely a causal connection between the belief  and the person. In this case, it is doubtful 
whether the person has a belief  at all, as opposed to a mere response to a stimulus; a 
doxastic analog to a knee-jerk reflex. But suppose there are beliefs that are merely causal, 
whatever else these are, they are surely not the kinds of  beliefs we are interested in when we 
evaluate someone based on their belief(s). At best, these kinds of  beliefs help us determine 
if  a cognitive system is functioning properly. For example, being able to read the bottom line 
of  random letters at the optometrist, or being able to distinguish a “d” from a “b”, and so 
on. The point is that these kinds of  evaluations are not directed at the person, but rather at 
various systems or faculties hosted in the person. 
 Strawson famously suggested several other examples of  exempting conditions: being 
psychotic, sociopathic, a child, under great strain, hypnotized, or being unfortunate in 
formative circumstances.30 In each of  these examples, the actions or beliefs of  the individual 
do not result from the individual’s agency (either moral or epistemic). In the first three, the 
individual lacks moral agency (and epistemic agency in the case of  the child). Since 
psychopaths and sociopaths cannot be motivated by moral reasons, their actions are not the 
                                                 
29 I might either absolve her rather than treat her as exempt or I might also evaluate her based on her action, 
viz. uttering racist things. It is one thing to believe X and another to assert it. Here, my judgment misses the 
mark not because she is exempt—she did really utter those things—but because she is excused. The racist 
terms were not directed at anybody. 




result of  moral decision-making. But, being subject to moral evaluation requires (at least) 
that one has the capacity to be moved by moral considerations. Hence, they lack moral 
agency and are therefore not subject to relevant reactive attitudes. The final three examples 
suggest circumstances that undermine one’s agency in important ways. If  a person does 
(believes) something due to being hypnotized, her action (belief) is not the result of  her 
acting for reasons (or recognizing reasons that justify her belief), but instead the result of  the 
hypnosis. When asking whether an individual is responsible in the sense that implies 
competence in epistemic matters we are not asking whether they actually have the belief  (as 
in the actor running racist lines) and we are not asking whether there is a belief—or perhaps, 
a belief-like state31—in them (as in mere causal responsibility), rather we are asking whether 
in believing as they do they are open to epistemic evaluation.32  
 An essential feature of  what I am calling openness to appraisal or evaluation is that the 
subject must be rationally accessible to certain kinds of  attitudes33—that certain attitudes 
make sense or are reasonable when directed at that individual—in general. This becomes 
more apparent when we consider situations in which our attitudes toward the subject are 
affected by further information.34 In some such cases we exempt or excuse the subject from 
                                                 
31 I take it that sometimes when a subject actually has a belief they are open to assessment, but that epistemic 
subjects with belief-like states are not open to assessment. These might be mere thoughts or fancies, intuitions, 
etc. but they do not become beliefs until further conditions are met. For present purposes, we may say that a 
person has a belief just in case she has a propositional attitude caused by a cognitive faculty that she—in a 
sense to be articulated in chapter in five—owns. This recognition of her capacities makes the propositional 
attitude usable in an evaluation of her. 
32 See Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes;” Fischer and Ravizza, Perspectives, Ch 1; and Scanlon, Thomas. What 
We Owe to Each Other. (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 1998). 
33 Bennett, Jonathan. “Why Is Belief Involuntary?” Analysis 50, no. 2 (1990): 87–107; Fischer, J. M. My Way: 
Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Strawson, “Freedom”; Watson, G. 
“Two Faces of Responsibility.” Philosophical Topics 24, no. 2 (1996): 227–248. 
34 Some discussions of this idea are muddled by terminological differences. Bennet, “Why is Belief 
Involuntary?” speaks of accountability; Watson, “Two Faces” wants to distinguish attributability from 
accountability; Strawson, P., “Freedom” thinks of these matters in terms of what we actually do in practice. 
Watson, G. “Free Action and Free Will.” Mind 96, no. 382 (1987): 145–172, “Two Faces” and Fischer and 
Ravizza, Perspectives, want to keep central importance on the reactive attitudes, but allow for what responsibility 




those attitudes. Exempting conditions in some way undermine the subject’s agency, wholly or 
partially. To illustrate, let us return to the realm of  action.   
 
One night, Thea is out with her friends, she decides to drink some wine and drive 
home.  Her judgment is impaired and as a result, while driving under the influence, 
she is in a serious accident and the driver in the other car is seriously but not fatally 
injured. 
 
In reading this case, one is likely to have attitudes towards Thea: disgust and anger, for 
example. One is also likely to evaluate her in various ways: she was reckless, foolish, selfish, 
blameworthy, etc. But filling out the details of  the case changes those attitudes and 
evaluations. 
 
Thea has never done drugs or had more than a drink or two when she goes out with 
her friends precisely because she always wants full control of  her faculties. One 
night, she orders a single glass of  wine and proceeds to drink it over the course of  an 
hour over dinner. Unbeknownst to her, the drink is laced with a very powerful drug. 
As a result, Thea’s judgment is seriously impaired and she decides to drive home. 
Unfortunately, while driving under the influence she is in an accident and the driver 
in the other car is seriously but not fatally injured.   
 
In this case, Thea’s actions are not attributable to her. Our attitudes of  disgust and anger 
dissipate; we see Thea as victim and not as culprit. Notice that (i) Thea is an agent and (ii) 
not only is she not accountable for her actions after drinking the drug-laced wine, but also 
the actions fail even to be attributable to her. In being under the influence of  the drug, 
Thea’s agency is undermined. Put differently, we would not say Thea is excused from 
responsibility, rather, we would say she is exempt. (Or, perhaps we may say she is absolved.) 
Questions of  accountability cannot sensibly be raised when it is inappropriate to target a 
subject with various attitudes. The same would hold in the epistemic case as well.   
 Now in some cases, while we are not exempt from evaluation for our actions and/or 




actions and/or beliefs may be excused. The appearance of  responsibility and the subsequent 
attitudes and evaluations directed at us miss the mark not because those attitudes do not 
make sense—are not aptly attributed to us—but rather they miss the mark because of  
apparent (or even unapparent) mitigating or absolving factors; something else explains why 
we did what we did or believed what we believed.35 In some cases, it is not quite clear 
whether the person is excused or exempt since it is not clear whether factors merely mitigate 
or absolve or whether those factors undermine the general applicability of  reactive attitudes 
in the circumstances; our lack of  a purely objective perspective tends to result in situations 
that call for defeasible evaluations. I mention the possibility of  excusing conditions to 
contrast evaluability and accountability.  
 If  the question concerns whether there are mitigating factors that lessen or alter which 
attitudes and judgments we are warranted in having toward someone, then we are dealing 
with excuses. If, on the other hand, the question concerns whether the individual herself  is 
the appropriate target of  evaluation, then we are dealing with exemption. There is not 
necessarily a sharp dividing line; context will play a significant role. In the example of  Thea 
above, we might think she is excused because something (namely, the powerful drug) 
undermines her awareness of  what she does and therefore mitigates her responsibility. Or, 
we might think that she is absolved—i.e., fully excused—from any negative evaluations. But 
we might think that, in a deep way, Thea was not herself  when she drove and this is not due 
to conscious choice to undermine her ability to make good choices (i.e., not the result of  her 
choice to get drunk by consciously drinking a lot). Hence, Thea is exempt from 
responsibility attitudes and judgments. The upshot is, if  we are concerned whether a subject 
                                                 
35 See , John L. “A Plea for Excuses.” In Essays in Philosophical Psychology, (1964): 1–29.  Reprinted in Austin, J L. 
Philosophical Papers (3rd ed.), eds., J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 




is fully responsible—whether evaluations fully apply—we have already settled (at least tacitly) 
the competence question. There can be no accountability without competence. 
 I have suggested that being exempt from evaluation entails that those evaluations are 
inapt in one of  three main ways: (1) the subject did not do/believe what she is accused of,36 
(2) the action/belief  is merely causally connected to the subject, and (3) the subject is not the 
appropriate target of  evaluation, in general. The sense of  exemption of  interest to me is (3). 
Thus, understanding how and why individuals are exempt from evaluation in this way will 
provide answers as to how and why individuals can be open to appraisal.  
 To sum up all that has been said thus far, there are at least two senses of  responsibility 
that we might be interested in: one that implies basic normative competence and one that 
concerns whether and which particular kinds of  evaluation are warranted in particular 
cases.37 The former sets conditions the satisfaction of  which opens us up to particular 
evaluation. Insofar as we are interested in the evaluation of  others, we should be interested 
in this sense of  responsibility. This is one motivation for thinking about general normative 
competence, or, as in the present work, epistemic competence. There is another motivation 
for thinking about this sense of  responsibility intimated in the relationship between 
evaluability and accountability, and the interest in doxastic responsibility.  
  
                                                 
36 This is too simplistic. As I shall argue in chapter three, we are often evaluated based on beliefs that we do not 
have, but should or based on beliefs that we do have, but should not have even if we are unaware of it. These 
doxastic omissions and the aptness of evaluation based on them does not undermine the point I am making 
here, however. In the case of doxastic omissions there is normative failure that explains the appropriateness of 
evaluation. In the case of absent belief omissions that imply exemption, the failure is not in meeting relevant 
standards but rather in failure to believe simpliciter. 
37 One might suggest that these are not two senses of responsibility, but two questions that need to be 
answered to determine whether any particular reactive attitude is justified, and thus one is responsible (in one 
sense). However, I think we use responsibility in these two senses. For example, when a boss calls her 
employees together and asks, “who is responsible for the mess in the break room?” She is asking who the mess 
is attributable to. Only after that is settled, can questions about accountability sensibly be raised. Once the mess 
is attributable to Jerry, the boss can inquire whether Jerry has any excuse for making the mess. Thanks to Hilary 




1.3. The Importance of  the Competence Question 
We have seen that epistemic responsibility is a pervasive feature of  our lives.  Many 
philosophers have picked up on this and have closely tied it with the justification we have for 
our beliefs. Indeed, it is one of  the central contentions among internalist and externalist 
conceptions of  justification. Here is a representative sample of  the role of  responsibility 
according to prominent epistemologists: 
 
One way, then, of  reexpressing the locution 'p is more reasonable than q for S at t' is 
to say this: S is so situated at t that his intellectual requirement, his responsibility as an 
intellectual being, is better fulfilled by p than by q.38 
 
My contention here is that the idea of  avoiding … irresponsibility, of  being 
epistemically responsible in one's believings, is the core of  the notion of  epistemic 
justification.39 
 
S is justified in believing that p at t if  and only if  it is epistemically responsible of  (or 
permissible for) S to believe that p at t.40 
 
It is not surprising that we should be interested in epistemic responsibility. Epistemic 
responsibility is an important aspect of  rationality. It is important because our methods 
for forming beliefs go beyond the fixed cognitive equipment that animals are 
restricted to. Our beliefs can be made articulate and (we hope) improved. Trying to 
be epistemically responsible is the means to such improvement.41 
 
Responsibility is here tied up with doxastic justification, whether one is justified in believing a 
proposition that p. This sense of  responsibility is what I have called accountability and we 
have seen that accountability presupposes evaluability. In evaluating an epistemic agent for 
her belief  much is already settled: whether the agent is an appropriate target of  certain kinds 
                                                 
38 Chisholm, R. M. Theory of Knowledge. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1977): 14. 
39 Bonjour, L. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 8. 
40 Steup, M. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001): 135. 





of  attitudes or appraisals, whether (we think) what she believes is true or false and whether 
she has some justification for the belief. Evaluability revolves around being the kind of  thing 
that is or could be subject to epistemic reactive attitudes, while accountability revolves 
around the kind and degree to which one is warranted in holding an epistemic subject 
accountable for what she believes in a particular case. I have argued that to be accountable 
one must first be the appropriate target of  evaluation—one must be epistemically 
competent. General theoretical interest in epistemic accountability motivates an investigation 
into the preconditions of  that accountability. 
 We may wonder, though, why thinking about evaluability is in any way fruitful. After all, 
we are actually quite sophisticated in doling out accountability in everyday practices. To put 
the point a bit differently, even if  I am right in thinking that evaluability is presupposed in 
accountability, what reason do we have to present an account of  evaluability when we are 
already very good at determining whether reactive attitudes are appropriate (at least in 
practice)? Should we not simply focus on accountability and leave it at that level? And, do we 
not already have a good enough theory about evaluability, i.e., good enough to ground 
accountability judgments? Answers to these questions become clearer once we try to 
articulate some marks of  a pre-theoretic account of  evaluability. In doing so, I am merely 
attempting to bring out plausible features of  openness to evaluation. As we shall see, while 
these features are quite plausible, the difficulties they present entail a need for deeper 
theoretical explanation. I shall focus on responsibility ascriptions, but these remarks apply 
mutatis mutandis to other reactive attitudes as well.  
 When we hold someone accountable for an action (belief), we think of  them as being 
able to take responsibility—to be able to say or think of  themselves as responsible. Implied 




believing—though complications arise with cases of  culpable omissions—that they have a 
sufficient degree of  understanding concerning what they did (not) do (believe), and that 
perhaps that they made a choice that resulted in their action (belief). 
 There is a lot here that needs cleaning up. First, the idea of  taking responsibility as being 
able to say or think of  oneself  as responsible is ambiguous between actually saying or 
thinking of  oneself  thusly and it being appropriate to think of  oneself  thusly. The former 
implies that children, exempt from responsibility, might be responsible since they can say or 
think of  themselves as responsible. The latter begs the question since the appropriateness of  
responsibility ascriptions is the point at issue. Perhaps, what is meant is that when an 
individual thinks of  himself  as responsible he has a certain kind of  awareness. There are 
more or less vacuous ways of  understanding awareness.  Pretty obviously, a person must be 
aware of  themselves in some capacity to take responsibility, but it cannot be merely that they 
are aware of  themselves in general. Rather, it seems as if  someone must be aware (or, at 
least, capable of  being aware) of  relevant features of  the act or belief  that matters. This 
seems to be closer to what is needed. However, now the difficulty is understanding how 
awareness can play a role in culpable omissions. In speaking about the role of  awareness in 
responsibility for action, George Sher nicely captures the point: 
 
When an agent should, but does not, recognize that he is acting wrongly or 
foolishly—when he fails to respond to the beliefs or aspects of  his situation that 
constitute his evidence—his failure cannot by itself  render him responsible 
because it is a mere nonevent that involves no positive facts about him. This 
remains true even if  the resulting lack of  awareness causes him to fall below 
some applicable standard (my emphasis).42 
 
 What we need is some way of  connecting the agent with the failure to believe (act) that 
explains why she is responsible. For example, suppose Janet watches the documentary 
                                                 




Blackfish and due to her love of  Sea World is unable to view the film objectively. She is 
unmoved by the arguments of  the film but she thinks she is an impartial viewer. After 
watching the film, she begins to tell all her friends that the film is unbalanced, presents false 
information, and that Sea World would never do anything to lessen the quality of  life for its 
cetaceans. She has failed to meet relevant standards of  belief  formation, but is wholly 
unaware that she has. In this case, what grounds the responsibility judgment we may direct 
towards Janet is not her taking responsibility or her awareness. We need a way of  thinking 
about Janet’s epistemic responsibility that explains why she is at fault even if  she is unaware 
of  her failure to meet relevant standards. (The problem of  omissions notwithstanding, we 
must not overlook the fact that were Janet literally incapable of  recognizing the norms she 
violates—i.e., were those norms brought to her attention or perhaps were she to flout similar 
norms in a less emotionally charged situation she would still not recognize or be motivated 
by them—then she would not be the apt target of  responsibility ascriptions.) There is a 
tension between needing a general awareness of  norms and standards that govern action and 
belief  (acquisition), not to mention the understanding of  when and how those norms apply, 
and requiring awareness for each particular act (belief). An account of  evaluability must 
address this or the justification we have in ascribing responsibility in these cases is in 
jeopardy. 
 Another intuitive mark of  responsibility is that an individual must understand what they 
are doing (believing). Since understanding is dispositional, the issue of  culpable omissions 
does not affect the role of  understanding in responsibility. However, there is a question 
about the object of  understanding. When someone is responsible for, say, an action, what 
must they understand? Intuitively, if  someone does not understand the thing they are doing, 




who mistakenly shoots his mother with the gun he found in her purse arguably does not 
understand that he just shot his mother. At least, he does not sufficiently understand what he 
just did. However, it is not just the content of  the action that responsible individuals must 
understand, rather, an individual must understand more general norms. Recall Janet’s bias 
towards Sea World. If  Janet were wholly incapable of  recognizing the fact that bias is 
epistemically pernicious, she would be exempt from doxastic responsibility in those cases.   
 Understanding norms that govern belief  and action are preconditions for understanding 
how they apply in particular cases. So if  responsibility, in the accountability sense, 
presupposes that one understand norms and accountability presupposes evaluability, then it 
is likely that understanding norms is a part of  evaluability. The point is that investigation into 
epistemic competence has potential for illuminating nearby concepts of  theoretical interest. 
We have seen this with the discussion of  exemption in the previous section and the remarks 
on awareness in this section. The same reasoning applies to understanding norms and 
perhaps even norm recognition. 
 The final mark of  responsibility I want briefly to discuss in this section is choice. When 
someone is responsible we often think that they made a choice (or choices) that led to or 
brought about that action (belief). We often use choice language to excuse or exempt from 
accountability: “she couldn’t help it;” “If  it was up to me I would X, but I have no choice in 
the matter.” Phrases like these are quite common in our evaluations of  others. They signify a 
distancing between the individual and the act (belief). The thought seems to be that since I 
did not choose to act in this way, then this action cannot be mine. And, if  the action cannot 
be mine, then I am not evaluable based upon it.  
 The concept of  choice raises a problem for the unreflective way we ascribe 




also quite often hold people accountable for things they could not help doing (believing). 
What this suggests is that there are requirements—preconditions—on responsibility that 
must explain how, why, and when lack of  choice matters for warranted evaluation. Moreover, 
if  we can be responsible for things over which we lack choice, we must explain this as well. 
These final points along with each of  the marks of  responsibility discussed above bring to 
light two central themes of  responsibility: ownership and control. Since these concepts will 
feature more prominently in the rest of  this work, I want to take a little more time discussing 
them. 




1.4. Ownership and Control 
We have before us a concept that implies the appropriateness of  epistemic assessment, viz., 
reactive evaluability. I have argued that we ought to understand this as constituting epistemic 
competence and that presenting an account of  it is the central purpose of  this dissertation. 
The question, “under what conditions are we epistemically competent?” is answered by 
providing an account of  the conditions of  reactive evaluability. I have argued that this is 
interesting in its own right and that, given the general epistemological focus on responsibility, 
it ought to be of  serious interest to epistemologists, more generally. When we begin to 
examine our practice of  evaluating others based on their beliefs (actions), we start to see that 
the preconditions of  evaluation must explain how we can be assessed for beliefs we are 
unaware we should (not) have as well as how we can be assessed for beliefs over which we 




evaluation based on beliefs an individual is unaware she should have suggests that there is 
something about her that explains how we can be warranted in evaluating her. It suggests a 
kind of  relation or connection to the belief  (or lack thereof). Now, whatever explains this 
relation or connection must be something that the individual owns in such way that it 






Implicit in the idea that one is open to evaluation is the notion of  ownership. Some beliefs 
we have are in some sense alien to us; they do not fit in with the rest of  what we believe. 
Sometimes these alien beliefs come to us out of  the blue and sometimes these kinds of  
beliefs are uncovered. In the former case, some of  these beliefs are not (and in some cases, 
could not be) integrated with our other beliefs. In the latter case, we often modify or 
repudiate them. In modifying them, we come to own them; they become indicative of  our 
values, our intelligence (or ignorance), our goals, and abilities. It is only then that we open 
ourselves up to evaluation based on them.  
 It would make no sense (or at least be unjustifiably uncharitable) to evaluate someone 
based on an alien belief  that could not be integrated with one’s other beliefs. If  brainwashing 
causes Jerry to see a certain political figure as an enemy after a triggering phrase, we would 
not be warranted in holding Jerry accountable for that belief; it is not indicative of  him, his 
values, intelligence, goals, or abilities. Such beliefs are not connected or related to those who 




to the beliefs (or, in the case of  omissions, of  connecting the believer to the lack of  belief—
of  explaining why in failing to believe what they should they are nevertheless evaluable for 
that failure). Perhaps there is a sense of  ownership that could plausibly play that role. But, it 
is one thing to say that responsibility requires that our beliefs be ours, it is quite another to 
articulate what this means.  
 There are several questions that need to be addressed. What sense of  ownership is the 
right one? It is not just that someone owns a belief, but that she owns it in the right kind of  
way. Presumably, there is a sense in which the belief  about the political figure is Jerry’s belief. 
It is, after all, hosted in Jerry rather than Jerry’s friend Seth. But, in another sense, it is not 
Jerry’s belief  since it is not indicative of  his values, etc. So, what conditions do we need to 
meet in order to own a belief  or a set of  beliefs in the appropriate way? What is it that we 
own when we have fulfilled the ownership requirement for responsibility? Do we own 
discrete states or do we own the faculties and capacities that produce those states? Minimally, 
it seems that owning a belief  requires that one is or could be aware of  it, but this not 
sufficient. Recall bi-polar belief above. It seems that Thom is aware of  the belief, but yet 
not responsible for it. Plausibly, this is because in a sense relevant to responsibility it is not 
his belief; it is not indicative of  the beliefs he has and the values he holds in his non-manic 
states. So, in addition to being aware of  the belief  (or capable of  being aware of  it), 
something else must be true of  an individual to explain belief  ownership. There is much that 
needs to be filled out here and we shall come to it in due course,43 but for now let me make 
two brief  comments.  
 First, above I suggested that when alien beliefs are uncovered they become modified or 
get rejected. This also happens quite organically with a lot of  other beliefs that are not alien. 
                                                 
43 See chapter three for a discussion about awareness and chapter five for my account of ownership as 




For instance, we have a lot of  beliefs before we can justify, modify, or endorse them.44 Many 
beliefs, including beliefs by young children, have a default entitlement that may be challenged 
later,45 perhaps when we become competent knowers. In other words, we have very many 
beliefs before we are able to support them. The practice of  giving reasons in support of  our 
beliefs indicates our endorsement and ownership of  them. Note that giving reasons, revising, 
and endorsing beliefs requires some minimal understanding of  norms and standards. This 
suggests that ownership of  beliefs requires awareness and understanding of  norms that 
govern belief  formation. It further suggests that one has the ability to recognize those 
norms and assess the reasons for the belief  being questioned.    
 Second, we do not want our conditions to be so strict that almost no one meets them. 
So, the ownership condition for responsibility must not be understood as a conscious or 
reflective taking of  ownership. Instead, we should seek to understand ownership in terms of  
tacit commitments. In owning a belief, we are on display; our values, goals, intentions, etc., 
are reflected in the beliefs we own.46 Stating the ownership of  belief  this way, places me in 
the “attributionist”47 camp of  responsibility.48 According to the attributionist “the 
fundamental question of  responsibility [is] a question about the conditions of  … 
attributability, that is to say, the conditions under which something can be attributed to a 
                                                 
44 Lehrer’s Truetemp is a great example here. He finds himself with beliefs about the ambient temperature, but 
does not know why. These alien beliefs can later become endorsed by Truetemp if is checks them enough 
times to recognize that he is reliable in such beliefs. In doing so, his tempucomp becomes a cognitive ability 
that he can manifest. See Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge. 
45 See Williams, Problems, especially chapter 13 for discussion about default entitlements. 
46 This is true even if, as I indicated above, the best way to understand ownership of belief is derivative of 
belief-forming capacities. The capacities that we form and subsequently own are not simply the faculties of 
belief-formation (i.e., the biological subpersonal processes that all normally functioning human beings have), 
but also the capacities we develop because of our interests and commitments. For example, my dispositions to 
recall inane details of science fiction movies and shows form a capacity that tends to store such information. In 
debating with friends about the particulars of a film, my interests and values are on display in my ownership of 
that capacity manifest in my assertions and avowals. 
47 The terms “attributionism” and “volitionism” are from Levy, Neil. “Restoring Control.” 
48 To be clear, I am only suggesting an attributionist theory of responsibility and evaluability for belief. I remain 




person in the way that is required for it to be a basis for … appraisal of  that person.”49 We 
might think that evaluability as I have characterized it is not therefore a kind of  
responsibility, but is instead a precondition of  it. There is surely something to this idea, but I 
have argued that our uses of  “responsibility” implicate both the concept of  accountability 
and the concept of  evaluability.50 There is, however, a deep implication of  placing myself  in 
the attributionist camp. In so doing, I am placing myself  in opposition to a volitionist 
understanding of  responsibility.  According to the volitionist, “an agent is responsible for 
something (an act, omission, attitude, and so on) just in case that agent has—directly or 
indirectly—chosen that thing.”51 This brings us to another central theme of  responsibility 





There is an intuitive notion that responsibility requires control; we are responsible just in 
case it was up to us to do or not to do an act or to believe or not believe a proposition. More 
generally, we are evaluable just in case it was up to us to do or not to do an act or to believe 
or not believe a proposition. The thesis that we are evaluable for an act (or belief) only if  we 
have control over it is meant to satisfy the condition that our actions (or beliefs) are the 
result of  something we do.52 In the case of  belief, it is difficult to square this idea with the 
                                                 
49 See Smith, Angela M. “Responsibility for Attitudes.” Smith sets the question in terms of moral attributability, 
moral appraisal, and moral responsibility. Since my interests are in epistemic evaluability, I shall eschew the 
moral quality of attributability. While it is certainly true that in forming a belief that p we could be doing 
something subject to moral evaluation, we overwhelmingly form either morally neutral beliefs or we form 
beliefs in a morally neutral way. 
50 See fn. 39 
51 Levy, “Restoring Control,” 2. 
52 See Aristotle, Fischer, My Way, and Deep Control; Fischer and Ravizza, Perspectives, and Responsibility and Control: 




equally strong intuition that we do not have that kind of  control over our beliefs. We have 
before us three equally unpalatable options: (i) give up the intuition that evaluability for 
belief  requires control, (ii) give up the intuition that we do not have that kind of  control 
over our belief, or (iii) give an account of  control that satisfies both intuitions (or at least the 
motivations behind the intuitions).  
 If  one thinks of  reactive evaluability along volitionist lines, the only strategy available is 
to endorse (iii) and therefore reject (i) and (ii). Since the volitionist maintains that we are 
evaluable only for that which we choose, she is committed to a strong control condition. The 
volitionist might, however, defend the idea that we have a strong control over our beliefs but 
it is not like the control we have our actions. It is not at all clear how she would do this 
without begging the question, though. Perhaps then it is more plausible to remove the 
control condition on epistemic evaluability and reject volitionism. To do so, we would need 
fairly compelling arguments against control and also some account as to why we tend to 
think evaluability requires control in the first place. This is a tall order, indeed. It might be 
more fruitful to focus our attention on the notion of  control. But, it seems equally difficult 
to come up with a non-volitionist account of  control.  What does it mean to say that we 
have control over some act or belief  but that we did not voluntarily choose it?  
 On close reflection, there is much that we do not voluntarily control for those actions we 
think of  as voluntary. Consider all the chemicals released within various regions of  my brain 
as I type this, all of  the flexing and relaxing of  the muscles within my wrists and fingers, the 
signals sent from the motor cortex to the muscles themselves, and so on. In choosing to type 
the words I am these things are occurring, but I did not choose for them to occur; I chose to 
type specific words and as a result the under-the-surface events took place. Perhaps belief-




gaze, and to whom to listen, but once I do, subpersonal systems take over. How ought we to 
understand control (i.e., the kind of  control required for epistemic evaluability) in the light 
of  all of  the subpersonal processes going on in belief-formation? Further, might there be 
different control requirements for different kinds of  evaluability? Perhaps, understanding the 
role of  awareness and ownership in belief  formation is sufficient for evaluability, but 
accountability requires a kind of  volitional control. I return to these questions in chapters 






The question of  epistemic competence is a question about the aptness of  reactive attitudes. I 
have argued that to understand this we must home in on and clarify an account of  a kind of  
responsibility—evaluability—that is presupposed in our pervasive epistemic evaluations. I 
have also urged that the kind of  evaluability we are seeking to understand is the kind having 
to do with one’s participation in belief-formation; that is, the kind that treats the subject of  
evaluation as a believer as opposed to a system with belief  forming processes or that merely 
hosts beliefs. As we begin to think about what it means to be subject to epistemic reactive 
attitudes, three prima facie conditions emerge.  
 First, there must be something that explains the connection between the believer and the 
belief  (or between the believer and failure to believe, in the case of  omissions). Second, since 
we think that an individual who is utterly oblivious of  herself  as a believer is not subject to 




that satisfies the intuitions behind the need for awareness) must be met. Finally, there 
appears to be a control requirement for warranted evaluation(s) (or, again, something that 
would satisfy intuitions about the relation between evaluation and control). Since it is the 
purpose of  this work to present a theory of  evaluability, and thus competence, that meets 
the demands for these conditions, I must determine whether intuitions about epistemic 






















A natural starting place for an investigation into what underwrites epistemic evaluability is 
the notion of  control. Quick reflection on events wholly out of  our control53 reveals the 
absurdity of  being responsible for them. If  my daughter rolls over, falls out of  her bed, and 
begins wailing at 3:30 in the morning, it would be absurd for my wife to think me 
responsible. In the doxastic realm, reactive attitudes are inappropriate in many instances of  
automatically formed beliefs. For example, many relatively simple beliefs—e.g., sensory 
beliefs—are out of  our control and thus cannot be used in person-level evaluations.54 If  I 
am in good light and not too far from it, I cannot help but believe that the car is blue. In 
ordinary situations, this kind of  belief  cannot be used as a basis for evaluation of  me.55 
Examples such as this give us reason for thinking that responsibility and control are in some 
way related.56 Since my focus is on what underwrites epistemic evaluability, my aim in this 
chapter is to examine and reject the idea that such evaluability requires doxastic control.  
                                                 
53 By “out of our control” here, I mean those events that we could not intervene on. In other words, some 
events out of our control are such that we could do something or should have done something before them 
and since we did not our negligence explains our responsibility. Other events are out of our control in such a 
way that they do not trace back to anything we did (not) or should (not) have done. In this sense, I mean that 
when we reflect on events of this latter type, we can see a putative connection between control and 
responsibility. 
54 Complications arise because we do not, unless we are epistemologists or psychologists, typically report based 
sensory beliefs. The beliefs we use as a basis for evaluation are typically conceptually thick and therefore require 
the deployment of concepts with which we can be careless in our deployment. Moreover, there is the important 
distinction between belief and judgment; I may form the belief that p, but then not judge, or endorse, my belief 
that p. Interestingly enough, when I do form a belief reflection on which leads me to withhold judgment, I am 
being subject to new causal influences, viz., the reasons that lead me to withhold judgment. 
55 Though it might be used as a basis for evaluation of my eyesight. 
56 There is a long and detailed debate about the role of control in responsibility if determinism is true. 




 I argue that either we cannot exercise control over belief, whether direct or indirect, or 
that those cases where it might be possible to exercise such control are so narrow in scope as 
to be of  no help in underwriting epistemic reactive attitudes, in general. For example, 
consider for a moment the sheer amount of  beliefs we acquire on trust during our 
development. Given that so many beliefs are simply taken in without any explicit telling or 
instruction, and that these beliefs play a significant role in the background that makes 
possible our later beliefs and commitments, it would be impossible for any kind of  putative 
doxastic control to underwrite reactive evaluability. As Wittgenstein notes, we swallow down 
consequences with what we learn.57  
 A central part of  my argument is that there is an important, though often overlooked, 
distinction, brought to the fore by William Alston, between the ability to exercise control over 
our beliefs, whether direct or indirect, and the ability to exercise influence over our beliefs.58 
According to Alston, to exercise control over belief, either directly or indirectly, is to form a 
belief  that p—where my intention is specifically to believe that p. I decide that I want to 
believe that p, then I do believe that p—either directly merely by willing to believe that p, or 
indirectly by doing things that make my belief  that p come about. The point is that 
controlling belief  is effectively voluntarily believing (a) specific proposition(s). Likewise, it is 
also to exercise effective voluntary control over believing that not-p, and withholding belief, 
i.e., not believing that p and not believing that not-p.59  By contrast, I exercise influence over 
                                                                                                                                                 
to say here. Some wish to maintain that there are kinds of control we exert over our actions even if we are 
determined to do so––even if we ultimately had no choice over doing them. Others argue that genuine 
control––the kind that would underwrite responsibility––is possible only if determinism is false. I have no wish 
to settle this issue here, or for that matter, even chime in. 
57 Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty. Anscombe and Wright (eds.) (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1975): §141-44. 
58 Alston, W. P. “Deontological Conception of Justification,” Tomberlin, J.E. (ed) Philosophical Perspectives, 2 
(1988). Reprinted in Alston, W. P. Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, Cornell University Press: 
Cornell, NY. (1989); and especially chapter four of his, Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, 
Cornell University Press: Cornell, NY. (2005). 




belief  just in case I can directly or indirectly affect how I believe. In other words, when I 
exercise influence over belief  my intention is not specifically to believe that p, but to, e.g., 
believe what is true, avoid what is false, be careful in my thinking, and so on. In doing these 
things I may end up believing that p, but my intention is not specifically to believe that p.60 
Restated, my central aim in this chapter is to argue that control over belief  is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for epistemic competence. However, our examination of  doxastic control 
provides insight into doxastic influence and how it plays a role in epistemic competence.  
 The phrases, “deciding to believe” and “intending to believe” conjure the idea of  conscious 
choice. It would be a mistake to think that all intentional choice is conscious. In intending to 
walk across the quad, I exercise control over my steps though I am not, typically, consciously 
choosing where to place my feet. Part of  my argument in this chapter will revolve around the 
idea that the ability to control something comes apart from being aware of  what we control. 
Even if  we are typically consciously aware of  what we are doing when we exercise control 
over something, it is possible either to exercise control without awareness or to be aware of  
something we cannot control. That control and awareness come apart suggests we should 
attempt, as much as possible, to examine the nature of  doxastic control abstracted away 
                                                 
60 The paradigmatic example of a doxastic voluntarist is Descartes. At times Descartes appears to be a direct 
doxastic voluntarist who thinks we can will to refrain from believing things. Indeed, by the end of the first 
meditation, he refrains from believing anything about the external world. At times, he appears to be an indirect 
voluntarist. It is not a direct willingness to refrain from believing anything about the external world, but rather a 
recognition that unless he can rule out the possibility he is being deceived he cannot believe anything about the 
external world. But, even Descartes own views are at best doxastic influence.  
 One might argue that Descartes has no claim whatsoever on willing to believe, his claims are about judgment 
and knowledge; he doesn’t know anything about the external world. He cannot rule out the possibility he is being 
deceived, so he cannot judge there is an external world. Even here, he does not exercise control over his belief 
or knowledge. To see why we need only consider the criterion of certainty: clear and distinct perception. If we 
have a clear and distinct perception, (a) we cannot be wrong, and (b) we cannot refrain from believing it. The 
evidence of the clear and distinct perception is unequivocally compelling; we have no choice but to believe, 
judge, and know what we clearly and distinctly perceive. Moreover, whatever “control” we exercise merely 
influences what we will eventually believe on the compelling force of clear and distinct perception. 
 Recent proponents of doxastic control include John McDowell and Christine Korsgaard. Both take as a 
starting point that responsibility requires control. See Owens short discussions of McDowell and Korsgaard in 




from conscious awareness. I shall proceed in this way, and return to conscious awareness in 
the next chapter. 
 On some interpretations, a person exercises control over her beliefs if  and only if  she 
can directly form a belief  that p. On other interpretations, a person exercises control over 
her beliefs if  and only if  she can directly control some action(s) or event(s) that bring(s) 
about those beliefs—thus, indirectly controlling her beliefs. Advocates of  either direct or 
indirect doxastic voluntarism share a common idea that responsibility for belief  requires 
some nontrivial control over belief  and belief  formation.61 The reasoning that leads one to 
tie responsibility to voluntary control would likewise lead one to think that evaluability is tied 
to voluntary control; accordingly, we can be evaluated based on our beliefs only if  we have 
sufficient voluntary control over them.  
 We can approach this issue in two different directions. According to the first, we begin 
by thinking through our practice of  evaluating individuals who are competent, examine 
which features are necessary for those evaluations to be warranted—i.e., for those 
individuals to be accountable—and then work backwards to whether those conditions are 
necessary for evaluability. For example, we examine what conditions are required for us to be 
warranted in our ascribing carelessness to Don’s belief  that President Obama tapped his 
wires, and then work backwards. According to the second approach, we begin with those 
exempt from evaluation and seek to discover what conditions they must meet to be 
evaluable—to, so to say, get into the game of  evaluation. The benefit of  the first approach 
lies in the idea that less general concepts inherit the features of  their more general parent 
                                                 
61 Moreover, this commonly held idea appears to be motivated by a commitment to "ought implies can." To 
say that S ought to believe that p is to maintain that it is within S's ability (not) to believe that p. The corollary 
of this is that if there are forces, powers, processes, etc. that cause S to believe that p outside of S's control, 





concepts. If  the less general concept does not require a certain feature, then the more 
general concept cannot require it either.  So, if  it can be shown that control is not required 
for warranted evaluation—the less general concept—then it cannot be necessary for 
evaluability—the more general concept.62 For example, if  it can be shown that Don can be 
careless in his belief  even if  he lacks control over it, then control cannot be required for 
Don to be evaluable in general. The benefit of  the second approach lies in the ability to 
isolate or reject sufficient conditions. For example, if  it can be shown that individuals we 
treat as exempt satisfy that condition, then that condition cannot be sufficient. I shall take 
both approaches in the following discussion. 
In §§2.2 and 2.3, I examine robust forms of  direct and indirect doxastic control and 
argue they cannot underwrite evaluability. In the final sections, I discuss whether we should 
think of  doxastic control as a kind of  ability to monitor our beliefs and belief-acquisitions or 
instead as an ability to influence our beliefs. This final idea points us in the right direction by 
focusing the discussion of  the nature of  competence on deep features of  epistemic subjects. 
Throughout, the idea that doxastic control requires conscious awareness is a recurring 








                                                 




2.1. Clarifications and Potential Misunderstandings 
 
Before turning to examine what role, if  any, control over our beliefs has in an account of  
epistemic competence, we should clarify a few things that could lead to potential 
misunderstandings: the nature of  voluntary belief; the object of  evaluation (roughly, whether 
the subject is being evaluated based on acquiring or maintaining a belief); the kinds of  beliefs 
based on which a subject can be evaluated; and, my methodology regarding cases of  
intentional belief. 
 It seems intuitive that we cannot exercise voluntary control over our beliefs; I simply 
cannot help believing some things and, as Alston notes, even with great incentive I “cannot 
switch propositional attitudes … just by deciding to.”63 This is not as clear as it might be. To 
see this, we need to make two sets of  distinctions: willing oneself  to believe vs. bringing 
oneself  to believe and basic vs. nonbasic action. Roughly, to will oneself  to believe is to be 
to be able to believe anything for any reason or for no reason at all, while bringing oneself  to 
believe is to be able to do things that result in believing. The difference between basic and 
nonbasic actions is straightforward as well.64 A basic action is one whose execution does not 
require prior actions or one that is unanalyzable into other separate actions. So, whether this 
means that a basic action is a kind of  primitive volition or trying,65 or caused by a belief  or a 
                                                 
63 Alston, "Deontological Conception," 122. Interestingly enough, spelling out what having voluntary control 
over belief amounts to has not been very clear. For example, in Williams, Bernard. “Deciding to Believe,” in 
Williams, B. Problems of the Self. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), we find that to believe 
something merely by deciding to is to “believe something just like that.” But, he goes on to argue that this is 
not a contingent fact about our physiology or psychology as our inability to blush just like that is, but a 
conceptual truth about what believing is. To cash the idea out this way is to leave things quite vague. For I can 
bring it about just like that that I believe many things. To illustrate, I can bring it about just like that that I 
believe that my coat is on the rack by simply looking at the rack. So, voluntarily believing something is not just 
the ability to bring it about that I believe it, but do so in a certain way. Alston’s idea is closer to the point. 
64 Though there is controversy over this, the use I will make of the distinction should not turn on how that 
controversy is settled. 
65 Non-reductionist accounts of basic action maintain that basic actions are tryings or willings. Meylan, Anne. 




desire,66 what sets apart basic from nonbasic actions is that what initiates a basic action does 
not require a prior action.  
 Whatever having voluntary control over belief  would have to amount to we must be 
clear that we are not passing off  bringing ourselves to believe in a basic way as voluntarily 
willing ourselves to believe.67 So, “when we ask why we cannot believe at will, we are not 
simply asking whether the voluntary, non-basic action of  bringing yourself  to believe could 
become a basic one … we are, rather, asking why believing is not like either raising your right 
hand (a basic action) or making soup (a nonbasic action).”68 To have control over our beliefs, 
then, is to be able to believe in this way. However, even this kind of  voluntary control might 
be exercised directly or indirectly—basically or non-basically. I directly voluntarily raise my 
arm when I choose to, but only indirectly voluntarily make soup. Below, I examine whether 
any kind of  voluntary control over belief—whether direct or indirect—is what underwrites 
epistemic reactive attitudes. For now, it is enough that we become clearer on what voluntary 
control of  belief  amounts to and to distinguish it from nearby concepts. 
Related to this is the question of  what it means to exercise control over something. I 
exercise control over: the movements of  my fingers to type these words; avatars on video 
games; whether to reflect on my evidence for a belief. To control something is to have the 
ability to exercise control over it if  I want to. These examples have in common the 
                                                                                                                                                 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of basic action; Danto (1965) and Moya (1990) defend non-
reductionism about basic actions. See also O’brien (2014: chapters 2-3) for an extended discussion of various 
stripes of reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of intentional action. 
66 Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy 60, no. 23 (1963): 685–700 is the 
locus classicus of reductionist accounts of intentional action. 
67 Heironymi (2008) argues this is precisely what Bennet’s (1990) famous case of the Credamites does. In 
response to Williams’ (1973) claim that if we had the ability to believe at will we would know that we do and 
hence would know that we could form beliefs while remaining wholly indifferent to their truth value (which 
violates an essential feature of beliefs), Bennet presents a case that purports to show that believing at will is 
possible. However, Hieronymi argues that Bennet merely shows that the Credamites only have the ability to 
bring themselves to believe as a basic action. See Hieronymi, P. “Responsibility for Believing.” Synthese 161, no. 
3 (2008): 357–373; Bennet, “Involuntary;” and Williams, “Deciding.” 




formation of  an intention to do something and a subsequent (or what sometimes seems 
simultaneous) execution of  that intention.69 I intend to type the words in this way and guide 
my hands and fingers accordingly; I intend for my avatar to go left on the screen and so 
manipulate the control stick on the gamepad so that the avatar does so; I intend to think 
about my evidence for a belief  and then recall, focus, and attend to that evidence. So we 
might put the issue of  control over belief  in terms of  answers to two questions: 
 
 
(1) Can we intend to believe that p? 
 
(2) Can we execute an intention to believe that p such that our execution is causally      
  responsible for the formation of  the belief ?70 
 
 
A positive answer to (1) does not entail a positive answer to (2). Even if  I could intend 
to believe some particular proposition, I may nevertheless be powerless to execute it. To 
maintain that we can voluntarily control our beliefs is to maintain that we can intend 
specifically to believe that p and effectively execute that intention. Now, for this to do the 
work it needs to do in explaining what underwrites epistemic evaluability, we must be able to 
effectively voluntarily execute an intention to believe in a wide range of  cases, for a wide rage 
of  types of  beliefs. We must be able to effectively execute an intention to believe for any 
beliefs for which we can be evaluated. Or, at the least, those beliefs for which we can be 
evaluated must be traceable back to beliefs we have effectively executed an intention to have. 
                                                 
69 One might object that we can control something but not exercise control over it because we choose not to. 
In which case, forming an intention would be sufficient but not necessary. I am inclined to think that having 
control over X, requires the ability to exercise control over X. Now, one does not exercise control over 
something without forming an intention to do so. Hence, having control over X requires that one form an 
intention to X. Thanks to Hilary Bok for raising this issue about occurrent vs. dispositional control. 
70 See Heironymi, P. “Controlling Attitudes.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 1 (2006): 45–74 and 
Buckareff “Deciding to Believe Redux” in Matheson, Vitz (eds.) The Ethics of Belief. Oxford University Press: 




Contrasted with the ability to exercise control over belief  is the ability to influence what 
we believe. To exercise influence over (a) belief  is to be able to do things which are part of  
the “causal ancestry” of  my belief  such that were those things not part of  the causal 
ancestry of  my belief, I would have had a different belief.71 According to Alston, such things 
that comprise part of  the causal ancestry of  my belief  come in “two groups: (a) activities 
that bring influence to bear, or withhold influences from, a particular candidate, or field of  
candidates for belief, and (b) activities that affect our general belief-forming habits or 
tendencies.”72 In the first general group of  influences we find activities such as choosing 
where to direct our attention and for how long, seeking out new evidence, reflecting on a 
particular argument, and so on. In the second general group of  influences we find activities 
such as training ourselves to recognize good arguments, forming the habit of  withholding 
assent until we have sufficiently considered relevant alternatives, caring about being accurate, 
and so on.73 It is undeniable that we do have the ability to exercise control over these aspects 
of  our epistemic endeavors, but this is not to exercise control over belief. In this way, we 
affect what we believe by exercising control over how we believe.  
 A second source of  potential misunderstanding is the object of  evaluation. When we 
evaluate a believing subject for a belief  that p are we evaluating them for maintaining or 
acquiring the belief ? Problems arise that suggest the division is not that clean cut. Recall 
Walter from lunar landing in chapter one. Suppose years have passed and Walter still 
believes the moon landing was faked and has never done anything to support this doubt 
beyond the initial viewing of  the conspiracy documentary. We might evaluate Walter on the 
basis of  failing to, as it were, do his due diligence in keeping the belief, but we might equally 
                                                 
71 See Alston Beyond “Justification,” 74-5. 





evaluate him on having a belief  that he formed in such a careless way, or we might combine 
the two by suggesting that people have some obligations concerning good and bad ways to 
form beliefs and that forming beliefs in ways that violate those obligations is problematic.74 
The evaluation is targeted at Walter for having a belief  he ought not to have because of  the 
way he formed it years ago.75 The point is that these objects of  evaluation overlap; we often 
evaluate individuals for holding particular beliefs and for the ways they formed the beliefs. 
The two are not neatly divided.  
Since our interest is in the grounds of  evaluability in general, allow me to pause to see if  
the same overlap occurs. Are there different conditions on epistemic competence vis-a-vis 
holding beliefs or forming beliefs? It seems not. Evaluability applies across the board from 
belief  acquisition, to belief  maintenance, to simply holding a belief. I shall assume this is 
right and that general epistemic competence applies to all the various ways we evaluate 
individuals based on their beliefs.  
Finally, we should consider what kinds of  beliefs cause the various reactive attitudes to 
which the epistemically competent are susceptible. On the one hand, there are beliefs that 
individuals form which appear to require a sufficient amount of  sophisticated understanding 
or justification such as the belief  that humans are causing global warming. We evaluate 
                                                 
74 The last point about obligations to know which ways of forming or maintaining beliefs is not quite so clear. 
Either those obligations are so specific as to set the standard too high for almost everybody or they are too 
general to be helpful. Since, we are here talking about accountability rather than attributability, the issue is less 
clear.  
 If we assume that the relevant epistemic obligations apply after one has met the base requirements for 
competence, then those obligations cannot be part of competence. However, if we instead think that these 
obligations are just (part of) what it means to be competent, then we still need to account for how they apply. 
Either we must be aware of them or not. If we must be aware of them, then control is at best only part of what 
it means to be competent. If we need not be aware of them, then they must apply to us in virtue of other 
features. The argument in this chapter entails that it is not in virtue of control that such norms apply and in the 
next chapter I argue that it is not in virtue of merely being aware of the norms. We shall return to these points 
in chapters five and six. 
75 This applies to many memory beliefs. We might have a belief that given our background knowledge today it 
would be responsible to have, but upon learning how we formed that belief we would consider the subject to 




believing subjects based on these types of  beliefs quite often. Because missteps are possible 
at many junctures with these kinds of  beliefs, it is possible to see where one goes wrong and 
why. As such, we often create explanations—and even excuses—attempting76 to identify 
where one has gone wrong or how one has cottoned on to the truth. It is worth noting that 
our reactive attitudes and evaluations are not limited to whether one believes accurately or 
not. More often, we evaluate believing subjects based on why they believe as they do and not 
simply on what they believe. On the other hand, there are beliefs that are comparably 
unsophisticated, such as simple perceptual beliefs. It can be tempting to think that we are not 
evaluated based on simple perceptual beliefs, but this is a mistake.  
Even simple perceptual beliefs are fairly sophisticated, requiring the deployment of  
concepts and cognitive abilities. If  I pass myself  off  as having seen something, I thereby 
open myself  up to challenges and questions concerning it. This is true of  rather important 
things like claiming to see a friend’s spouse intimately kissing a stranger, and of  mundane 
things like where my daughter’s socks are when we are trying to get her ready. Now, if  we 
mean by simple perception seeing that the object before me is red or square, then it seems 
we are less prone to participant reactive attitudes. But this, too, is mistaken. The context of  
the belief  and the evaluation plays a large role. If  the signal for an assassin is a red square 
hanging on the balcony and he claims to have seen an orange rectangle, the assassin opens 
himself  up to challenges and questioning about his perceptual beliefs. Put differently, the 
assassin opens himself  up to epistemic evaluation. Likewise, if  I am colorblind and my 
experience of  red things is as of  green things, then I need to be careful about reporting 
seeing red things.    
                                                 
76 See Austin, “Plea,” for discussion on an analogous treatment of missteps in actions by understanding the 




 It is primarily for these reasons that giving a taxonomy or even a general sketch of  the 
kinds of  beliefs we are evaluated based on is problematic. The account I articulate in chapter 
five has the resources to explain why we are sometimes subject to epistemic evaluation for 
more or less sophisticated beliefs and sometimes not. To foreshadow, epistemic competence 
is a kind of  knowledge-how, a set of  cognitive abilities that we exercise or manifest to form 
beliefs. But before I can present this view, we need to explain why neither control (this 
chapter) nor awareness (chapter three) is necessary for epistemic competence. 
 There is one final source of  potential misunderstanding concerning my argument that I 
would like to preemptively address. To show that doxastic control is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for epistemic evaluability, I shall attempt to provide examples where individuals 
form an intention, specifically, to believe a particular proposition. More precisely, in my 
examples, the individuals consciously form an intention, specifically to believe a particular 
proposition. I recognize this is quite peculiar since we do not often (perhaps ever) 
consciously form intentions to believe things. More plausible is the idea that we 
subconsciously form an intention to believe something due to bias, fear, hate, wishful 
thinking, etc. Further, we probably extremely rarely even do this subconsciously. It is more 
likely that we do not form an intention to believe something, but that we want something to 
be true, and therefore “try” to make it true.  I do not set out to believe something I don’t 
think is true; I set out to confirm something that I “think” or hope is true. Consider the 
difference between the father who goes to the hypnotist and asks to be induced to believe 
that his son is not a murderer as opposed to that same father whose love for his son causes 
him to be blind to the evidence against his son. The former is quite odd because he wants to 
have the belief  regardless of  whether it is true whereas the latter wants to form the belief  as 




He does not just want to believe that his son is innocent; he wants his son to actually be 
innocent.77  
 If  this is a more accurate description of  how we intend, specifically, to believe particular 
propositions, why then do I employ examples where the individuals consciously form an 
intention? Quite simply I am trying to give my opponents the best possible case for their 
view. If  we cannot exercise doxastic control, either directly or indirectly, over our conscious 
intentions, specifically, to believe particular propositions, then what reason do we have for 
thinking that we can do so over subconscious intentions? More to the point, if  consciously 
intended beliefs could not underwrite reactive attributability, then how could subconsciously 





2.2. Direct Doxastic Voluntarism and Competence 
 
 I take as a starting point that we can be evaluated for many of  our beliefs. As I have 
suggested, my aim in this work is to understand and explain what underwrites our actual 
practice of  targeting individuals with reactive evaluations. As such, if  a given feature is 
thought to be a part of  that explanation and it turns out we do not have that feature, that 
will show evaluability does not require it; our practice of  evaluating people for their beliefs 
and treating others as evaluable is on much firmer footing than any antecedent theoretical 
                                                 
77 This is similar to Williams’, “Deciding,” famous argument against doxastic voluntarism based on the idea that 
the aim of belief is truth. The hypnotist example highlights the peculiarity of wanting to believe something 




condition we might place on that practice. Given this methodological assumption, the 
strategy of  this section is to show that we do not have the kind of  direct voluntary control 
over belief  that could play the role it would have to in an account of  epistemic competence. 
Hence, direct voluntary control over belief  can be neither necessary nor sufficient to ground 
epistemic reactive attitudes. 
 There is overwhelming agreement by both philosophers and psychologists that we 
cannot form beliefs at will. Some maintain exercising direct voluntary control over our 
beliefs is a conceptual impossibility.78 Others argue it is merely a contingent fact we lack such 
control.79 The small minority who do argue for direct doxastic voluntary control maintain 
that our ability to form beliefs at will is limited in scope; the types of  situations in which we 
can believe at will contain idiosyncratic features not present in most our other belief  
(acquisitions). In this section, I will briefly dispel the idea that our epistemic competence is 
constituted by direct voluntary control over belief.80  
 According to direct doxastic voluntarism, we have direct voluntary control over belief  if  
and only if  we can execute an effective intention to believe p or not-p merely by deciding to 
do so. To have this kind of  control over belief  is to have a power or ability wholly insensitive 
to the evidence, reasons, and causal processes of  belief-formation; it is to maintain that once 
all the typical causal factors of  belief  are in we can, by an act of  will, believe what we want 
to believe81—we have a kind of  strong control over what we believe (for at least some of  our 
beliefs). Hence, direct doxastic voluntarism might also be called strong doxastic voluntarism. 
                                                 
78 Williams, “Deciding;” Hieronymi, “Controlling,” “Responsibility,” “Two Kinds,” and “Believing at Will.” 
Belief and Agency. (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011): 149–187. 
79 Alston, “Deontological,” §III & IV; Beyond “Justification,’ §ii & iii. 
80 This is not to say that control plays no role, however. Ultimately, I shall argue that knowing how to know— 
understood as having certain kinds of cognitive abilities—constitutes competence. Further, exercising those 
abilities requires a kind of control. But, as we shall see in chapter 5 and 6, it is quite different from what 
philosophers ordinarily take our voluntary (whether direct or indirect) control over belief to be. 
81 See Alston, Beyond ‘Justification,’ Ch 4 and Feldman, Richard. “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation.” in 




To defend this kind of  control as constitutive of  epistemic competence one would have to 
establish the Strong Control Condition: 
 
Strong Control Condition: S is an appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes 
for a belief  that p iff  S can exercise direct voluntary control over whether she 
believes that p.82  
 
Although there are both phenomenological and theoretical reasons for thinking we 
simply do not have this ability to control our beliefs, it is not necessary to argue directly 
against strong doxastic voluntarism to undermine the strong control condition. Rather, it is 
sufficient to show that not all the beliefs for which we can be evaluated are beliefs we can 
exercise strong control over. (Either that, or the beliefs for which we can be evaluated do not 
trace back to those over which we can exercise such control. However, this amounts to 
indirect doxastic voluntarism, the subject of  §2.3.) Consider two of  the strongest kinds of  
direct voluntary belief: (i) staked beliefs and (ii) world-state-tracking beliefs.  
 
 
a. Staked beliefs 
 
Ginet presents cases where the believing subject is not sure what to believe, but after 
deliberating decides to count on it being the case.83 For example: 
 
                                                 
82 There is a corresponding strong control condition concerning the more restricted or narrow notion of actual 
appraisals, i.e., those that implicate accountability: 
 
Restricted Strong Control Condition: S is the warranted target of epistemic reactive attitudes, in 
principle or in fact, for a belief that p iff S can exercise direct voluntary control over whether she 
believes that p. 
 
The broad and narrow parallel here reflects the broad and narrow parallel presented in Section 1.2 between 
accountability and attributability. We are concerned with what makes a believing subject the appropriate target 
of evaluations and appraisals as opposed to whether we are justified in the evaluation or appraisal so directed. 




We have started on a trip by car, and 50 miles from home my wife asks me if  I 
locked the front door. I seem to remember that I did, but I don't have a clear, 
detailed confident memory impression of  locking that door (and I am aware that my 
unclear, unconfident memory impressions have sometimes been mistaken). But given 
the great inconvenience of  turning back to make sure and the undesirability of  
worrying about it while continuing on, I decide to continue on and believe that I did 
lock it.84 
 
In this case, I have counted on it being the case that I locked the door, p, and therefore 
have "adopted a dismissive or complacent attitude toward the possibility of  losing what [I 
have] staked on p because of  its turning out that not-p."85 In other words, because I have 
something at stake, namely the great inconvenience and worry, I decide to believe the 
proposition that does not inconvenience or worry me even though I have reasons to believe 
either p or not-p.  
It is doubtful that cases of  staked beliefs like these are genuine cases of  believing the 
proposition. Instead they appear to be merely acting as if the proposition is true.86 But, even if  
they were genuine cases of  deciding to believe, would that show us we have the kind of  
control over our beliefs that underwrites epistemic evaluation? Not likely. These cases are 
rare enough that if  the control involved in them is constitutive of  epistemic competence it 
would leave evaluation and evaluability for beliefs lacking such control wholly unexplained. 
Because I can choose a belief  over another where both are equally supported, it does not 
follow that I have the ability to choose a belief  where the evidence for it is overwhelming or 
underwhelming.  
 Consider the following kinds of  beliefs. In some cases, I may decide to believe that I saw 
something even though I was not wholly convinced. But, how could my decisions in the 
abnormal case explain the normal case? I take it that to do so, one would have to argue that 
                                                 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, 65. 




even though I do not decide in the normal case, the abnormal case shows that I could.87 This 
in principle ability to choose would then ground the evaluation because it would explain how 
I am responsible due to choices I made or could have made. This would be an instance of  
what Steup calls hypothetical voluntary control,88 which we shall return to in section 2.4 
since this would not be an instance of  directly choosing to believe.89 So, either staked beliefs 
are not genuine beliefs (but merely acting as if), in which case, control over them does not 
explain how doxastic control can underwrite evaluations, or, they are so limited in scope as 
to leave a majority of  typical epistemic evaluations unexplained, in which case, staked-belief  
control does not explain how doxastic control can underwrite evaluability, in general. Does 
the control exercised in world-state-tracking beliefs fare any better? 
 
 
b. World-state-tracking beliefs 
The second kind of  beliefs over which it is suggested we can exercise direct voluntary 
control are those beliefs about states of  the world over which we have control.90 If  I want to 
                                                 
87 Further, if one could argue that the abnormal case shows we have the in-principle ability to exercise direct 
voluntary control over belief in the normal case, one wonders why this more general argument is not made in 
the first place. Since we have strong reasons to think that we do not have the ability in the normal case, then 
absent some argument to the contrary, the advocate of direct doxastic voluntarism has merely stipulated we do 
have the ability. Thus, the promissory note is nothing more than an empty gesture. Thanks to Hilary Bok for 
pointing this out in comments on an early draft. 
88 Steup, Matthias. “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.” Acta Analytica 15, no. 1 (2000): 25–56. 
89 Steup might disagree. The language he uses to describe hypothetical voluntary control varies. Even in his 
brief claim that we can exercise hypothetical doxastic control, he is unclear: 
 
“But can we execute decisions to take alternative doxastic attitudes? The answer to this question is: of 
course we can, at least under ordinary circumstances. What indeed should stand in the way of executing 
a decision to take an alternative doxastic attitude? Suppose you believe that p, but you weigh your 
evidence and decide your evidence contradicts p. What should then prevent you from disbelieving that 
p? And if you weigh your evidence and decide your evidence neither supports nor contradicts p, what 
should then prevent you from suspending judgment about p?” (38-39)  
 
At first, it appears that Steup is speaking about directly choosing to believe something, but then he quickly 
shifts to deciding to weigh evidence. 




believe that right now my youngest daughter is awake, I simply must go wake her up. If  there 
is some reason I need to have this belief, say, because I am paranoid my child might fall into 
a coma, then I can control whether I believe this simply by controlling the state of  the 
world. If  this is right, then I can exercise voluntary control over belief  because I can exercise 
immediate control over states of  the world. As Feldman notes, “when I have control over a 
state of  the world and my beliefs about that state track that state, then I have just as much 
control over my belief  about it as I have over the state itself."91 
 Even here, this kind of  voluntary control is not necessary to ground epistemic 
evaluation. On the one hand, this is still only indirect control over belief  formation because 
what one is doing in cases like this is making the world conform to the desired belief  
outcome and then coming to believe that outcome. The individual is manipulating the 
evidence or reasons she has for believing. Nevertheless, once those reasons and that 
evidence are in place, she does not decide to believe the outcome belief, rather, those reasons 
and that evidence take over and she responds to them. On the other hand, even if  it were an 
instance of  direct control over belief, it would still be insufficient to account for evaluability 
because of  the preponderance of  beliefs that are not of  this kind—not subject to this kind 
of  control.  
As this discussion about candidate cases of  direct doxastic voluntarism illustrates we 
tend to ignore, conflate, or take for granted the intervening steps in normal cases of  indirect 
voluntary control. Until we spell out the process of  belief  formation in putative candidate 
cases of  strong voluntarist belief, we tend to think of  them as instances of  directly 
voluntarily controlling what we believe. For example, in the kinds of  cases we have been 
looking at, it is easy to treat staked beliefs as those over which we have control. However, 





once we look closer we see that these are cases of  acting as if  the proposition is true rather 
than genuine belief. Similarly, in world-state-tracking cases, what looks like my believing by 
deciding to do so is really making myself  come to a belief  by manipulation of  my evidence 
or surroundings. In neither case do I believe merely because I decide to do so.  
 
 
c. Strong doxastic control and evaluability 
 
Thus far, our discussion in this section has been couched in terms of  accountability. Given 
that we are evaluated based on (some of) our beliefs, what explains this? But what if  we shift 
to the question of  evaluability? Could direct voluntary control over belief, perhaps as an in-
principle possibility, underwrite evaluability? Since we have seen that accountability does not 
require direct voluntary control over belief, the advocate of  the strong control condition on 
evaluability—competence—would have to argue that somehow the ability to exercise direct 
voluntary control does nevertheless underwrite evaluability. I confess I have no idea how this 
argument could go for the following reason. Accountability presupposes evaluability. Since 
the latter is the more general concept, the less general inherits its essential features and not 
vice versa. Now since the less general concept of  accountability does not require strong 
doxastic control, the more general concept of  evaluability cannot require it either, otherwise, 
as a necessary feature of  the more general concept, the less general concept would inherit 
the requirement of  strong control, which it does not. Whatever is required for accountability 




part of  the extra conditions for accountability, it cannot be part of  the preconditions for 
accountability, viz., evaluability.92    
 This argument only affects one direction of  the biconditional. The other direction, 
however, is irrelevant to this work. Since I am interested in understanding and explaining 
epistemic competence given our actual practice of  evaluating others—i.e., treating others as 
epistemically competent—the sufficiency of  the hypothetical ability to exercise strong 
doxastic control as a ground for evaluability does nothing to explain epistemic competence 
given the de facto lack of  that ability. In other words, the above arguments show we do not 
have strong doxastic control and yet still treat individuals as epistemically competent. This 
shows us that there must be other explanatorily relevant features of  belief  (or belief  
formation) that do ground epistemic evaluation. As such, the question of  the sufficiency of  
strong doxastic control for epistemic competence can safely be set aside.  
One final point before moving to discuss indirect voluntary control over belief. The 
rejection of  direct voluntarism opens a gap between control and evaluability, in the general 
sense, and between control and evaluation, in a narrower sense. Since I am not in direct 
control over that for which I am evaluated, namely my beliefs, we now must think about 
what can explain our evaluability given this gap. This is nothing new. In accounting for our 
responsibility for actions, we must also explain this. We are often only indirectly the cause of  
many actions for which we can be held accountable; frequently we only initiate actions 
whose outcome is traceable to us. But, it is still a problem in the present context.  
I have argued that direct voluntary control over our beliefs does not underwrite 
epistemic reactive attitudes since we do not have this kind of  control over belief.93 So we are 
                                                 
92 The general structure of this argument is inspired by Russ Shafer-Landau’s argument for ethical non-




led to examine indirect voluntary control. Just as we are responsible for actions whose 
outcomes trace back to us, perhaps we are evaluable based on beliefs caused by something 
we did earlier. In the next section, I argue that either the putative kinds of  indirect voluntary 
control are nothing more than indirect influence over belief  or those cases that appear to be 
genuine instances of  effectively executing an intention to believe, specifically, that p by 
indirectly bringing oneself  to believe are so rare that they could not uphold the pervasive 





2.3. Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism and Competence 
 
Having dispatched with direct voluntarism as the grounds for general epistemic competence, 
we move to thinking through indirect voluntarism. According to indirect doxastic 
voluntarism, we can make ourselves come to believe propositions. Proponents of  indirect 
voluntary control claim that by choosing where to focus our attention, by cultivating 
intellectual habits, by choosing to reflect on our reasons, etc., we indirectly exercise control 
over what we believe. But, to reiterate, we do not exercise indirect control if  we do these 
things to believe some proposition or other; rather, we exercise indirect control over belief  just in 
case we can do such things in order to make ourselves come to believe specific propositions.94 To 
                                                                                                                                                 
93 If we did have it, this would be sufficient to explain competence. But since we are examining the actual 
practice of evaluating others based on their beliefs, this gives no aid or comfort to an advocate of the strong 
control condition. 
94 At this point, one might rightly object that we are often evaluated on how we came about a belief that p not 




exercise indirect control is to form an intention, specifically, to believe that p and then to do 
something to bring it about effectively to execute that intention. Even so, this kind of  
doxastic control is considerably weaker than direct control over our doxastic attitudes. Thus, 
indirect doxastic voluntarism might also be called weak doxastic voluntarism. Accordingly, 
those who want to argue that having this kind of  control underwrites the appropriateness of  
epistemic evaluability would have to try to establish a weak control condition: 
 
 Weak Control Condition: S is an appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes for a 
  belief  that p iff  S can exercise indirect control over whether she believes that p.95  
 
 It is important to note right away that some might think this mischaracterizes the indirect 
voluntarist. It is not that we exercise control over a particular (set of) belief(s), but that we 
control ourselves in a way that affects our belief  formation. So, when we evaluate a person 
based on their beliefs, we are evaluating them on the choices and control they had over how 
they form beliefs (e.g., whether they so regulate themselves as to be good knowers) or on 
things they did that caused them to believe as they do (e.g., choosing to attend to some 
evidence, reflecting on their reasons for belief, maintaining focus on particular aspects of  a 
problem, etc.). As I have already made clear,96 this confuses influence over belief  with control 
over belief. To so regulate ourselves is not to have the ability to exercise control over our 
                                                                                                                                                 
eventually arriving at the belief that p. So why restrict the discussion to indirect voluntary control over specific 
beliefs? My reasons are partly programmatic and partly substantive.  
 I am trying to build my case by starting with those kinds of control that are least plausible as candidates for 
what underwrites epistemic evaluation and proceeding to those more plausible. I am doing this because I think 
that separating what control is from the other features more commonly associated with it is clearer when we 
proceed this way. Later, in §2.5, I return to an even weaker kind of “control” we exercise over our beliefs, but 
suggest that we think of this as indirect influence instead of control. Thanks to Hilary Bok for raising this issue. 
95 Just as with the strong control condition, there is a more restricted or narrow weak control condition. 
 
Restricted Weak Control Condition: S is the warranted target of epistemic reactive attitudes, in principle 
or in fact, for a belief that p iff S can exercise indirect control over whether she believes that p.  




beliefs, even though doing so does affect what we believe.97 We shall return to doxastic 
influence in §2.6, 5.3, and 6.1. But first, I want to examine four different kinds of  indirect 
voluntary control: deep hypothetical or reflective, long-range, and monitoring.98 I shall argue 
that either so-called indirect control is nothing more than indirect influence or that if  there 
are genuine cases of  effectively executing an intention indirectly to believe, specifically, that 
p, they are too rare to underwrite reactive attributability. 
 
 
a. Deep hypothetical (reflective) control 
 
 Let us begin by turning our focus on hypothetical control. Matthias Steup presents three 
ways we might understand voluntary control over belief: categorical, hypothetical, and deep 
voluntary control. The first type of  control implies strong doxastic control and so the 
arguments of  the previous section apply.99 The latter two types of  voluntary control over 
belief  are slightly more plausible. "If  we can execute a decision to take a doxastic attitude 
toward p that is different from the one we have actually taken, then we have hypothetical 
voluntary control over our doxastic attitude toward p."100 What sets apart hypothetical from 
deep voluntary control is that the latter includes a kind of  internal mechanism meant to 
                                                 
97 My thanks to Hilary Bok for pointing out this possible response on behalf of the indirect voluntarist. 
98 Another way people have tried to justify epistemic evaluability by appeal to doxastic control is by suggesting 
that we exercise doxastic control via the belief policies we adopt. Accordingly, we get: 
 
Belief-policy Voluntary Control: S has belief-policy voluntary control over a belief that p iff S can 
voluntarily adopt a belief policy and adopting that belief policy is (at least partly) causally responsible for 
S’s belief that p. 
 
We need not go into all the details about why such policies cannot underwrite epistemic evaluations, though. It 
is easy to see that belief policies are not means of executing effective intentions to believe, specifically, that p. 
For an excellent discussion of belief policies see Peels, “Belief Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic 
Responsibility.” Erkenntnis 78, no. 3 (June 22, 2012): 561–69. 
99 See Steup, “Doxastic Voluntarism,” §6. 




avoid problems of  brainwashing and manipulation; were my beliefs merely under 
hypothetical control my decision to take a different doxastic attitude toward p might be the 
result of  being hypnotized. The advocate of  deep control demurs; such a decision is not the 
result of  a decision procedure or mechanism that is relevantly part of  me.101 So, let us focus 
on deep hypothetical voluntary control: 
 
Deep Hypothetical Voluntary (Reflective) Control: S has deep hypothetical 
voluntary (reflective) control over a belief  that p iff  S can voluntarily execute a 
decision to take a doxastic attitude toward p. 
 
 
The key to understanding deep hypothetical voluntary control lies in what it means to 
execute a doxastic decision. Steup relies heavily on the parity of  reasoning between practical 
deliberation and theoretical deliberation. Just as we can weigh the reasons for various courses 
of  action, we can weigh the evidence for various propositions. But the two are importantly 
disanalogous as well because of  the effort involved in executing a practical decision. In the 
practical realm, once I decide on a course of  action, it is left for me still to initiate that 
course of  action and to act according to my decision. This is not (typically) the case with 
doxastic decisions. Once I have brought my theoretical deliberations to a close, ordinarily, I 
simply form a belief. But, this is not always the case. A man brought up in a racist household 
may decide that his racist beliefs are false (even morally wrong) and give them up, but still 
find it hard to execute the decision to not have racist beliefs anymore.102 
It is not clear to me that we should call this indirect control over belief. On the one 
hand, taking a different doxastic attitude is nothing more than exercising direct control over 
belief. I believe that p, but for whatever reason do not want to do so anymore and so I 
                                                 
101 See Steup (ibid) for a more in-depth discussion of these different kinds of doxastic control. 




decide to take a different attitude toward p, viz., believe not-p. In this case, the arguments of  
§2.2 apply. On the other hand, executing a decision to take a different doxastic attitude 
toward p might be nothing more than deciding (or realizing) that my belief  that p is not as 
strongly supported as I thought it was and so reexamining my evidence (reasons) for 
believing that p. In this way, I do take a different attitude towards p—my attitude changes 
from confident that p, to less than confident (or, perhaps, suspect about) p. The question is 
whether this amounts to exercising indirect control over belief.  
When I decide to take a different doxastic attitude toward p, can I do so to believe a 
specific proposition? Either way we answer this question, it brings no aid or comfort to the 
idea that doxastic control underwrites epistemic evaluability. On the one hand, obviously if  
we cannot take a different doxastic attitude in order to execute an intention to believe specific 
propositions, then Steup's hypothetical control is actually a form of  doxastic influence and 
not doxastic control. On the other hand, the ability to take a different doxastic attitude 
toward p supports the claim that indirect doxastic control underwrites epistemic evaluability 
only if  in taking a different doxastic attitude we are exercising indirect doxastic control over 
our belief that p. The question, then, is whether taking different doxastic attitudes constitutes 
indirect control. Here, we run into issues about what we control. 
Suppose Jesse believes his co-worker is guilty of  embezzling from their company, but 
that he does not want to believe this about his friend and so forms the intention to believe 
that his friend hasn't embezzled. He then takes a different doxastic attitude toward the belief  
that his friend embezzled. (Of  course, ordinarily, we don’t do this at all; ordinarily we say 
things like, “I refuse to believe that” and that bias sets us on a path to confirm it by ignoring 
some important evidence, not taking adequate stock of  the available evidence, and so on.) 




that his friend did not embezzle, then he would have direct control over his belief, which we 
have seen is not possible. So, the attitude that he takes must be something closer to a hope 
that his belief  is wrong or a desire to be absolutely sure that he is right before he commits to 
the belief  that his friend embezzled. Neither of  these attitudes imply that Jesse exercises 
control over his belief; neither implies that he will execute his intention to believe that his 
friend has not embezzled.  
In order for Jesse’s exercise of  hypothetical control to count as doxastic control he 
would have to be able to will himself  to believe that his friend has not embezzled by taking a 
different doxastic attitude. The intention to believe that his friend has not embezzled may 
function to cause him to reevaluate his evidence, but the ability to step back to determine if  
his evidence suffices for his belief  is not to effectively execute an intention, specifically, to 
believe that his friend has not embezzled. If  Jesse does come to that belief  it is either 
because the evidence convinces him—i.e., the evidence is strong enough that it would be 
unreasonable of  him (or anybody with the relevant background knowledge) to persist in the 
belief  that his friend embezzled—or that he deceives himself  into believing that his friend is 
innocent, perhaps because of  unconscious confirmation bias. In the former case, the 
doxastic decision is not to believe that his friend is innocent, but rather because of  affection 
for his friend, he is prompted to take the decision to reexamine, or seek out new, evidence. 
If  the latter, then the negative evaluation we direct at Jesse is grounded in his failure to be 
governed by the appropriate norms and not in the failure to exercise control over his belief. 
Cases like this are quite common; we often decide that we may be mistaken in our beliefs. In 
many cases, this is because: we realize we did not have enough information, new information 




this happens, we do execute a doxastic decision to reexamine our reasons for our belief, but 
we do not execute a decision, specifically, to believe something different.  
There may be genuine cases where we do effectively execute a decision to form specific 
beliefs by exercising hypothetical control. For example, I may be worried about my wife who 
is later than usual coming home. Perhaps I just watched a particularly troubling crime drama 
and now I want to effectively execute a doxastic decision to believe my wife is safe. As a 
result, I call her; she answers her phone and tells me she is fine and in a taxi on her way 
home. It appears I have effectively executed a doxastic decision to believe that my wife is 
safe. Even here, it is not clear that I am not simply reassuring myself  of  something I already 
believe. More than effectively executing an intention to believe my wife is safe, I appear to be 
seeking out additional evidence for my belief  because something has happened that caused 
the stakes to go up for me.  
More pointedly, I do not want merely to believe that my wife is safe, I want to know that 
she is; I want it to be true that she is safe and so do something, viz., call her, to make sure 
that it is. What appears to happen is that I have the belief  that she is safe, but the crime 
drama makes salient the possibility she is not, thereby ratcheting up the standards for 
knowledge. Thus, my knowledge that my wife is safe is undermined by the live possibility 
that she is not.103 When I call my wife, I find she is safe and I become more confident in a 
belief  that I already have. But this is not effectively to execute an intention, specifically, to 
believe that my wife is safe since I have had that belief  the whole time.   
Finally, this case is structurally similar to Ginet’s locked door example, with a notable 
difference. In the Ginet example, I neither believe nor know that I locked the door and given 
there is no way to ensure I did, I act as if  I did. However, the thought that I did not lock the 
                                                 
103 See Fantl, Jeremy & Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World. (New York: Oxford University Press, 




door makes salient the possibility that I did not. Until I rule out this possibility, I cannot 
induce either belief  or knowledge. In the present case, I had knowledge that she was safe 
and therefore believe it until the crime drama made the possibility that she is not safe salient. 
Until I can rule out that possibility, my claim to know she is safe is undermined. In this case, 
I can rule that out by calling her. However, suppose she did not answer her phone. My 
knowledge that she is safe is undermined until I rule out the live possibility she is not safe. I 
can, of  course, act as if  she is safe; perhaps even do things to increase my confidence of  
this. Even here, I am not controlling my belief  so much as seeking out reasons to make me 
more confident in a belief  that I already have. Note, that those reasons I seek out either 
increase my confidence that my wife is safe or not. They are either compelling reasons, in 
which case my confidence increases merely by having those reasons, or they are not 
compelling reasons, in which case my confidence remains the same or goes down merely by 
having those reasons. Further, if  they are compelling or not, it will be because of  other 
reasons, background knowledge or assumptions, etc., and not because I have decided to be 
compelled by those reasons, or have taken a different doxastic attitude toward my belief.   
Perhaps I am incorrect and this is a case of  indirectly controlling my belief. Is this 
enough to show that indirect control underwrites epistemic evaluability? As we saw in the 
examination of  direct doxastic voluntarism, the kinds of  cases where we may have such an 
ability are vanishingly rare to do the required work. Hypothetical control can underwrite 
epistemic evaluation only if  either we can exercise hypothetical control over each kind of  
belief  for which we can be evaluated or those beliefs ultimately trace back to beliefs over 
which we can exercise hypothetical control. But we cannot exercise such control over our 
ordinary perceptual, introspective, or memory beliefs. The best we can do is put ourselves in 




specifically, to believe that p, But rather to exert influence over what we believe. Thus, we 




b. Long-range voluntary control 
 
We cannot either directly or indirectly effectively execute an intention, specifically, to believe 
that p immediately. That is, we cannot, as Alston puts it, bring it about that we form a belief  
that p “right away, in one intentional act.”104 Surprisingly, we do sometimes, though 
unreliably, execute an intention, specifically, to believe that p through a series of  acts. We can, 
oddly enough, exercise long-range voluntary control over (some) of  our beliefs: 
 
Long-range Voluntary Control: S has long-range voluntary control over a belief  
that p iff  S effectively executes an intention, specifically, to believe that p through a 
series of  intentional actions designed to produce the belief  that p. 
 
 
My argument against doxastic control as the ground for epistemic evaluation (and 
evaluability) has revealed concepts gradually more and more removed from the phenomena 
they are meant to explain. I began with direct immediate control over belief  and found that 
the putative examples of  such control were nothing more than a type of  doxastic influence. 
Next, I turned to a kind of  indirect immediate control and found that there, too, examples 
of  indirect immediate control were nothing more than doxastic influence. Before us now is 
the notion of  a type of  control that is quite removed from the evaluable belief  that such 
control brought about. This alone should indicate that it will not be robust enough to 
underwrite reactive evaluability. Nevertheless, we must first ask whether they are genuine 
                                                 




cases of  effectively executing an intention, specifically, to believe that p through a series of  
actions designed for that purpose. 
 Prima facie, there seem to be genuine examples long-range voluntary control. For: 
 
people do set out on long range projects to get themselves to believe a certain 
proposition, and sometimes they succeed in this. Devices employed include selective 
exposure to evidence, selective attention to supporting considerations, seeking the 
company of  believers and avoiding non-believers, self-suggestion, and (possibly) 
more bizarre methods like hypnotism. By such methods people sometimes induce 
themselves to believe in God, in materialism, in communism, in the proposition that 
they are loved by X, and so on.105 
 
There are three points about long-range voluntary control I should like to make. The first 
two are familiar and concern whether long-range voluntary control is a genuine form of  
doxastic control or whether it, too, is another example of  doxastic influence, and whether if  
there are genuine cases of  long-range voluntary control they cover enough kinds of  beliefs 
to underwrite reactive evaluability. The final point raises an issue about the role of  awareness 
in reactive evaluability. 
 There are, to be sure, things someone can do to increase the probability that they will 
come to believe specific propositions, but it is far from clear that a generally unreliable 
execution of  an intention could be called a kind of  control or could be reliable enough to 
underwrite epistemic evaluability. The thought that it is appears to be based on an analogy 
with long-range control over action. I intend to make stir-fry and go through a series of  
steps to do so. In this way, I exercise control over my action of  making stir-fry. Notice right 
away a putative disanalogy. The control I exercise in making stir-fry is over the action and 
                                                 
105 See Feldman (“Voluntary Belief,” 80-2); and Alston (Beyond ‘Justification’ ch. 4). As another example, we can 
turn to the character of Leonard in Christopher Nolan’s 2000 film Memento. Leonard suffers from short-term 
memory loss and tattoos notes to himself all over his body to help him solve his wife’s murder (Nolan 2000). 
In a twist, knowing that he will forget his reasons for writing himself a note that incorrectly identifies his wife’s 
murder, he proceeds to write down “clues” that will eventually cause him to believe that  particular person he is 




not the product of  the action, stir-fry (what would it even mean to say I exercise control 
over stir-fry?). But, in the case of  belief, I am supposed to exercise control over what I 
believe—the epistemic analogue of  the product of  the act of  believing. We might think this 
is just a consequence of  the internal/external divide in the two cases. The product of  my act 
of  believing is a belief, an internal state, whereas the product of  my act of  making stir-fry is 
the stir-fry, and external thing. But, we can see that our control in the case of  making stir-fry 
is internal as well; I control my act of  making stir-fry—how I make stir-fry. In a similar way, 
I control how I believe. This is not what the advocate of  long-range control wants if  she 
wants to attempt to ground reactive evaluability in our ability effectively to execute long-
range doxastic control. For exercising control over how I believe is to do things in such a 
way that I believe something or other, and not, per the control condition, something 
specifically intended. In other words, to shift from the ability to exercise control over what I 
believe to how I believe, is to shift from control to influence.  
 I mentioned above that there is another problem with long-range control, viz., that one 
could not be reliable in the exercise of  it. This is because “it requires the capacity to bring 
about a state of  affairs, C, by voluntarily doing a number of  different things over a 
considerable period of  time, typically interrupted by activity directed to other goals”106 An 
analogy to archery is apt. In archery, I intend to hit the target by a series of  acts, but once I 
release the arrow, I no longer have any control over whether the arrow hits the target. To be 
sure, I do exercise control over how I position myself, where I aim, how much tension I put 
in the bowstring, and so on. Many things can happen that cause my shot to be unsuccessful: 
a freak wind could blow it off  course, the target could fall over, the fletching could fall off, 
and so on. Part of  the skill of  archery is adjusting for things one foresees as affecting one’s 
                                                 




shot. Long-range control is similar in that I can do things to put myself  in the best position 
to believe, specifically, that p (i.e., hit my intended target). And like archery, many things can 
go wrong in the attempt. In fact, in an exercise of  long-range control, depending on how 
long the range is, I would need to constantly course correct. If  I inadvertently become 
exposed to some piece of  information that is likely to cause me not to believe what I have 
intended, I must now engage in other projects of  belief-formation that overcome this new 
piece of  information. Each such exposure compounds the unlikelihood of  me acquiring my 
intended belief; each such exposure undermines the amount of  control I have over what I 
believe. It is difficult to see how the ability to exercise long-range control can ground 
accountability ascriptions—i.e., warranted evaluations—let alone evaluability, more generally. 
 Add to this the further problem that even if  long-range control were not just another 
instance of  doxastic influence, one would be hard-pressed to explain how such an ability 
could possibly matter to evaluating individuals for their “immediate” beliefs. I turn on the 
news and see a report that I relay to my wife. It is perfectly reasonable of  her to think me 
evaluable based on what I say about the report even though long-range control is nowhere in 
sight. The sheer amount of  “immediate” perceptual, testimonial, introspective, and memorial 
beliefs coupled with the amount of  effort it would take to control them through a series of  
long-range acts makes it implausible in the extreme that such control is required or even 
sufficient to underwrite reactive evaluability. 
 There is one final point about long-range control I want to make that concerns the role 
of  norms in epistemic evaluation. Thus far, I have not discussed norm recognition because I 
wanted to keep the concept of  control clear from entanglements that we typically conflate 
with it. To be able to exercise control over something does not require that one has the 




epistemic subjects, we do so in ways corresponding to the putative reactive attitudes we have 
towards them. The reactive attitudes we have (and therefore the evaluations we direct) 
towards others are tied to normative standards. If  we did not think that the epistemic subject 
met, failed to meet, or went beyond an appropriate standard, then our attitudes would make 
no sense. Second, because our reactive attitudes are tied to normative standards, whether 
those attitudes are appropriate is (at least partly) fixed by our ability to meet them. Suppose I 
think Joe’s belief  is stupid. Not just that the belief  itself  is stupid, but that Joe, in believing it, 
is in some sense being stupid. My attitude toward Joe makes sense or is appropriate only if  
there is some standard or norm that Joe failed to meet and that failure is attributable to him. 
To say that the belief  is stupid, is to attribute some quality to the belief, perhaps it is based 
on faulty grounds.107 But to say that Joe, in believing it, is in some sense being stupid, we 
have to ask why? It is not simply because he believes something stupid. Children believe 
stupid things all the time—i.e., children believe things that it would be stupid for adults to 
believe—and we don’t think them stupid for doing so. This suggests that reactive attitudes 
are directed at believers and not what they believe, even if  we sometimes speak as if  the 
belief  itself  is the target of  the reactive attitude. Hence, when Joe believes something stupid, 
it is because Joe, in believing it, is being (or acting) stupid and this because Joe has done 
something stupid.  
If  Joe is stupid in believing that p, then he should not have believed that p. Why? If  it 
turns out that Joe believed that p because all of  what he takes to be relevant evidence points 
to p, would we still think that Joe has believed stupidly? I do not see why not. Suppose Joe’s 
                                                 
107 We don’t judge beliefs in the abstract like this, though. Instead we would say something like “anyone who 
believes that is stupid”. But then, we are not judging or evaluating a belief, but instead commenting on the 
merits of a claim. We do judge claims all the time, but in so doing we are tacitly suggesting those judgments and 
evaluations would apply to the individuals who believe such things. People, and not claims, are the target of 




belief  is that climate change is a hoax, that he believes this because he watches Fox News 
exclusively, and Fox consistently denies the reality of  climate change. It is perfectly 
reasonable for us to maintain that Joe’s belief  makes sense and that he ought not to believe 
it. And he ought not to believe it because watching Fox News is not a good source of  
information. In which case, he ought not to watch Fox News (or he ought not to watch only 
Fox News) to be informed. Why? Again, looking at his reasons for doing so may perfectly 
explain why he “should”, according to his perspective, watch Fox News.108 Still, although his 
choice to watch Fox is under his control and makes sense according to his background 
reasons, religiously watching Fox News is not a good thing to do. But from Joe’s perspective, 
his choice to watch it is not stupid; he may believe this is the best way to be informed.109 
Now, if  we are trying to account for the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes given indirect 
control, then his intentional actions that lead to his stupid belief  require both control and some 
kind of  recognitional capacity.110 He must be able to recognize (at least, in general) the 
norms and standards that govern acceptable belief  formation, even if  he fails to recognize 
that his epistemic practices, in this case, fail to meet those standards. But again, even here, he 
does not control what he believes, only how he believes. 
The preceding three paragraphs seem to get us, at best, only to that claim that we can 
and do indirectly influence our beliefs. We do this in all the ways indicated: by adopting 
belief  policies; by training our faculties over the course of  our lifetime to be more finely 
discriminatory; by developing intellectual habits of  weighing evidence, withholding assent; by 
cultivating intellectual virtues such as curiosity, open-mindedness, studiousness, and the like. 
                                                 
108 For a brief discussion of the logic of “ought,” see Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The 
Philosophical Review 84, no. 1 (1975): 3–22. 
109 Assuming he does think this and he is not watching Fox News because, say, he likes being angry and Fox 
News makes him angry. Thank to Hilary Bok for raising this point. 




So, if  we have any indirect control over our beliefs, as such, it is found in our ability to 
manipulate our environment to make ourselves come to specific beliefs. Recall the examples 
of  state-tracking beliefs. Yet, examples such as these are too rare to underwrite epistemic 
evaluation in general. In other cases, where we engage in long-term projects to control what 
we believe, we are nowhere near reliable enough to explain general competence.  
Before turning to reasons why indirect control is not sufficient for epistemic 
competence, it will be helpful to reiterate my target in this chapter. I am arguing that we do 
not have control over belief  where this is to be understood as an ability either directly or 
indirectly to will ourselves to believe, specifically, that p. I have not argued that control plays 
no role in understanding or explaining epistemic competence. What should be clear from the 
argument so far is that the object of  control is not what we believe. Rather, we when 
exercise doxastic control, we exercise control over how we believe. In other words, we 
exercise control in such a way that influences what we believe. It may be helpful to contrast 
doxastic control—the ability either directly or indirectly to make ourselves believe, specifically, 
that p—with epistemic control—the ability to exercise control over capacities and abilities that 
affect belief  and knowledge, perhaps by where we focus attention, the habits we form, and 
so on. Furthermore, I think epistemic control, when understood within the context of  an 
ability-based know-how, plays a significant role in an account of  epistemic competence.  
The arguments of  this section thus far have focused on whether voluntary control over 
belief  is necessary for competence. What should we think about voluntary control as 
sufficient for competence? One the one hand, even if  the arguments marshaled against 
indirect voluntarism in this section fail, it does not follow that such an ability underwrites 




be evaluated not affected in any way by indirect voluntary control. On the other hand, it 
seems that the noncompetent believer might be able to exercise this kind of  control.  
A child certainly has the ability to follow belief  policies, to manipulate the world in 
important ways, and so on. Yet, children are not the appropriate targets of  epistemic 
evaluation. For example, a young child might manipulate the world to make a belief  turn out 
true, perhaps to avoid discipline. A parent tells the child, you may not get your toy right now 
and the child is later seen with the toy.  When the parent says, “I told you not to get your 
toy.” The child replies, “I didn’t get my toy, my little sister got it.” She may even emphasize 
things, “You told me not to get my toy, and I didn’t.”  
The point is that she may believe that she is obeying the parent. In fact, children follow 
the “letter of  the law” quite often not to be difficult or contrary, but because they are 
learning about idiomatic uses of  language. They believe they are doing what is expected of  
them, but they fail to realize that what they are doing is an actual instance of  the thing they 
are not supposed to be doing. These cases give us strong reason to reject the idea that 
indirect doxastic voluntarism is even sufficient for competence. I conclude, therefore, that 
neither strong nor weak doxastic voluntarism underwrites epistemic evaluation, and 
therefore evaluability. We turn now to whether the kind of  control we exercise over belief  is 









2.4. Direct Intervention, Monitoring, and Awareness 
If  the kind of  control we exercise over our beliefs is not to be explained by an ability directly 
to form beliefs simply by deciding to do so or by our ability to voluntarily form beliefs by 
means of  intermediary intentional acts, then perhaps what we mean is that we have an ability 
to monitor our beliefs and belief  formation. That is, perhaps our ability to take stock of  our 
beliefs is what matters. The mechanisms by which we do so may or may not be crucial here. 
Suppose our ability to monitor our doxastic situation turns on a reflective capacity. Then 
monitoring turns into a form of  indirect control of  the hypothetical variety. Suppose, 
instead, that such an ability is a function of  directly intervening in our formation of  
beliefs—a negative control. However we understand this and whatever the mechanisms by 
which we engage in this “control” over our beliefs, it will become clear that it is not just 
control at work, but rather something like control and awareness. To see why, let us examine 
control as a kind of  monitoring: 
 
Monitoring Control: S has monitoring control over a belief  that p iff  S can monitor 
(i) her belief  that p or (ii) her belief-forming capacities in such a way as to bring 
about the belief, specifically, that p.  
 
 
Monitoring by itself  cannot ground evaluability since either it is only when coupled with 
an ability to do something about what we monitor that matters or an awareness of  what we 
are monitoring. If  we understand our capacity for monitoring in terms of  an ability to 
intervene, we run into a further dilemma: either our ability to intervene in the formation of  a 
belief  is best thought of  as control over that belief—in which case, the arguments of  the 




withhold assent to a belief.111 Based on the previous sections, it should be clear what I would 
say about withholding assent as control. Namely, in very many beliefs, the evidence is so 
overwhelming that we simply do not have the ability to withhold assent. Or, more exactly, 
while we may, in moments of  philosophical consistency and tremendous psychological 
exertion, withhold our assent to a proposition; it is implausible in the extreme that we actually 
fail to believe it. Further, to require our ability to do so for epistemic competence excludes 
both far too many individuals and far too many beliefs from epistemic evaluation. So, let us 
think about why monitoring our beliefs (or belief  formation/acquisition/maintenance) 
cannot be a kind of  control, properly speaking. 
The advocate of  monitoring might have in mind the following line of  argument. To 
simplify things let us say that each action (or belief) is a chain.112 So an action-chain has 
something like the following schema: intention-event, intention-event communicates to 
movement-event, movement-event communicates to body, body event. In the case of  belief, 
it would look like this: stimulus (where this is meant to imply anything from a perceptual or 
sensory event to a recalling event, to the initial thought of  an inference, etc.), processing, 
interpretation, belief.113 There are various ways we can influence an action-chain: we might 
change our mind about our intention (e.g., I might intend to go get something to eat, but 
realize that if  I go into the kitchen I could wake my napping daughter); or, I might realize 
                                                 
111 In chapter 5, we shall return to the ability to withhold assent as an example of revising our belief in light of 
justifying reasons. 
112 I focus on simple actions because more complex actions are arguably broken up in to several simple actions.  
So, my desire to write this thesis is broken up in to very, very, very many days of typing, reading, thinking, etc.  
And each word I write is broken up into discrete simple actions of striking a single key. 
113 The details of how all this actually occurs are not important for the present argument. All that is required is 
that there are some events in an action-chain that happen completely without our directly regulating or causing 
them (like the brain sending signals to the muscles and the muscles flexing and relaxing).  Once we see this, the 
idea of direct control must be radically revised or repudiated altogether. Note, that the characterization of an 
action in this way is neutral with regard to the question of what exactly constitutes the action. For my purposes, 
we need not settle the issue of whether the action is the trying or the movement (see fn. 60, above). It is 
sufficient we recognize that however we identify the action there will be subpersonal processes (e.g., brain-




that my body is not doing what I wanted it to do and make adjustments; or, I might have an 
end goal in mind and come to think my original intention is not the best way of  meeting that 
goal. In each of  these various ways I could possibly influence or control an action I can 
regulate only a small subset (if  any) of  the different components in the action-chain. 
Similarly, there are various ways we can influence a belief-formation chain. We might affect 
the stimulus (by either taking in a different stimulus—e.g., looking elsewhere—or 
concentrating on an aspect of  the stimulus—e.g., thinking about the assumptions of  a 
particular claim). And, we might affect the interpretation of  a belief-formation stimulus by 
gathering more evidence, say.   
Control over our actions and beliefs manifests in our ability to adjust our actions and 
beliefs/belief  acquisitions. If  this is what control is then our ability directly to intervene in 
the action-chain will be important. We monitor ourselves and intervene where necessary. We 
have all had the experience of  driving home from work only to realize that one does not 
recall anything about the drive; we drove home on autopilot, we say. And we have all had the 
experience where we “clicked in” to autopilot because we were on a familiar route, but were 
actually going someplace else. For example, after years of  driving from Baltimore to 
Washington, D. C. on I-95, it has become such a habit for me that I scarcely have to think at 
all about the drive. However, one evening I needed to pick someone up from the airport and 
I realized that I just missed my exit. My brain, from habit, began to get into the flow of  
driving straight home, but I quickly realized that I was not supposed to drive straight home 
and adjusted my drive accordingly by taking the next exit and turning around.114  
                                                 
114 In cases where my intention to take the unfamiliar exit fails and I instead continue on the familiar route, I 
commit what is sometimes called a double capture error. See Roessler, Johannes, and Naomi Eilan. “Agency 
and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology,” 2003.  
 4; and Reason, James. Human Error. (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1990): 68 for discussions of this 




There are two ways to think about this monitoring ability. On the one hand, we might 
think of  monitoring along the lines of  simple input/output relations. The inputs are the 
various components of  the action-chain and the outputs are the adjustments or 
interventions. Unfortunately, this not the kind of  monitoring we need for an evaluability-
grounding control. Consider a monitoring program in a computer. The job of  this program 
is to make sure all processes and programs are running efficiently, say. So, this program has 
as its inputs the various other programs running. Upon coming to a problem, the monitoring 
program adjusts accordingly. Put differently, this understanding of  monitoring our actions 
maintains that we control our actions to the extent that we can adjust. But, we might make 
adjustments in ways that do not imply evaluability. Or, more precisely, our subpersonal 
systems and faculties might adjust our behavior in such a way that there is no connection 
between the action and the agent, and hence no evaluability.   
Consider a reflex arc. We pull our hand away from a hot dish or stove before becoming 
consciously aware of  the heat from the stove. In this case, a stimulus activates a pain 
receptor that travels to the spinal column that innervates an excitatory neuron which then 
excites the alpha motor neuron in the arm causing us to withdraw our hands.115 Here we 
have a type of  monitoring as nothing more than signaling. This cannot be what we need to 
ground evaluability. There is no sense in which I am evaluable for removing my hand from 
the burning stove like the sense in which I am for grabbing my daughter’s hand when she is 
about to touch the stove. That is, if  I am evaluable at all for removing my hand from the 
stove in the case of  a flexor reflex, it is merely causal. But the sense of  evaluability we are 
interested in is normative and not merely causal; it is the kind that makes appropriate certain 
attitudes and judgments of  individuals based on those acts and beliefs. Hence, if  our 





evaluability for our beliefs is underwritten by monitoring ability it cannot be this type of  
signaling. 
 On the other hand, we might think that monitoring requires an awareness of  what is 
going on. The reason why the computer program is not responsible is that it is not aware; it 
does not possess even a minimal understanding of  why it is doing what it is doing or that it is 
doing what it is doing. Notice that in the autopilot example, I realized (i.e., became aware) 
that I missed the exit. There are different ways to read this awareness component of  
monitoring, however.  We might think that monitoring is nothing more than awareness; in 
being aware of  our belief  formation we are ipso facto monitoring it. If  this is the right way to 
think about it, it implies nothing about our ability to adjust or correct ourselves and is 
therefore not an alternative account of  control, which is what the advocate needs to explain 
evaluability. To keep things clearer, I will not think of  this as monitoring. Instead, this way of  
thinking about the condition that underwrites responsibility is nothing more than awareness.  
If  the advocate of  monitoring wants to keep some self-corrective and adjustment ability, 
then it is not clear how our ability to monitor ourselves as a ground for evaluability is in any 
way different from the idea that our ability to control our beliefs is what grounds evaluability. 
It is worse than that since it requires awareness plus an ability to control. But as we have seen 
control is not required to underwrite evaluability, and hence competence. So, our ability to 
monitor our beliefs and belief  formation understood as a kind of  control is not what 
explains the appropriateness of  epistemic evaluation. Perhaps the ability to monitor our 
beliefs conceived as a kind of  conscious awareness of  belief  (formation) does. We shall 
examine this thought in the next chapter. First, allow me to suggest that the kind of  
“control” we need over belief  is actually an ability to influence our beliefs. More precisely, 




plays a constitutive role in epistemic competence. This latter claim is only hinted at here. In 
chapters five and six, I show that the ability to influence belief  is a part of  the ability to 





2.5. Doxastic Influence 
 
We do not exercise voluntary control over belief  or belief  formation in the sense that we do 
not effectively choose (decide or will), specifically, to believe that p. Of  course, we might 
reflect on some of  the causal factors and later reject the belief  that p, but this is just to be 
subject to a new set of  causal factors. Now we might be persuaded at this point to simply 
drop the control condition and look elsewhere. Alternatively, we may reexamine the 
assumption that we have control over our beliefs, as such. In our examination of  indirect 
voluntarism, it was suggested that while we do not have the ability to exercise control over our 
beliefs, we do seem to have the ability to influence them. I want briefly to look at this idea 
conceived as a kind of  reasons-responsiveness. That is, we might think that our ability to 
adopt policies, cultivate intellectual virtues, develop habits, choose where to focus our 
attention, consider whether our belief  has enough support, etc., influences what we believe. 
And, we might think that our ability to do these things is due to our ability to recognize and 
respond to reasons. 
 Different accounts of  responsiveness to reasons will highlight different features. For 




process, etc. causally responsible for the formation of  the belief  that p and see if  the same 
belief  would be formed in the light of  new information in a sufficient number of  cases.116 
For others, responsiveness to reasons turns on deep features of  the individual such as 
epistemic virtues and vices.117 But the key similarity is that our responsibility—or, for our 
purposes our competence—is grounded the ability to be motivated to believe by the norms 
that govern belief  formation (acquisition and maintenance).  
 How is this different from the kind of  control we have been discussing so far? In the 
first place, the norms governing responsiveness to reasons and by extension the features of  
ourselves that are subject to reasons—cognitive abilities, epistemic virtues, and so on—hold 
whether we can exercise direct voluntary control over them. Just as I can still be blamed for 
anger I have no control over, I can be blamed for sloppy thinking. This is true even when we 
have done all we can to avoid it. If  I go to seminars, practice mindfulness, and meditate, I 
may still be blamed for becoming angry at slight provocation. Similarly, if  I have studied and 
thought about a particular claim and believe it even though I ought not to, I can be evaluated 
negatively. In such a case, my control over my belief  extends only so far. In fact, it is more 
apt to think of  this kind of  control as the ability to influence my beliefs.  
 Epistemic competence entails a host of  different and varied types of  evaluations of  an 
individual. We are not subject only to deontological constraints—ought, obligated to, must, 
permitted to—and the corresponding evaluations in both our actions and beliefs. Rather, the 
kinds of  evaluations targeted at us, and that we target at others, cover deep features of  the 
individual herself. It is not simply that someone ought (not) to believe that p, but that some 
individuals, in believing that p, are stupid, ignorant, brilliant, careless, meticulous, open-
minded, and so on. As such, our understanding of  epistemic competence must 
                                                 
116 See Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, Ch. 2 section IV, and Fischer, My Way, 2006: Ch. 3. 




accommodate the rich normative landscape of  evaluation for belief. To be the appropriate 
target of  epistemic evaluation is to be subject to evaluation not just of  what one believes, 
but of  being a believer.118  
To appreciate epistemic competence as being about what it is to be a believer subject to 
the norms that govern belief  (formation/acquisition/ maintenance) is to appreciate the 
contextual and perhaps holistic way we evaluate others. This alone should show us that 
whatever constitutes epistemic competence cannot be a relatively straightforward feature like 
voluntary control. The mere ability to control our beliefs and our environment means 
nothing without knowing what to do and how to do it.119 This is not to say that we do not 
have any ability to affect what we believe. In my arguments against voluntarism, I have 
intimated that what we think as control over what we believe is not control at all. Rather, we 
have an ability to influence our beliefs. We cannot voluntarily choose what we do (not) 
believe, but we can voluntarily engage in activities, adopt policies, and so on, that do lead to 
some belief  or other.  
It is tempting to think about influence as a way to ground epistemic evaluability, but we 
should resist that temptation.120 And this for two reasons: on the one hand, because the 
norms that govern belief  (formation) could hold absent what we do (that is, however much 
effort we put into changing our habits, developing a capacity, and so forth), the mere ability 
to influence our beliefs may not be necessary for competence; on the other, there are surely 
very many individuals who are able to influence what they believe who are exempt from 
                                                 
118 Contrary to some attempts to rescue deontological constraints for belief despite not having voluntary 
control, this is not simply to reinterpret those constraints as, say, role oughts (as Feldman, “Voluntary Belief” 
does). This view includes role oughts, proper deontological constraints (where appropriate), virtue constraints 
and others. 
119 Of course, no one thinks it does. But once we make explicit what it is to control something, we see that the 
mere ability to control something does not require awareness or sensitivity. Just because it is overwhelmingly 
the case that awareness, sensitivity, and know-how attend instances of control, it does not follow that those 
features are constitutive of it. 




(certain kinds of) appraisal. In this case, the ability to influence our beliefs is not sufficient. 
What I am suggesting here is that we must be careful to avoid the temptation to replace a 
control condition on reactive evaluability with a mere ability to influence how we believe. As 
I suggested above, the mere ability to influence belief  is explanatorily inert without the 
corresponding knowledge of  how to do so and why. I shall argue later that once properly 
understood within the context of  the abilities to recognize and assess reasons to believe, the 
ability to influence belief  is a part of  epistemic competence; the ability to influence our 
beliefs is part of  an integrated cognitive ability. To be clear, it is not just an ability to engage 
in activities that influence our beliefs that makes us the appropriate target of  evaluation. 
Rather, it is because we have the ability to recognize norms and direct ourselves in response 
to them. In other words, the ability to influence our beliefs is part of  being responsive to 
reasons, or as I shall eventually argue, the ability to influence our beliefs is partially 
constitutive of  knowing how to know.  





Before we begin to reflect critically on epistemic evaluability (and evaluation), we seem to 
have an intuition that being evaluable requires that we be in control of  the belief; the degree 
of  evaluability covaries with the amount of  control we have. But this extremely coarse-
grained way of  looking at things begins to fall apart immediately on deeper scrutiny. We do 
not have this kind of  control—which is fairly obvious—nor is it the case that even if  we 




control that to be epistemically competent one must be able to exercise some kind of  control 
over belief.   
     So, the arguments in this chapter that belief  is not under our voluntary control do not 
miss the mark. While it may be true that it is control that underwrites responsibility (or 
evaluability) for action, it is not so for belief. If  we want an account of  what grounds 
reactive epistemic evaluability, however, we must look elsewhere. So, if  it is not control that 
underwrites doxastic evaluability, perhaps it is instead a feature that we mistakenly believe 











In the last chapter, I intimated that rather than control underwriting the appropriateness of  
epistemic reactive attitudes, it is some aspect that we mistakenly identify with, or think 
entails, control. While the ability to influence what we believe seems to be the natural 
replacement for doxastic control, I suggested unless we know how and why we would want 
to do so, the ability merely to influence belief  is at best only one part of  the story. Since fully 
exempt epistemic subjects influence their beliefs in myriad ways every day, if  doxastic 
influence plays a role in epistemic competence it will not be quite so straight forward. It is 
not just the ability to influence our beliefs, but the ability to do so in the right way. But what 
is the right way to influence belief ? I take it that epistemically competent individuals have the 
ability to influence their beliefs in ways that increase the probability of  their beliefs being 
true. This is not to say they do influence their beliefs in these ways all the time or even a 
majority of  the time, but rather to maintain that they have the ability to do so. The 
implication is that they are aware of  what they are doing or that they know how to influence 
their beliefs.  
 Ultimately, I reject conscious awareness as the ground of  evaluability since we might be 




not to maintain that epistemic evaluability does not require any kind of  awareness, but rather 
that the nature and object of  that awareness is quite different from the intuitive candidates I 
discuss below. Yet, just as the investigation into the nature of  doxastic control in the 
previous chapter yielded insights about the role of  influence we have over our beliefs, the 
investigation and rejection of  awareness will likewise yield some insights or clues for where 
to look for an account of  competence. In particular, the aptness of  evaluation in the case of  
doxastic omission suggests that the ground of  evaluability—and therefore that which 
constitutes epistemic competence—must be a deep and stable feature of  our cognition. A 
natural place to look for such features would be our cognitive virtues and abilities.  
I begin in §3.1 by briefly discussing the nature and object(s) of  doxastic awareness. If  we 
suppose that an individual is epistemically competent on the grounds of  some kind of  
doxastic awareness, we must clarify the nature and object of  that awareness. Are we aware of  
the reasons for belief, the belief  itself, the formation of  the belief, or ourselves as belief  
forming subjects? I argue that awareness plays a crucial role in epistemic competence even 
though we need not be conscious of  our reasons for belief, the faculty/capacity that formed 
the belief, or the belief  itself, and that we may fail to be subject to evaluation even in cases 
where we are aware of  such things. Although this gives the appearance that awareness is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic competence, I maintain this is to oversimplify 
the holistic character of  belief  formation. In §3.2, I examine two alternative accounts of  an 
awareness condition on epistemic competence and suggest they provide clues to 
understanding strong intuitions about doxastic awareness. More exactly, I raise the possibility 
that epistemic competence is (at least partially) explained by structural features of  our 
psychology, namely, intellectual capacities and abilities that make possible epistemic 




 These structural features of  our psychology must provide resources to satisfy several 
desiderata if  they are to do the work required to underwrite reactive evaluability. Specifically, 
they must be able to: explain apt evaluation in light of  doxastic omissions, explain our ability 
to influence our beliefs, be present in all intellectually mature individuals, offer plausible 
explanations about evaluability and evaluation, suggest a relatively clear demarcation between 
competent and noncompetent individuals while recognizing the fact that there is no hard 
and fast line, and so on. The recent focus on cognitive abilities and virtues argued for by 
virtue epistemologists provides valuable resources in this regard. In §3.3, I shall argue that 
epistemic competence is constituted by cognitive abilities and virtues. To stop here would be 
to fail to answer the competence question, though. It is not enough to argue that cognitive 
abilities and virtues ground evaluability; I must also present a case for how they do so and 
which abilities are necessary (and sufficient), which is the task of  chapters 5 and 6. 
 Before proceeding to investigate the nature and role of  doxastic awareness in epistemic 
competence, I should like to make a methodological point. Just as with my discussion of  
doxastic control, part of  my argument will trade on the fact that control and awareness come 
apart. Once we abstract awareness away from choice or control, we find that merely being 
aware of  our beliefs, our reasons for belief, and so on is insufficient to explain epistemic 
competence. One might think all we need to do then is put control and awareness together 
in the account. Of  course, this strategy cannot get off  the ground since doxastic control is a 
myth. Nevertheless, the focus on conscious awareness divorced from control shall yield 
clearer insights than if  we muddied the waters by including control as well. Consequently, the 
account of  competence I develop later will provide a more nuanced role for awareness and, 





3.1. Doxastic Awareness 
 
As with control, there is an intuitive connection between responsibility and awareness. If  an 
agent through no fault of  her own is unaware of  the rightness or wrongfulness of  her 
action121—if  we would be wrong to think she ought to have been aware of  those features 
but through her own negligence was not—then there is a strong case to be made that she is 
exempt or absolved from responsibility. The same may be said of  doxastic responsibility. If  
an agent failed to be aware of  relevant epistemic features through no fault of  her own, it 
seems at least uncharitable, if  not wrong, of  us to hold her responsible for forming (failing 
to form) the relevant belief. But the conditions for the warranted ascription of  responsibility 
either for our actions or our beliefs are stricter than the appropriateness of  ascriptions—
evaluability—in general. The point generalizes to other kinds reactive attitudes as well. Since 
the latter attitudes could be apt, in general, even if  they are not warranted for the specific 
belief, the conditions of  epistemic competence may likewise be fulfilled even in the absence 
of  awareness. So-called culpable omissions appear to lead us to the conclusion that 
awareness is not necessary for either competence or responsibility. This is, however, to 
dismiss the role of  awareness in epistemic competence too quickly; just because we are not 
aware of  the rightness or wrongfulness of  a belief/action it does not follow that conscious 
awareness plays no part in the explanatory story. The task of  this section is to examine the 
nature and objects of  doxastic awareness and address whether some kind of  awareness is 
sufficient and/or necessary for epistemic competence. 
                                                 
121 For simplicity, when characterizing the awareness requirement on responsibility or competence I shall use 
“right” and “wrong” and its cognates. In practice we use a much richer vocabulary when attributing 
responsibility. An action may be careless, thoughtful, rude, and so on. I take it the context will determine the 




 I shall suggest that even a minimal kind of  non-reflective awareness of  the belief, our 
reasons (evidence) for the belief, our belief-forming capacities, or even ourselves as believing 
agents—collectively referred to as epistemic awareness—is not sufficient to underwrite 
epistemic reactive attitudes. Moreover, the problem of  doxastic omissions presents a 
powerful, though not complete, case against the necessity of  epistemic awareness. If  I could 
rightly be the subject of  epistemic reactive attitudes in cases where I lack awareness, then it 
seems the only role it could play implicates a modal awareness requirement. For example, if  I 
fail to be aware of, say, reasons for a belief  that I should be (have been) aware of, then a case 
can be made that awareness is necessary, in some sense, to underwrite epistemic competence. 
Unfortunately, even this modal awareness requirement cannot adequately explain 
responsibility for omissions. Let us begin with the nature of  epistemic awareness. 
 
 
a. The nature and objects of  epistemic awareness 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, because I tried to highlight the parity of  reasoning between 
responsibility for action and belief, I focused on the idea that doxastic responsibility and, 
even more generally, epistemic competence appears to require at least the possibility of  
reflective awareness on the reasons and evidence for (against) belief. But we should consider 
three other possible objects of  awareness: the belief  itself, the belief-forming faculty or capacity, or 
ourselves as believing subjects. The prevalence of  culpable doxastic omissions shows that we can 
rightly be targeted with epistemic reactive attitudes even when we are not aware of  the 
reasons and evidence for a belief, the belief  itself, or the capacities productive of  belief. 
Further, since awareness of  each of  these is possible without being epistemically competent, 




 Allow me to clarify the possible objects of  awareness a bit more. If  one wants to 
maintain that epistemic competence is constituted (wholly or in part) by consciousness 
awareness, she must first identify what the competent individual is aware of  such that in 
being aware of  it, she is competent. I suggested four possible objects of  awareness. Consider 
the belief  that the lunar landing was faked. If  we think that Walter in believing that the lunar 
landing was faked is open to assessment on the basis of  that belief  because he was 
consciously aware of  it, what does "it" refer to? Perhaps Walter is evaluable because he is 
aware of  having the belief. In this way, we might say that Walter is evaluable because in being 
aware of  the belief, he consciously endorses it.122 Or perhaps we mean that Walter is 
evaluable because he is aware of  the reasons on which he came to believe that the lunar 
landing was faked. Since he persists in his belief, it looks as if  he consciously endorses those 
reasons. Or, we might think that Walter is evaluable because he is aware of  the process(es) by 
which he came to believe it—i.e., consciously aware, for example, of  the faculties or 
capacities, or that in believing as he does he must have manifested or exercised those 
capacities. Here, he consciously endorses the capacities he exercised or manifested in coming 
to believe the landing was faked. (There is one final object of  awareness that bears 
mentioning. One might think that competence—i.e., being the appropriate target of  
epistemic reactive attitudes—is constituted by self-awareness, or more precisely, awareness 
of  one's self  as a believer. It seems obvious that self-awareness is necessary for competence, 
but fairly vacuously so—we return to this below—but it is not at all clear why it would be 
sufficient; to put it bluntly, conscious awareness of  ourselves as believers is impotent to 
effect any kind of  influence on our belief  acquisition or retention.) Now the advocate of  
                                                 
122 One might object at this point by accusing me of being too simplistic. Awareness of the belief, capacities or 
reasons for belief need not be consciously endorsed. Rather, it is enough that one would endorse them if 
questioned about it. There is some plausibility to this, but ultimately, the problem of doxastic omissions which 




conscious awareness might accept any combination of  these objects of  awareness to make 
her case. For now, let us turn to discussing more fully the nature of  that awareness. 
 In a recent book, George Sher argues against what he calls the “searchlight view” of  
conscious awareness for moral responsibility. According to this view, “an agent’s moral 
responsibility extends only as far as his awareness of  what he is doing."123 Of  course, this 
does not imply that responsible action requires that one is aware of  everything one is doing; 
rather, what is required is that one is aware of  the morally or prudentially relevant features 
of  the act. In essence, the searchlight view maintains that responsibility is found within the 
searchlight of  conscious awareness. Just as the range and distance of  an actual searchlight is 
limited, so too is the range and distance of  our conscious awareness of  an act limited. And, 
it is only those morally or prudentially relevant features of  an act, illuminated by the 
searchlight of  our consciousness, for which we can be responsible. Notice that “the view 
says not that we are responsible only for those features of  our acts to which we are actively 
paying attention, but rather that we are responsible only for those features of  which we are 
at least passively aware.”124 The argument can be applied to the focus of  the present work 
mutatis mutandis; accordingly, advocates of  such a view would maintain that a subject is 
epistemically accountable only for those features illuminated by the searchlight of  his 
conscious awareness.  
 The prima facie intuitive plausibility of  this view immediately falls apart once it is made 
explicit. Not only do I bear responsibility for things I am aware of, but I also bear 
responsibility for actions of  which I am not aware. I might be fully to blame for an accident I 
caused due to negligence where I was not aware that in performing that action I caused the 
accident. For example, I might cause an accident by texting and driving because I was so 
                                                 
123 Sher, Who Knew?, 4. 




engrossed in the text message that I was completely unaware of  the road and nearby drivers. 
It is important, then, to determine the kind of  awareness we must have, if  any, in order to be 
responsible, keeping in mind that the conditions of  doxastic responsibility, and to a greater 
extent epistemic evaluability, differ from conditions of  responsibility for action. 
If  I can be evaluable for actions where I am not aware either that I am doing them or 
that they are right (wrong), then perhaps my evaluability lies in the fact that I should have 
been aware or that I was aware I was doing something that could very easily cause such an 
accident. In other words, my evaluability seems to lie either in a conscious awareness that an 
action is wrong, say, or trace back to a consciously chosen action that brought about the 
current wrong action. We need not enter in discussion of  convoluted action-sequence chains 
to find issues with thinking about awareness and evaluability along these lines. If  I forget to 
pick my wife up at the metro station because it slipped my mind, her frustration or anger or 
sadness at my carelessness is apt,125 assuming carelessness is the cause and not, e.g., a head 
injury. I may have done nothing to forget this, and yet I bear responsibility for it. It will not 
do to maintain that my responsibility lies in my failure to cultivate a way to remember such 
things or a failure to cultivate care for my wife’s wellbeing. Unless every act of  carelessness 
such as this can be traced to a conscious decision to not cultivate certain habits or attitudes, 
then responsibility ascriptions, as well as more general evaluations, are apt even in cases 
where there is no initiating conscious choice that leads to the present wrong act. At the very 
least, such a response combined with the searchlight view fails to explain the appropriateness 
of  my wife’s attitude. 
Suppose that my responsibility in this case involves awareness in some way. What way 
could that be? It is not conscious awareness of  the wrongfulness of  the action since I am, ex 
                                                 





hypothesi, not aware of  the act itself  and hence of  its wrongfulness; it is as Sher says, “a mere 
non-event.”126 It is likewise not awareness of  an action that brought about the forgetting. 
Nor is it even an awareness of  the fact that a conscious action could have resulted in my 
forgetting my wife at the Metro. It seems that if  awareness plays any role at all here it is in 
the fact that upon realizing that I forgot to pick up my wife I would recognize this as a 
failure on my part and that upon recognizing this I should take steps to make sure, insofar as 
possible, that I am not so careless in the future; when I recognize a failing in me as a failing 
and do not take steps to become better, I am accountable for such negligence.127 In other 
words, it is in the ability to recognize and be moved by relevant norms. So, responsibility 
requires at least the awareness of  the wrongfulness of  an action when that action is brought to my 
attention, the recognition that such an action is or would be wrong, or perhaps more weakly 
an awareness of  the relevant norms that would lead me to recognize the action as wrong 
once I adequately understood it. 
What seems to be required is a kind of  in-principle awareness; upon reflection, I would 
or at least could be aware that what I was doing was wrong, and that nothing blocks my 
ability to exercise that capacity, e.g., such as unconsciousness. What follows from this is that 
my inattention at the moment exempts me only if  I lack this capacity globally or this capacity 
is undermined temporarily and locally. This gets tangled up with modal and normative issues. 
To suggest that upon reflection I would be aware is to maintain that had I been more careful 
I would have noticed certain features of  the belief/action, including features of  myself—e.g., 
that I am prone to forgetfulness or that I am not well enough informed to decide—which 
made it wrong. And why would this matter unless I should have been aware and thus could 
have been aware of  those features? Still, even if  we require only this less demanding form of  
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awareness, we may be evaluable in cases where the searchlight of  our awareness failed to 
illuminate features it should have. By parity of  reasoning one could argue that we are 
evaluable based on beliefs just in case we are either aware of  the reasons and evidence for 
(against) them—including features about ourselves—or we should have been aware of  the 
reasons and evidence for (against) them.128  
If  we extend this to broader epistemic reactive attitudes, we find similar reasoning. We 
might argue that one's thinking is careless only when one has been or (at least) should have 
been aware of  the reasons and evidence for (against) a claim.129 This would leave us with a 
disjunctive condition. Epistemic competence requires either that one is aware of  the 
rightness (wrongness) of  one's belief  or that she should have been. The disjunctive 
understanding of  the awareness condition, if  right, maintains that awareness is necessary to 
underwrite epistemic competence. But there is no such requirement since one could fail to 
be aware in relevant ways and yet be the appropriate target of  reactive attitudes. To see why 
we need to understand what “should” means when we say that an individual is evaluable for 
a belief  only if  she was aware or should have been aware of  the rightness or wrongfulness 
of  it. 
George Sher offers four different interpretations of  what it means that an individual is 
responsible for an act only if  she should have been aware of  its rightness or wrongfulness. 
We can apply his interpretations to epistemic evaluability. We might mean that: (a) there is 
some sort of  relation (deductive, probabilistic, or evidential) between something that the 
                                                 
128 There is a notable exception to the analogy from accountability for action, however. Action requires control. 
So an agent is responsible for an action if and only if she was (could have been) aware of the rightness or 
wrongfulness of her action and chose to act on (disregard) it. There is no such control condition on epistemic 
accountability; I am not made aware of the reasons and evidence for a belief which I then subsequently decide to 
believe. In being made aware of those reasons and that evidence my belief-forming capacities or cognitive 
abilities take over and produce the belief. 
129 We should not be confused by our evaluations that appear to contradict this idea. Sometimes we evaluate 
someone’s thinking as careless for pedagogical reasons. The point here is not to target them with reactive 




individual believes and the foolishness or wrongness of  the belief; (b) that the individual 
failed to realize the reasons and evidence that, in the situation, would have shown the belief  
to be wrong or foolish; (c) the individual fell below an applicable standard by failing to 
realize those reasons; (d) or, she fell below an applicable standard by failing to do something 
that would have led her to realize the reasons that show her belief  is wrong or foolish.130 The 
problem, Sher argues, is that none of  these connect the individual to the failure to believe in 
the right way. The fact of  the abstract relations between a belief ’s wrongness and the reasons 
for thinking it wrong in (a) do not explain how those relations can underwrite evaluability 
unless the individual should have been aware either that there are such relations between 
what the individual believes and the wrongness of  foolishness of  the new belief, or that 
something the individual believes makes the new belief  wrong or foolish. But this is to 
introduce the problematic “should” all over again. There is a similar difficulty with (b). It 
does no good to attempt to understand the awareness condition by appeal to what the 
individual should have done if  that explanation maintains that the individual failed to realize 
the reasons that showed the belief  is wrong. Again, we have reintroduced the problem of  
awareness at the level of  the reasons for thinking the belief  was wrong. Since I am 
attempting to give an account of  competence understood as that which underwrites the 
appropriateness of  reactive attitudes, (c) and (d) provide no help either.  
To suggest that we understand “should have been aware” as implicating the failure to 
meet a standard is to suggest, obliquely, that we understand competence—i.e., the 
applicability of  reactive attitudes when failing to meet those standards—as requiring that one 
meets standards. An example will clarify this. Recall Susan whose bias towards Sea World 
causes her to fail to view the documentary Blackfish objectively. If  Susan is unaware of  her 
                                                 




epistemic faults, it is natural to suggest that she is, nevertheless, evaluable because she should 
be aware of  them. The present suggestion is that the appropriateness of  our reactive 
attitudes towards Susan is grounded in the idea that either she fell below an applicable 
standard by failing to realize that she was not viewing the film objectively or that she fell 
below some applicable standard in failing to do something to realize this. How could this 
possibly illuminate epistemic competence? Our competence could not be constituted by an 
awareness of  this kind since it already assumes competence in the very notion of  applicable 
standards. We already know Susan is evaluable based on her epistemic fault because she is 
competent. We now want an explanation as to how she could be evaluable for a belief—that 
Blackfish is misleading and defamatory—precisely because she is unaware she has fallen 
below an applicable standard.  
 Susan is evaluable not due to awareness (whether occurrent awareness of  the reasons 
and evidence for a belief) or a requirement that she should have been aware, but rather 
because of  a general ability to recognize reasons for (against) belief, an ability to “justify what 
one says.”131  This latter point brings to light the importance of  norm recognition. To 
suggest that I could have been aware of  the rightness or wrongness of  a belief  or the 
reasons for it is to suggest that I could recognize when belief  or the reasons for it are good 
(bad). The arguments that follow provide insight into the role of  awareness in epistemic 
competence, which leaves us with something that retains the spirit of  the modal condition 
of  awareness—i.e., epistemic evaluability requires, at least, that one should have been aware 
of  the reasons and evidence for a claim—but moves from the awareness of  reasons and 
evidence to a recognition of  norms made possible by the individual’s cognitive abilities. 
 
                                                 




b. Epistemic omissions and the necessity of  awareness 
 
Sometimes epistemic reactive attitudes are appropriate even in cases where the subject was 
not aware they (failed to) believe(d) something they should (not) have. Call this the problem 
of  (accountable) epistemic omissions. Put most simply, the problem of  epistemic omissions 
maintains that since a subject is the appropriate target of  reactive attitudes when due to her 
negligence she fails to be aware of  something she should have (and thus could have) been 
aware of, doxastic awareness is not necessary to underwrite those attitudes. When it comes 
to awareness of  our beliefs and reasons, there are corresponding cases of  appropriate 
reactive attitudes without awareness. When it comes to awareness of  our belief-forming 
capacities or ourselves as believing subjects, we find either the awareness component is 
vacuous or not broad enough. Let us take each object of  awareness in turn. 
Fairly obviously, I might have a belief  I am unaware I should not have and be subject to 
evaluation based on it. For example, recall Joe the Fox News-loving climate science denier. 
We could think (rightly) that Joe is rather careless (or perhaps something stronger) for his 
belief  even if  we find out that Joe is not aware of  any good reasons not to believe what he 
does. Alternatively, we could think (rightly) that Joe is rather careless (or perhaps something 
stronger) for his refraining from believing something he should believe even if  we find out 
that he is not aware of  any good reasons not to refrain. And similarly, for his failure to reject 
a belief  he is not aware he should reject or for his failure to form a belief  that he is not aware 
he should form. There are, then, four ways in which one can be evaluable for culpable 
epistemic omissions. In addition, there are any combinations of  the object of  awareness as 
well. For example, one might be evaluable for thinking reasons r are good reasons to believe 
that p even if  one is unaware that one is cognitively “blind” to the fact that r are not good 




evaluation even though one is unaware of  the fact that another object of  awareness, namely 
one’s cognitive capacities/faculties, are causing one to be unjustifiably biased. Perhaps one’s 
fears about one’s own economic situation cause one to be unable to recognize that r are in 
actuality bad reasons to believe that p. The point is there are many ways one can commit 
epistemic omissions. In order to examine whether some kind of  awareness is necessary for 
epistemic competence, we need not examine each possible combination, however. We need 
only construct the least demanding cases—i.e., cases with the least demand for conscious 
awareness, or those with the least possibility of  smuggling in conscious awareness—to 
determine what role, if  any, conscious awareness plays in underwriting epistemic reactive 
attitudes. 
Now, the least demanding general type of  epistemic omission is the double failure: the 
failure to believe because of  the lack of  awareness of  different objects of  epistemic 
awareness. This also happens to be the most difficult kind of  case to explain why someone 
might be evaluable for an omission. To see why, we need only recognize that the double 
failure is the only kind of  omission where there is a total non-event. Not only is there no 
belief  formed, hence no belief-forming act, there is no awareness of  one’s not forming the 
belief. If  it can be shown that we are or can be evaluated based on a double-failure omission, 
then it follows that conscious awareness—at least occurrent conscious awareness—is not 
necessary for epistemic competence. I shall present three cases of  apt evaluability for a 
double failure corresponding to each of  the proposed objects of  epistemic awareness: 
reasons for belief, the belief  itself, and belief-forming capacities/faculties. Fairly obviously, if  
one lacks all self-awareness, then reactive attitudes would be inapt, but we shall return to the 




Examination of  the three types of  double-failure omissions points us towards the idea 
that the kind of  awareness required to be apt targets of  reactive attitudes is the kind present 
in knowing how to do something. Indeed, since reactive attitudes are directed at individuals, 
they target deep features of  the individual; features present even when an individual is guilty 
of  an omission, especially those expressed or manifest in one’s abilities. 
The first kind of  double-failure omission we shall look at involves failing to believe 
something because one is unaware of  the reasons to believe it. 
 
1) Reasons Double-Failure: Jon has an important upcoming job interview. He 
arrives at the original time the interview was set but comes to find out the time was 
pushed up and he missed it. A week prior he received an email with the updated time 
but never read it. So, Jon fails to revise his original belief  and in so doing fails to 
believe the meeting is earlier than originally scheduled because he is unaware of  the 
reasons to believe it, viz., that it was rescheduled. It seems perfectly reasonable for 
his prospective employers to hold this against him.  
 
There are ways to fill out the details such that Jon is excused, absolved, or exempt from 
any negative assessments his prospective employers may direct at him. Suppose Jon was out 
of  the country, deep in the jungle away from any internet connection and only arrived back 
in town the morning of  the interview. In this case, his failure to know the new time is 
excused. Or, suppose Jon was in an accident and was in a coma for the past week. He fully 
recovered only the day before the interview and was in medical tests all day. In this case, the 
prospective employers’ evaluations misfire, they are directed at an individual who is 
absolved—i.e. wholly excused—from such attitudes. However, for our purposes let us say 
that Jon was perfectly capable of  checking his email but simply did not do so. So, Jon had a 
reasonable amount of  time to ensure that he knew the appropriate time of  the meeting and 
simply failed to do so. Here, his employers are entitled to count this against him. It would 





We must be careful not to conclude that awareness plays no role, however. If  Jon were 
wholly unaware he would be exempt from reactive attitudes as in the case where he was in a 
coma. It seems, then, that Jon’s lack of  awareness of  the reasons to believe the meeting time 
changed does not imply a complete lack of  awareness. In particular, we would expect that 
given the importance of  the interview that Jon would be more careful and confirm his 
appointment. That he did not indicates a careless attitude that plausibly carries over to other 
activities. In other words, since Jon is aware that the meeting is important he should have 
been more careful. What this case does show is that awareness of  the particular reasons for a 
belief  is not required to underwrite the aptness of  reactive attitudes. A more general 
awareness of  the activity or its importance does appear to be necessary. This amounts to 
awareness of  norms or at least normative features of  the situation. We can garner similar 
lessons from cases of  belief double-failure.  
In cases of  belief double-failure, one may be unaware that another belief  one has, q, 
causes one to fail to believe something else, p. For example, one might be unaware that one 
believes so strongly that a person is good that it makes them incapable of  believing anything 
bad about that person.  
 
2) Belief  Double-Failure: Joe implicitly believes whatever Fox News reports. 
As a result, he fails to believe that humans are causing climate change. In fact, he 
believes the contrary that humans are not causing climate change and the 
temperature and weather fluctuations are the result of  a solar cycle. His implicit 
trust in Fox News causes him to be blind to any contrary evidence. If  pressed, 
Joe would claim to be well informed and have fair and balanced opinions about 
the matter. He would report what he has heard on Fox News all the while 
thinking he was reasonable. He might even think that he does not trust Fox 
News in everything but attempts to get a well-rounded perspective. In fact, he 
does not look anywhere but Fox News for his information, including his 
information about climate change.132  
 
                                                 
132 To modify this case make his lack of awareness be about contrary views or about his failure to recognize the 




As with reason double-failure there are ways to fill in the details where Joe would be 
excused, absolved, or exempt. But surely there are details that would implicate his openness 
to appraisal as well. Additionally, the lesson we should learn from this case is that the nature 
and the object of  awareness need to be made clearer. If  we think that responsibility and thus 
competence requires conscious awareness either of  the belief  one does not have (which 
would be very odd) or, at least, of  the unknowingly undermining belief, then this case 
presents a deep problem for the advocate of  awareness as constituting competence. If, 
however, we think that there is some kind of  awareness involved even if  it need not be 
about the target belief  or undermining belief, then this case helps us to illuminate the nature 
and object of  that awareness. Indeed, a picture is emerging of  the nature and object of  that 
awareness which suggests a kind of  awareness of, not what we believe or do, but how we 
believe or act.  
This picture highlights the very evaluations and reactive attitudes we are trying to 
explain. When we evaluate individuals based on their beliefs or actions, our principal target is 
not the act or belief, but the agent. The problem with Jon in the first case is that he is careless 
about important matters and the attitudes directed at him reflect this. Likewise, the problem 
with Joe is not that he does or does not believe that humans are causing climate change; after 
all, there may be some highly knowledgeable scientists that also believe this. Rather, he 
shows himself, in the way he goes about acquiring/maintaining beliefs, to be closed-minded, 
dogmatic, and blinkered. Nevertheless, he has a kind of  epistemic awareness whose object is 
how to go about believing—a kind that, at least partially, constitutes his knowing how to 
acquire/maintain beliefs—and this implicates the aptness of  the reactive attitudes we direct 




The final way we might commit a double-failure omission is when our lack of  awareness 
of  our faculties or capacities—or, more likely, a lack of  awareness of  the limitations of  our 
faculties or capacities—can cause us to fail to believe something. Whether the lack of  belief  
is the result of  the inadequacies or limitations of  cognitive faculties and capacities or a lack 
of  awareness of  the affect of  conative faculties and abilities on cognitive faculties, capacities, 
and abilities, our ground-level reactive attitudes may be appropriate. 
 
3) Faculty Double-Failure: Steve fails to believe that texting and driving is 
dangerous. He happily texts and drives most days whether he is on the highway 
or sitting at a stoplight. He is completely unaware of  inattentional blindness and 
defends his ability by claiming that he never looks down at his phone but only 
keeps it in line of  sight with the road.133    
 
Steve’s lack of  awareness about inattentional blindness keeps him from seeing the danger 
in texting and driving. Since he thinks that if  his eyes are directed at the road, then he sees 
the road, he believes that there is no problem with his texting and driving. In this case, a 
limitation in his perceptual capacity of  which he himself  is unaware causes him to fail to 
believe that texting and driving is unsafe. As with the previous two examples, his lack of  
awareness does not excuse, absolve, or exempt him from reactive attitudes. The importance 
of  being safe not just for oneself  but for the other drivers on the road demands that Steve 
show more attention. The fact that he shows himself  to be careless is both epistemically and 
morally problematic.  
Again, the attitudes we direct at Steve are not just about the belief  or lack thereof; we do 
not direct reactive attitudes at abstracta like beliefs, or propositions, we direct them at the 
                                                 
133 One way of filling out the details of this case reveals it to be another instance of belief double-failure. For 
example, perhaps Steve is unaware of his tacit belief about his own driving skill that causes him to not believe 
that texting and driving is dangerous, or, that his texting and driving is dangerous. This is plausible, but so is the 
case where his lack of awareness concerning his cognitive limitations causes him not to believe that texting and 




individuals who have them. We do so because something about them explains why they believe 
as they do. Like Joe in the second case, Steve shows himself  to be aware of  norms governing 
belief  and action. But this case highlights also the fact that Steve is aware, in some sense, of  
his abilities. For example, he is aware that holding beliefs requires that we give reasons for 
them (evinced in the defense of  his practice). Additionally, he is aware that certain activities 
and actions, e.g., driving, requires that we exercise certain abilities, e.g., paying attention to 
the road instead of  looking away from it.  
What is not yet clear from these examples is what norms and abilities we must be aware 
of  in order to be epistemically competent.134 Since we are concerned with basic epistemic 
competence, the norms and abilities must be general enough that all normally functioning 
adults have them. It is implausible, in the extreme, that normally functioning adults—
possessors of  mature human knowledge—are wholly unaware of  basic norms governing 
belief  formation or of  the abilities one must manifest/exercise in order to acquire beliefs in 
accordance with those norms. Awareness of  some kind, then, appears to be required to be 
the appropriate targets of  reactive attitudes, but not awareness of  the reasons, belief, or 
faculty.  
This discussion of  doxastic omissions has raised three central clues to understanding 
epistemic competence. First, fundamentally, epistemic evaluation is directed at epistemic 
subjects. When we say things like, "that's a stupid thing to believe," this is shorthand for, "in 
believing that, you are acting/being stupid” (in some sense). Second, when we target 
epistemic subjects with reactive attitudes, we implicate either how they went about coming to 
believe as they do or their understanding or awareness of  how one should go about forming 
                                                 
134 We shall return to this in chapter five and six where I argue that cognitive abilities are capacities that we 
exercise guidance control over and that the ability to recognize, attend to and assess reasons for belief—




beliefs—i.e., we implicate their understanding or awareness (or lack thereof) of  belief  norms. 
Third, forming beliefs is an activity brought about by the exercise or manifestation of  
abilities. I shall return to this below. For now, I need to determine whether awareness is 
sufficient for competence.  
 
 
c. Is epistemic awareness sufficient for competence? 
 
The case against the sufficiency of  awareness is rather straightforward. Conscious 
awareness—be it reflective or non-reflective—of  the reasons for belief, the belief  itself, or 
the faculties or capacities productive of  belief  could not be sufficient for epistemic 
competence since that awareness is wholly passive. As I intimated in chapter 2, I shall argue 
that the ability to influence our beliefs is partially constitutive of  epistemic competence. 
Neither could awareness of  the norms that govern belief  formation nor awareness of  the 
cognitive abilities one exercises/manifests when forming beliefs be sufficient for the same 
reason. As such, it could not connect the believer to the belief  (or mere awareness could not 
explain the lack of  belief  in the case of  omissions). Consider an analogy with moral 
attributability. Suppose Gary suffers from Alien Hand Syndrome—a condition where one’s 
hand does things that the individual cannot stop. Upon meeting his new boss, Gary attempts 
to shake his hand only to find that instead his “alien” hand is slapping the new boss across 
the face. Individuals who suffer from alien-hand syndrome are fully aware of  what that hand 
is doing, they are simply unable to do anything about it.  
In the doxastic realm, we do not target individuals with reactive attitudes on the basis of  




assessment only. While someone may be judged on the way they have come to have poor 
vision, for example by staring at the sun because they believed it would make their eyes 
stronger, the individual is not negatively assessed for seeing as they do, now that they have 
poor eyesight. This is true even if  the individual is wholly aware of  their sensations, the 
reasons for believing something, or the belief  itself.135 
Requiring that individuals be aware of  the reasons for belief, the belief, or belief-forming 
capacities in order to be epistemically competent is vacuous if  it is not coupled with a way 
of  doing something. The mere idle observance of  the manifestation of  capacities and the 
subsequent beliefs that are formed could not make us the appropriate subject of  reactive 
attitudes. We would be no more than passive receptors of  information. But we are active 
knowers. Beliefs are something we acquire, use, justify, and correct. If  we could do no more 
than monitor the coming and going of  our beliefs, there is no reason to think we should be 
subject to anything more than the objective evaluations of  systems. 
 Let us take stock of  the argument so far. Doxastic control is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to underwrite epistemic evaluability. This conclusion led to the idea that perhaps 
there is another feature that constitutes competence that is mistakenly thought to entail 
control. The most promising candidate appears to be conscious awareness. Yet, upon 
scrutiny, if  awareness plays a role in a theory of  epistemic competence it does not do so in a 
straightforwardly obvious way. The fact that we can rightly be targeted with reactive attitudes 
in the case of  doxastic omissions shows us that we need not be aware of  the reasons for the 
belief, the belief  itself, nor even the faculties that produce or form the belief. What we are 
aware of  is the norms that govern belief  formation and perhaps the abilities we manifest 
when attempting to satisfy those norms. We are appropriately targeted with reactive attitudes 
                                                 
135 Sometimes the stakes affect assessment. A spy might be assessed negatively for reporting seeing a red square 




in the case of  omissions because we neglect to use our cognitive abilities to satisfy norms 
that we should, and hence could, satisfy.  
This last point is important. It suggests that once we recognize our failing, we would do 
something to correct it. There is a de dicto/de re ambiguity here that proves instructive.136 
Consider Joe, the Fox News devotee. He might recognize that he has some epistemic failing 
without recognizing, specifically, any epistemic failing he has. In much the same way, we 
recognize that we have many false beliefs without recognizing, specifically, which of  our 
beliefs are false. Once we recognize an epistemic failing as an epistemic failing, rather than 
just not as efficient, say, we would do something to correct it. Presumably, since Joe believes 
the way he gets his news is “fair and balanced” he would not recognize he is blinkered in his 
consumption of  the news, he does not recognize this failing as a failing. He may recognize, 
in general, that he has some epistemic faults and yet persist in the particularly egregious fault 
of  blindly trusting Fox News. It is in the ability to recognize that he has some epistemic 
failings—has not adequately satisfied the norms of  belief  acquisition/maintenance—where 
we find grounds to appropriately target Joe with epistemic reactive attitudes. For this 
suggests a general ability to adjust his beliefs or belief  forming/maintaining practices. Yet, if  
the occurrent awareness of  our epistemic faults is not required, how can we make sense of  
our openness to reactive attitudes in light of  this general recognitional ability? Two recent 
accounts of  responsibility for action offer alternatives that provide insight into the epistemic 





                                                 




3.2. Alternatives to Awareness 
 
My purpose in this section is to glean important lessons from two alternative accounts of  
responsibility without awareness: George Sher’s structural-normative account and Angela 
Smith’s rational relations account. While I ultimately find each of  these views lacking for my 
purposes, there are nevertheless important features of  these views which shall point us in 
right direction for an account of  general epistemic competence.  
According to Sher, responsibility in cases where an agent was unaware of  the morally or 
prudentially relevant features of  her action is explained by that agent’s constituent 
psychology—e.g., attitudes, desires, dispositions, and commitments that make the agent who 
she is. Roughly, the failure to recognize the morally or prudentially relevant features of  that 
action falls below an applicable standard and that failure is caused by the relevant 
psychological properties of  the agent. This structural-normative account points to deep 
features of  the agent, features that (partially) constitute who she is. By contrast, Angela 
Smith argues that responsibility is explained by the relation between one’s evaluative 
judgments and commitments and one’s attitudes, dispositions, and traits. Her rational 
relations account points to the importance of  commitment, judgment, and norm 
recognition.  
 There is an important difference between our goals. Sher’s focus is on the responsibility 
for action and he wants to know how responsibility ascriptions—accountability 
ascriptions—are justified. Since my project is to understand epistemic evaluability and thus 
competence, unlike Sher, I do not assume that an agent is already the appropriate target of  
reactive attitudes in general. In this way, my goals are more aligned with Smith’s. The sense 




appropriate target of  moral reactive attitudes—which is the moral analogue to epistemic 
evaluability. Despite these important differences I shall eventually argue (in chapters 5 & 6) 
that the structural features of  one’s constituent psychology—in particular, one’s cognitive 
abilities—make possible the judgments and commitments that Smith avers. However, Sher’s 
structural-normative view is too shallow for my purposes. His requirement of  the 
applicability of  normative standards assumes precisely what I want to explain.  
 
 
a. Sher’s Structural-Normative Account 
 
Once we make explicit the idea that responsibility requires conscious awareness of  the 
rightness or wrongfulness of  an action, we see that we must immediately reject it since many 
of  our common, ground level evaluations of  others often involve features of  the act of  
which the agent was unaware. The same may said for evaluations and appraisals that do not 
imply responsibility. We might think that individuals are just as susceptible to, e.g., aretaic 
appraisals though they are unaware of  the features of  the act that render those kinds of  
appraisals apt. It is often precisely the individual that is wholly unaware how selfish he is that 
is judged to be most selfish. In the epistemic realm, we aptly evaluate conspiracy theorists as 
foolish even though they may be unaware of  why belief  in the conspiracy is foolish. So, 
Sher’s arguments extend to other (perhaps all) person-level evaluations. We have also seen 
that individuals are aptly evaluated in cases where the present lack of  awareness does not 
trace back to a conscious choice or act.137    
                                                 
137 In order to strengthen his arguments, Sher attempts to argue for an awareness requirement by appeal to the 
idea that responsibility is a practical concept implicating the first-personal nature of deliberation, or the concept 
of fairness (Who Knew?, chs. 3-4). Neither attempt succeeds. On the one hand, we often hold people (even 
ourselves) responsible for acts the features of which they (we) were unaware. On the other hand, the notion of 




 As an alternative, Sher proposes the following disjunctive account of  the epistemic 
condition of  responsibility: 
 
When someone performs an act in a way that satisfies the voluntariness condition, 
and when he also satisfies any other conditions for responsibility that are 
independent of  the epistemic condition, he is responsible for his act’s morally or 
prudentially relevant feature if, but only if, he either: 
 (1) is consciously aware that the act has that feature (i.e., is wrong or 
foolish or right or prudent) when he performs it; or else 
 (2) is unaware that the act is wrong or foolish despite having evidence for 
its wrongness or foolishness his failure to recognize which 
    (a) falls below some applicable standard, and 
(b) is caused by the interaction of  some combination of  his 
constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits; or else 
 (3) is unaware that the act is right or prudent despite having made enough 
cognitive contact with the evidence for its rightness or prudence to enable 
him to perform the act on that basis.138 
 
The first and third disjunct do not concern us. Against the first disjunct, I have already 
argued against the claim that conscious awareness of  our beliefs, the reasons for them, of  
the faculties or states that produce them is not required for reactive evaluability. We can 
safely leave aside the third disjunct because positive reactive attitudes are less troubling to 
explain than negative reactive attitudes. So let us focus on the second disjunct. I call Sher’s 
account of  the epistemic condition on responsibility structural-normative because it 
maintains that one might be responsible for an act the moral or prudential features of  which 
one is unaware by failing to meet the normative evidential standard because of  constitutive 
and structural properties of  one’s psychology. In essence, (2) is meant to supplant the 
                                                                                                                                                 
holding someone responsible must imaginatively reconstruct the perspective of the responsible agent. But, 
appeal to deliberation cannot overcome the fact that we hold people responsible from a third-person 
perspective. 




intuitive idea that one is responsible without being consciously aware in cases where one 
should have been aware.139  
In the present context, since a structural-normative account would presuppose the 
applicability of  norms, which is precisely what I am attempting to account for, we must 
eschew the normative component in favor of  a purely structural account of  competence.140 
 
S-competence: A subject S is epistemically competent iff  she is capable of  meeting 
epistemic norms due to the interaction of  some combination of  her constitutive 
attitudes, dispositions, and traits. Alternatively, since reactive attitudes are apt when 
epistemic norms apply, S is competent iff  she is capable of  meeting those norms due 




This appears to be exactly what epistemic competence is, viz., the ability to satisfy epistemic 
norms. However, as stated it is hopelessly vague. Much more needs to be said about: (i) the 
interaction of  the constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits; (ii) which combinations of  
one’s constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits are relevant; (iii) the nature of  the 
constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits, and (iv) which norms are relevant. Further, is 
the mere capability of  meeting the relevant norms sufficient or must one also, in some sense, 
be aware that they are meeting those norms, and thus be aware of  the norms themselves? 
                                                 
139 Sher canvasses some plausible interpretations of the counterfactual awareness claim, but rejects all of them 
as either not adequately connecting the act to the agent in such a way as to warrant responsibility or as failing 
our intuitive judgments. See “section” 3.1a above and Who Knew?, chapter 5. 
140 If we were to keep the normative component the account would look like this: 
 
S-N Competence: A subject S is epistemically competent iff epistemic norms are applicable and 
whether S is capable of meeting those norms by the interaction of some combination of his 
constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits. 
 
Recall Sher’s characterization of the epistemic condition on responsibility is only a necessary condition. In 
addition, to be responsible for action requires the choice of the action—i.e., a control condition. So, S-N 
competence differs from Sher’s account by being necessary and sufficient; there is no control condition for 
doxastic responsibility. Moreover, as it stands S-N Competence begs the question. The purpose of this work is 
to understand the appropriateness of epistemic reactive attitudes. In other words, my goal is to explain the 
applicability of epistemic norms; once an individual is subject and responsive to those norms she is the 




Often such recognition has to do with recognition of  violating those norms rather than 
recognition of  satisfying them. If  so, then Sher’s arguments against awareness fail. Since in 
order to be accountable for our actions those actions must be attributable to us—in order to 
be the warranted targets of  responsibility ascriptions, we must first be the appropriate targets 
of  responsibility ascriptions—awareness is required for responsibility. Sher’s mistake lies in 
the depth of  his analysis. This is true even in cases of  omission. 
Recall the aptness of  the attitudes towards Jon for missing the important interview. It 
would be right to conclude according to Sher’s view that Jon’s lack of  awareness of  the time 
change neither absolves—i.e., wholly excuses him—nor mitigates the evaluations directed at 
him—i.e., partially excuses him—from those attitudes. It does not follow from this that one 
can be subject to those attitudes with no awareness, though. Suppose we modify the case so 
that Jon’s lack of  awareness is due not to carelessness but to not understanding norms of  
punctuality. Perhaps he was raised in a culture where punctuality is not valued at all and only 
last week arrived in the United States. What explains the appropriateness of  the attitudes in 
the one case and not the other is precisely the awareness of  relevant norms. Additionally, we 
might easily imagine cases where the relevant object of  awareness is the cognitive ability 
(abilities) one manifests/exercises. Joe, the climate science denier, may be aware that he does 
not understand the various arguments on either side—is aware that he lacks the ability to 
understand them—and yet persists in his belief, even if  he is unaware that he should not do 
so.141  
                                                 
141 In chapter 5 I shall argue that cognitive capacities become abilities if and only if one owns those capacities—
roughly, sees oneself as exercising or manifesting that capacity or doing something that requires that the 
capacity is exercised or manifest—and the exercise or manifestation of that capacity is responsive to reasons. 
The important point is that the ownership condition has a kind of built-in awareness. This is importantly 
different from the ways we have been discussing awareness in this chapter, however, since the object of 
awareness is not the belief, reasons for the belief, or faculty that produces it. Rather, it is an ownership of 




It is also important to note that one’s awareness of  one’s context affects which abilities 
one ought to manifest. Because exercising some and not other cognitive abilities requires 
more effort, we often must determine (quite quickly) whether we need to go to the trouble. 
My efforts to recall the color of  the amazing dog that dialed 9-1-1 because his owner was in 
trouble are not nearly as important as recalling the arguments marshaled against 
environmental regulation. To be sure, in some contexts, the former bears no importance 
whatsoever. The relative importance of  the stakes greatly affects which cognitive abilities 
one exercises/manifests. It is because one does recognize that being careless in one’s thought 
and action leads to wrong beliefs and actions that the present lack of  awareness about the 
wrongfulness of  an action (because one is not thinking about it or is momentarily distracted) 
does not exempt or excuse. If  we did not or could not—i.e., through no amount of  
reasoning and attaining of  new information—recognize that a belief  or action was wrong, 
we would not be evaluable based on that belief  or action. And if  we cannot be evaluable 
based on a belief  or action we cannot be accountable for it. As we saw above, we must at 
least be aware of  the relevant norms or cognitive abilities in some sense for us to be subject 
to the reactive attitudes directed at us. 
 There is an important lesson to glean from Sher’s structural-normative account, 
nevertheless. Of  particular interest is Sher’s focus on constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and 
traits. In chapter six I shall argue that epistemic competence is explained by certain of  our 
cognitive abilities. In so doing I shall be advocating for a kind of  structural position as well. 
Specifically, I maintain that when one has the ability to recognize, attend to, and assess 
justifying reasons for belief  one is epistemically competent. Sher and I differ in two crucial 
respects, however. First, I think that some of  an individual’s constitutive psychology, in 




applicability of  the norms. In coming to be able to govern our belief  
formation/maintenance in accordance with epistemic norms those norms—and the reactive 
attitudes appropriate to satisfying and failing to meet those norms—become applicable. 
Second, I think cognitive abilities are capacities that an individual owns by being able to 
exercise guidance control over them. This entails seeing oneself  (in a sense to be articulated 
in chapter 5) as exercising those abilities and thus taking responsibility (in a sense to be 
articulated in chapter 5) for them. Thus, competence requires cognitive abilities which are 
nothing more than cognitive capacities that the subject is aware of. In this way, competent 
subjects are connected to their beliefs (or lack thereof) via their cognitive abilities. Let us 
briefly discuss one more alternative account of  epistemic awareness. 
 
 
b. Smith’s Rational Relations View 
 
Like Sher, Angela Smith thinks that awareness of  the rightness or wrongfulness of  an action 
is not necessary for responsibility. Unlike Sher she intends to account for moral 
attributability—understood as being rationally accessible to certain kinds of  attitudes and 
judgments—what I have called competence. According to Smith, what underwrites moral 
attributability is that one’s evaluative judgments or commitments are rationally related to 
one’s attitudes, dispositions, and traits. In consequence, a subject is rightly targeted with 
reactive attitudes even for unreflective patterns of  behavior that express those commitments 
or manifest those dispositions or traits. I shall briefly examine Smith’s view and suggest that 
it brings to light the importance of  judgment and commitment. To reiterate, my purpose is 





 We need to account for a wide range of  thought and behavior since we are appropriately 
targeted with reactive attitudes not only for acts of  omission, but also for general lack of  
care, thoughtfulness, or attention. According to Smith: 
 
"When we praise or criticize someone for an attitude … it seems we are responding 
to certain judgments of  the person which we take to be implicit in that attitude, 




“a mental state is attributable to a person in the way that is required in order for it to 
be a basis for moral appraisal if  that state is rationally connected in … relevant ways 
to her underlying evaluative judgment.”143 
 
Importantly, by judgment she means only general dispositions or "tendencies to regard 
certain things as having evaluative significance."144 Since many of  our beliefs, intentions, 
desires, etc., arise spontaneously, what accounts for the aptness of  evaluation based on them 
cannot require conscious choice.145 Rather, the attitudes, beliefs, intentions, etc., we have 
express deeper commitments and judgments, often commitments and judgments we are 
unaware of  until faced with a situation in which they are expressed. So they need not be 
explicit conscious evaluative judgments; given Smith's broad sense of  "judgment" as a 
tendency to regard something as significant, the important takeaway for our purposes is that 
we are evaluable for our beliefs and actions because they reflect—by being rationally related 
to—deeper attitudes and judgments we have towards, e.g., the content of  that belief, the 
                                                 
142 Smith, A. “Responsibility for Attitudes,” 251. 
143 Smith “Responsibility for Attitudes,” 262. 
144 Ibid, 251. 
145 cf. Ibid, 261-2: “ordinary cases of belief, intention, most desires, fear, indignation, admiration, and guilt, 
among others, as well as our moral perceptions and various patterns of unreflective thought and feeling which 
we take to be sensitive to and expressive of our underlying values and commitments. Since explicit choice or 
voluntary control is not necessary for these rational connections to judgment to obtain, [the rational relations] 
account implies that we can be responsible for our spontaneous attitudes and reactions no less than for our 




desirability of  an action, the more general goal of  having accurate beliefs, or of  doing the 
right thing.  
 In other words, the fact that our beliefs and actions are related to underlying evaluative 
commitments and judgments explains how we can be evaluated for belief  since those 
commitments and judgments are expressions of  who we are. More generally, a subject S is 
evaluable for a belief  that p iff  her belief  that p is rationally related to her commitments and 
judgments. The implication, though Smith is silent on this, is that an individual is likewise 
evaluable on the basis of  her underlying commitments and judgments. Presumably, this is 
due to the fact that those underlying commitments and judgments are subject to assessment 
and revision by the individual who has them. (If  so, then her view fails to explain what 
underwrites the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes.146 But, I shall set that aside as my 
purpose is not to critically examine Smith's view, but to gain clues for where to look in an 
account of  epistemic competence.)147 
 Smith avers that our underlying evaluative judgments and commitments are crucial to 
understanding evaluability in light of  omissions. While it is true that my lack of  awareness 
about a particular feature of  an action or belief  may not directly implicate an evaluative 
commitment—e.g., my failure to adequately attend to that feature may not be due to my 
judging that feature as unimportant—such commitments nevertheless explain their 
                                                 
146 Smith disagrees. She contends the seemingly circular nature of the evaluability of our attitudes or the 
underlying commitments betrays the holistic character of moral evaluation. The picture she presents is thus 
more complicated. 
147 Note, there is potential difference in Smith's goals for her account and my own. Although she states she is 
interested in an explanation of moral attributability, she may in fact provide only an account of moral 
evaluation. The underlying judgments and commitments she relies on are supposed to be expressed in the 
actions we are evaluated based upon. However, this seems to presume that we are already morally attributable. 
By contrast, it seems that since my interest is in how one becomes epistemically attributable, I need something 
that explains what makes those judgments and commitments possible. Presumably, whatever accounts for this 
in the epistemic realm, would mutatis mutandis account for it in the moral realm as well. 
 Putting this point together with the lesson about our constitute psychology we gleaned from Sher, we get the 
following: Some of our cognitive abilities make possible the ability to have evaluative commitments and make 





appropriateness for moral attributability. Sher’s example of  a woman who leaves her dog in a 
hot car is illustrative of  this. Suppose the woman, Alessandra, thinks she will just be a minute 
picking up her child from school and so decides to leave her dog in the car momentarily. She 
then gets caught up in an unscheduled meeting with the teacher and principal. We can even 
understand how the content of  that meeting could make her forget that her dog is in the hot 
car. It does not appear accurate to think that Alessandra does not value the dog and that is 
why she left her in the car. In which case, our moral evaluation of  Alessandra is not directed 
at the distorted commitment. Rather, it is precisely because she does value the dog that she 
recognizes herself  as being responsible for her lapse in attention and awareness. We can 
easily imagine the guilt Alessandra would feel in such a case, especially if  the result of  her 
negligence was the death of  the dog.148   
 When we target individuals with epistemic reactive attitudes, we do so because their 
beliefs and epistemic behavior(s) reflect underlying commitments and evaluative judgments, 
even commitments they may have been unaware of; thus, our appraisal of  them is directed at 
who they are and not just at what they do. This explains the common phenomenon of  
people acting out of  character. When there is a mismatch between an individual’s 
judgments/commitments and their actions/beliefs, we seek further understanding. It is not 
just that we expect one’s judgments to be consistent with one’s attitudes and actions, but that 
one’s judgments influence one’s attitudes and actions consistently as well.  
 Importantly, our patterns of  belief  formation are not just a function of  the cognitive 
equipment that we happen to have. No theory of  epistemic competence can appeal only to 
                                                 
148 This is evident in the horrific tragedy of parents who have forgotten their child in hot cars. Some of these 
parents are simultaneously convinced that their negligence was a deeply tragic accident resulting from 







that equipment in order to account for our openness to epistemic reactive attitudes. To 
suggest otherwise is to skate dangerously close to suggesting that electric eyes above grocery 
store doors are likewise open to such attitudes. In addition to properly working cognitive 
faculties, an individual must be capable of  having evaluative commitments. Commitments 
and judgments go hand in hand. If  I am committed to X, then either I judge X to be 
valuable or I am disposed to judge X as valuable.  
 And yet, moral or epistemic evaluability—and thus competence—cannot be a matter 
only of  our attitudes and actions expressing our value judgments. Nor can it be about 
properly functioning cognitive faculties coupled with our evaluative judgments. A child 
raised in a hateful racist home may have deep judgments and properly working faculties but 
still fail to be the appropriate subject of  reactive attitudes. Something more needs to be 
required. But what could that be? What is missing from the child raised in the racist home? 
Young children, we can agree, are not open to epistemic reactive attitudes. As I stated in 
chapter one, the apparent evaluation of  children is misleading; evaluative language directed 
at children functions pedagogically to guide, instruct, or train children into the right kinds of  
behavior, thinking, or attitudes. When we tell young children they should know better, we are 
training them to know better. By contrast, when we tell adults they should know better we 
indicate genuine disapprobation.  Young children may have properly developing cognitive 
faculties and even have deep evaluative judgments, but what they are missing is an ability to 
recognize and assess reasons and norms. Of  course, children gradually become evaluable as 
they mature and so become limited participants in epistemic exchanges, though, to reiterate, 
this is not true of  young children. In other words, children are not (fully), while properly 
developed adults are, reasons-responsive. Fundamentally, this amounts to being able to 




individual possess various intellectual skills or cognitive abilities that they know how to 
deploy. This entails some kind of  norm recognition as well. Not only does the young racist 
child not recognize that her racist values fail to meet norms of  belief  she lacks the ability to 
recognize (relevant) norms of  belief.  
If  this is right, then the epistemic condition or whatever analogue there is for general 
epistemic competence seems to require three conditions. First, one’s beliefs must result from 
cognitive faculties that are normally functioning or developing. Second, one must be capable 
of  judgment; negative assessments are underwritten (at least in part) by inconsistency or 
incoherence between one’s judgments and one’s attitudes or by failing norms that would 
justify that judgment or by an inconsistency between rival judgments. Third, one must have 





3.3. Epistemic Competence and Virtue Epistemology 
 
The discussions of  doxastic control and awareness have each pointed to the idea that 
whatever underwrites epistemic reactive attitudes must be deep and stable features of  the 
individual being evaluated. They must be deep in order to explain evaluability in light of  
omissions. And, they must be stable because they must explain basic competence that 
implies the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes across a range of  situations and for a variety 
of  beliefs. The previous discussion also highlights the idea that we evaluate individuals based 




know. They exercise or manifest their competence in their belief  acquisitions and retentions. 
Or, they fail to exercise or manifest their competence in their belief  acquisitions and 
retentions. But it is precisely because we recognize (i) that they are competent or (ii) they fail 
to exercise or manifest that competence that we evaluate them as we do. This suggests 
another place to look for the constitutive features of  epistemic evaluability: virtue 
epistemology. Specifically, the recent claim that epistemic virtues are best thought of  as 
cognitive abilities furnishes us with the tools to further explain evaluability as underwritten 
by structural features of  our psychology that make possible value judgments and 
commitments.   
 The central thesis of  virtue epistemology is the claim that epistemic subjects are the 
primary locus of  evaluation by virtue of  being the primary source of  epistemic value. If  we 
want to understand the nature of  knowledge or warranted belief, we first must understand 
the epistemic traits of  individuals. In particular, we must understand epistemic virtues. The 
virtue epistemologist claims that in order to understand the normative properties of  belief, 
one must first understand the traits and properties of  the individual who has that belief; the 
direction of  analysis is from believer to belief. This contrasts with the traditional analysis of  
knowledge and belief. The traditional epistemologist maintains that the normativity of  belief  
is not dependent on the properties of  epistemic subjects, but instead depends on the various 
logical or evidential relations among propositions. For example, suppose we claim that 
justified belief  is belief  supported by the evidence. The traditional epistemologist first 
attempts to understand the concept of  evidence abstracted from any individual whose 
possesses it, and then claims that justified belief  is belief  that conforms to that evidence. 
The virtue epistemologist demurs; justified belief  is function of  manifesting intellectual 





Primary justification would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for 
belief  acquisition, through their greater contribution toward getting us to the 
truth. Secondary justification would then attach to particular beliefs in virtue of  
their source in intellectual virtues or other such justified dispositions.149 
 
 
Importantly, for Sosa, intellectual virtues are kinds of  reliable faculties or capacities or 
abilities:  
 
… It may be one's faculty of  sight operating in good light that generates one's 
belief  in the whiteness and roundness of  a facing snowball. Is possession of  
such a faculty a "virtue"? Not in the narrow Aristotelian sense, of  course, since 
it is not disposition to make deliberate choices. But there is a broader sense of  
"virtue," still Greek, in which anything with a function—natural or artificial—
does have virtues. The eye does, after all, have its virtues, and so does a knife.150 
 
 
For Sosa, intellectual virtues are reliable cognitive faculties. Picking up on this, John Greco 
has defined knowledge in terms of  intellectual virtues understood as cognitive abilities.151 
Since this work is not concerned with the nature of  knowledge, going into the details of  
their respective accounts would take us too far afield. The relevant features of  virtue 
epistemologists' characterization of  intellectual virtues for my purposes are the following. 
First, virtues are, for some sense of  that term, abilities.  
 
Epistemic virtues or competences are abilities…Each such disposition is 




Sosa variously defines intellectual virtue as a disposition,153 an inner nature,154 and an 
ability.155 Inspired by Sosa, Greco characterizes intellectual virtues as abilities: 
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A number of  authors have defended the idea that knowledge is true belief  
grounded in intellectual virtue. If  we think of  intellectual virtues as abilities (or 
powers) of  the knower, then the claim is that knowledge is true belief  grounded 
in intellectual ability. This idea is closely related to another: that knowledge is 
creditable true belief. The ideas are related because a special sort of  credit is due 
for success through ability, and on the present account knowledge is a kind of  
success through ability.156 
 
Given this identification, after this brief  section, I will restrict my discussion to cognitive 
abilities. Since virtue epistemologists locate the seat of  epistemic evaluation in epistemic 
subjects and I have intimated the same, it is accurate to see this work as part of  the larger 
virtue theoretic approach to epistemology.  
A second important feature of  intellectual virtues is that they are dispositions. As such, 
the exercise or manifestation of  them is not the primary ground of  the aptness of  
evaluation. Put differently, evaluation is not apt only in cases of  the exercise or manifestation 
of  an intellectual virtue, but rather, it is enough that one merely has the virtue. Because by 
their very nature intellectual virtues—cognitive abilities—are stable dispositions, evaluation is 
apt even if  (especially if) one fails to exercise or manifest the ability in situations that call for 
it. 
Third, since intellectual virtues are part of  one's cognitive character, it follows that 
cognitive evaluations of  the kind that implicate epistemic competence are character 
evaluations. When we target individuals with reactive attitudes, recall, we evaluate the 
individual and not the belief. Intellectual virtues offer the resources to explain this; epistemic 
subjects are the primary locus of  evaluation and the primary source of  epistemic value. 
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Fourth, an individual is more or less intellectually virtuous. Alternatively, we have more or 
less mastery over our cognitive abilities. While evaluations in some domains may be apt, 
evaluations in other may be inapt.  
 Finally, we acquire our cognitive character—thus the virtues or abilities constitutive of  
it—as well as the exercise and manifestation of  that character before we are aware of  doing 
so. There are two relevant implications of  this point. I suggested in the previous sections 
that evaluability is partially explained by structural features of  our cognitive lives that make 
possible our evaluative commitments and judgments. The structural features that play this 
functional role just are certain of  our cognitive abilities. Now, many of  those evaluative 
judgments and commitments—not to mention the abilities themselves—arise organically 
and spontaneously in our upbringing and our experiences in early development. One might 
think this exempts us from evaluation since we had no choice in the matter. This is mistaken; 
since the conditions of  epistemic competence are not very demanding, unless our 
development was radically manipulated or derailed we are not exempt or absolved from 
evaluation based on beliefs that arise from those abilities, judgments, and/or commitments. 
The abilities that constitute epistemic competence are acquired through the course of  
ordinary development rather than through explicit instruction much like language is 
acquired. We learn to, e.g., recognize and assess reasons at the same time as we acquire 
beliefs, some of  which shall come under later scrutiny in light of  a mature (enough) ability to 
assess the reasons for them. (In chapter six I address this potential worry more fully.)157   
 The second relevant implication is related to the first. Because cognitive virtues are 
habits, they largely operate "automatically". This suggests both a resource and a drawback. 
The resource is that self-conscious epistemic regulation is downstream from virtue. My 
                                                 




virtues or abilities may be operative without my awareness. The drawback is how to 
understand the "automaticity" involved without thereby severing the appropriate connection 
required for evaluability. The answer lies both in which virtues constitute epistemic 
competence and in the nature of  epistemic virtues (cognitive abilities), which I discuss at 
length in chapter 6. 
Thinking about evaluability as grounded in epistemic virtue suggests itself  as quite 
plausible. Much of  the work in virtue epistemology arises from analogies with virtue ethics, 
not least of  which is the central focus on agents. In exercising or manifesting her intellectual 
virtues, an agent can influence not only what, but how, she believes because those virtues are 
part of  her. An agent or subject approach to epistemology naturally lends itself  to an 
investigation into epistemic competence, fundamentally, because the latter focuses wholly on 
the epistemic subject. Indeed, an alternative question to the competence question is the 
agent question: under what conditions is an individual an epistemic agent? It is no surprise 
then, that to find an answer to that question, we must turn to an agent-centered approach to 
epistemology. In light of  the current discussion, another analogy with virtue ethics seems 
apt. In virtue ethics, we might say that the virtuous agent knows how to act. In virtue 
epistemology, we might say that the virtuous agent knows how to know. 
Thus far I have only implied that intellectual virtues constitute epistemic competence. To 
be sure, from what we have seen in this section, intellectual virtues appear to be able to 
provide the needed explanation to ground evaluability while also avoiding the difficulties I 
have raised for doxastic control and awareness. But, it is one thing to say that intellectual 
virtues can answer the competence question and another thing to present an account of  how 
they can do so. The rest of  this work is dedicated to that central challenge. Before 




epistemology, one concerning cognitive ability and the other concerning where I see myself  
fitting into discussions of  virtue epistemology. 
As I suggested in the introduction to this work, we should read no more into the notion 
of  “virtue” than ability. Recent work in virtue epistemology has been comfortable with talk 
of  cognitive abilities in lieu of  cognitive virtues, especially among those within the broadly 
reliabilist tradition.158 I follow this trend since I argue that competence is constituted by a 
kind of  know-how and some instances of  know-how are nothing over and above having an 
ability. It would be odd, at the very least, if  not wholly misguided to think of  know-how as 
constituted by virtues. Additionally, the positive connotations of  “virtue” potentially lead to 
unnecessary complications that the neutral “ability” avoids.  
Before concluding the argument of  this chapter, I should like to note the idea that 
virtuous agents know how to know marks an important supplementation to current 
accounts of  virtue epistemology. As I mentioned above, by and large, virtue epistemologists 
have used the resources provided to address perennial epistemic questions. As such, the 
epistemic virtues and abilities they focus on play an explanatory role in understanding 
knowledge. The abilities I shall make use of  are different, albeit still epistemic. Specifically, I 
shall argue that some of  our cognitive virtues or abilities, make possible the appropriateness 
of  evaluation; they constitute general epistemic competence. One particularly salient 
difference lies in whether the ability in question was manifested in the belief  acquisition. 
Since current views focus on knowledge, advocates maintain that that bit of  knowledge is 
(partially) constituted by the virtue or ability in question; since knowledge just is true belief  
caused by intellectual virtue, in order to know that p, I must have manifested or exercised a 
                                                 





relevant ability. By contrast, in order to be evaluable, I need not have exercised or manifest 






I have intimated throughout chapters two and three that epistemically competent individuals 
have certain abilities, skills, and know-how. In the remainder of  this work, I turn to develop 
an account of  know-how and apply it to epistemic competence. The main idea is that what 
explains the aptness of  epistemic reactive attitudes is that the individuals we target such 
attitudes with have the ability to recognize epistemic norms and exercise/manifest their 
cognitive abilities to satisfy those norms.  
    The chief  obstacle to this idea is the recent defense of  intellectualist accounts of  know-
how. According to the intellectualist, knowing how to do something just is a kind of  
knowing that something is the case. Put differently, no know-how with factual or 
propositional knowledge. If  so, then know-how is not an ability at all so knowing how to 
know is not a matter of  exercising/manifesting cognitive abilities. Rather, it is to have factual 
or propositional knowledge of  epistemic norms and what must be done to meet them. 
Moreover, intellectualist know-how appears to entail that we have evaluable propositional 
knowledge before we are competent to have evaluable propositional knowledge. In order to 













In this chapter, I have one principal aim. I argue for a kind of  modest anti-intellectualism 
about knowledge-how—the thesis that know-how is not constituted by know-that. In 
particular, I argue that some kinds of  know-how are not (even partially) constituted by 
know-that.159 In doing so, I will have paved the way for the account of  knowing how to 
know that I develop in the following chapters.  
 Thus far, I have argued that in attempting to account for the appropriateness of  
epistemic reactive attitudes two intuitive necessary and/or sufficient conditions are neither 
necessary nor sufficient.160 On the one hand, the kind of  control required to ground 
epistemic evaluability is lacking in the epistemic domain; we simply do not have the control 
over our beliefs that could play that role, if  we have any control over our beliefs at all. On 
the other hand, we are responsible for beliefs even when we are not aware of  them, either 
because we do not have a belief  we should (or because we have a belief  we should not even 
though we are unaware of  it). But the problem with awareness as the ground of  person-level 
evaluations is compounded by the fact that we can fail to be apt targets of  evaluability even 
when we are aware of  the belief(s) and when we are aware of  the faculties and capacities that 
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know-how, but the view I offer largely ignores the question whether all forms of know-how reduce to know-
that. Since my aim is to present an explanation of the appropriateness of person-level epistemic evaluation, my 
discussion will not attempt to settle the greater issue. 
160 Recall that in the case of strong doxastic voluntarism the theoretical sufficiency is irrelevant to grounding 
epistemic competence since we actually do evaluate others on the basis of their beliefs and we do not have 




produce those beliefs. Hence doxastic awareness is not even sufficient for person-level 
epistemic appraisal. The failure of  these previous attempts to ground evaluability does not, 
however, lead to skepticism concerning epistemic evaluability—and thus, warranted 
evaluation. Put most simply, we are evaluable for our beliefs because we have certain kinds 
of  cognitive abilities. It is only then that we know-how to know. 
We shall arrive at this view of  cognitive ability and know-how in due course, but first I 
must defend a more general thesis about knowledge-how. In particular, I must argue that 
some know-how is not constituted by know-that. The reasoning behind this is rather 
straightforward. If, as I want to argue, knowing how to know underwrites epistemic 
evaluability, then know-how must not itself  be propositional in nature. If  know-how is 
propositional, then since when one has propositional knowledge one is (presumably) subject 
to person-level evaluations I will have either begged the question or become open to a 
vicious regress.161 If, on the other hand, know-how is not constituted by know-that (or 
otherwise necessarily bound up with it), then the conditions under which one is the 
appropriate target of  person-level evaluations for knowledge-how are different from the 





                                                 
161 There is another possibility here that, at least in this chapter, we shall not touch on. One might instead argue 
for a multiple levels approach to knowledge. There might be some kinds of knowledge for which person-level 
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(Perspective; “1991; Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Vol. 2. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); 2010; Knowing Full Well. Vol. 2. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) though he has not 






4.1. Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism 
 
When we say that Susan knows that Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of  the United 
States, we are saying that Susan is related in a certain way to a proposition, namely the 
proposition that [Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of  the United States]. Thus, we 
more or less understand who or what the relata are when we discuss or think about or 
ascribe propositional knowledge. But when we turn to knowledge-how, it is not so clear.  
 Suppose we say, “Susan knows how to type 75 words per minute.” Clearly the first 
relatum is [Susan]. What is the second? Is it [how to type 75 words per minute]? Or, is it 
[type 75 words per minute]? This is perhaps the central issue at debate when it comes to 
know-how162 since our answer to this provides the focus for examination on the relation 
itself. If  we think the second relatum is [how to type 75 words per minute], then the relation 
we are interested in appears to be nothing more than the knowing relation in propositional 
knowledge. If, on the other hand, we think the second relatum is [type 75 words per minute], 
then the relation is knowing how to, where that is not to be understood in terms of  
propositional knowledge.163 
 This, then, is the crux of  the debate: is the knowing relation in know-how a species of  
the knowing relation in propositional knowledge or is it not? Those that maintain that it is, 
and have thus intellectualized know-how, are aptly labeled intellectualists and those who 
                                                 
162 Bengson and Moffett (“Nonpropositional Intellectualism,” in Know How in Bengson and Moffett (eds.) 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 161-195) demur. They argue there are two central debates. One 
concerns the grounds of know-how and the other concerns the nature of know-how. I examine this more 
nuanced account of the debate(s) in §4.4 below. 
163 Stanley and Williamson (“Knowing How.” The Journal of Philosophy (2001): 411–444) bring this out most 




maintain that it is not, and have thus not intellectualized know-how, are fittingly labeled anti-
intellectualists. If  this is the right way to characterize the central issue and the two broad 
camps in the dialectic, then in what follows, I defend anti-intellectualism about know-how; 
more precisely, I defend a modest anti-intellectualism, one which maintains that some kinds 
of  know-how are not constituted by know-that.  
 In this section, I shall briefly present the lay of  the land when it comes to know-how and 
present some of  the putative difficulties for intellectualism. It is important that I present the 
dialectic since my argument for the modest anti-intellectualism I prefer shall exploit the fact 
the intellectualists rely on extremely high-level examples of  know-how. In §4.2, I attempt to 
further strengthen the intellectualist case by examining the claim that it is possible to have 
know-how without the corresponding ability, but each putative case suffers from the same 
fundamental issue: the fact that rarefied examples of  know-how do not require a 
corresponding ability does not undermine the claim that some know-how is nothing over 
and above having an ability. I turn to my positive reasons for modest anti-intellectualism in 
§4.3. There I argue that there are cases of  know-how that could not be instances of  
knowledge-that; there are basic or quite low-level examples of  know-how that could not be 
(even partially) constituted by propositional knowledge, and thus modest anti-intellectualism 
is motivated.  
 
 
a. Ryle's regress 
The current debate about know-how began with Ryle’s attack on Cartesian dualism. He 




case164—nor is knowledge-how constituted by knowing that something is the case. As he 
states it, “… knowing-how is not reducible to any sandwich of  knowings-that.”165 Ryle’s 
stated purpose was to “try to exhibit part of  the logical behaviour of  the several concepts of  
intelligence, as these occur when we characterize either practical or theoretical activities as 
clever, wise, prudent, or skillful, etc.”166 There are two steps to exhibiting this behavior. First, 
he dispels the intellectualist view that know-how reduces to or otherwise involves some piece 
of  propositional knowledge (causally relevant to bringing about the act). Second, he attempts 
to show that know-how is presupposed in know-that. I shall focus on the former. 
 I have suggested that the central issue turns on whether in knowing how to do 
something (φ) one must have some propositional knowledge that p (at least partially) 
constitutive of  φ-ing. The intellectualist contends that all instances of  know how are (at least 
partially) constituted by propositional knowledge. Ryle emphatically denies this, arguing that 
thinking of  intelligent behavior along intellectualist lines generates a regress in two 
directions. The first direction of  the regress maintains that since according to the 
intellectualist a prior consideration of  principles or rules is required for intelligent behavior, 
no piece of  behavior could possibly be intelligent. The argument, call it the basic regress, is 
reconstructed, simply, as follows:167 
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165 Ryle, “Knowing How,” 15. 
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167 Stanley and Williamson (“Knowing How”) thus miss a crucial point in their reconstruction. According to 
S&W, Ryle’s argument is this:  
 
(1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F 
(2) If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the proposition 
that p. 
 
…If knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, the content of knowledge how to F is, for some φ, 






 (BR1) Intelligent behavior requires prior (or perhaps simultaneous) consideration168 
of  some proposition p. [Taken as an assumption given intellectualism] 
 (BR2) Consideration of  p can itself  be done intelligently or stupidly. 
 (BR3) Therefore, before one can consider p, one must consider a further proposition 
q about what is or is not adequate or appropriate contemplation of  p, ad infinitum.169 
 
Stated in this way the argument apparently fails since not all knowledge-that is occurrently 
contemplated when manifest. An intellectualist can surely maintain the distinction between 
knowing some proposition and contemplating or considering that proposition. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                 
RA: knowledge how to F is knowledge that φ(F) (pp 413-4). 
 
They proceed to argue (1) is false since there are many actions we do that we don’t know how to do, such as 
digesting food (p 414). So (1) is true only if restricted to intentional action, which they recognize Ryle 
maintains. But, then, they argue that premise (2) is false since we might manifest our knowledge that p without 
any prior contemplation. As Ginet (Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. Dordrecht, Nederlands: Reidel, 1975): 7) 
suggests, there is a distinction between contemplation and manifestation. 
 This misses the point that Ryle is making, though. Ryle’s goal is to show that the intellectualist idea that 
know-how is a species of know-that is false. It is perfectly consistent with that claim that some instances of 
know-how are accompanied with or are manifestations of know-that. To show that intellectualism is false all 
that is required is that there are instances of know-how without the accompanying know-that. Or, as Ryle does, 
there could not be know-that without know-how since in intelligent action there is always application, an 
application wholly separate from the contemplation of the proposition or even how to apply the proposition. 
There is a movement of the mind from contemplating a rule, say, and applying that rule in action. 
 Picking up on this, Hetherington (How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011): 68) urges the following reconstruction: 
 
R: For any action F, and for some content φ describing a sufficient criterion of how to do F: If (when 
doing F) one knows how to F, then (1) one already has knowledge that φ(F), which (2) one knows how 
to, and one does, apply so as to do F.  
 
Hetherington relies heavily on the application since with each new instance of knowing how to F, there will be 
a new instance, according to intellectualism, of knowing the relevant content φ(F) and so a fresh requirement 
of knowing how to apply it, and so on, ad infinitum.  
168 I use “consider” here because Ryle himself does (seen fn. 153, below). But there is an ambiguity between 
considering whether and considering that. Considering whether is to be in a state of withholding assent to a 
proposition. When I consider whether p, I am not yet sure of p; I am vacillating between p and not-p. 
Considering that p is to believe p. It seems then, that Ryle could have in mind both, since both could be done 
intelligently or stupidly. I might consider whether to go to work tomorrow stupidly or intelligently. Suppose, I 
am waiting for the markets to close and if the NASDAQ has closed on an even number, I will go, but if on an 
odd I will not. Currently the markets are open and my mind has not been made up on whether to go. Further, I 
might consider that considering whether to go to work on the basis of the odd or evenness of the NASDAQ at 
close is something I should do and so on. Ryle’s argument, then, could run on both considering whether and 
considering that. For ease of use, my discussion will focus on the latter. 
169 “…If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or theoretical, is to be credited to the occurrence of 
some ulterior act of intelligently considering regulative propositions, no intelligent act, practical or theoretical, 




the intellectualist might also deny that intelligent behavior involves anything like the 
consideration or contemplation of  the act. As Ginet urges:   
 
“… all that [Ryle] actually brings out, as far as I can see, is that the exercise (or 
manifestation) of one's knowledge of how to do a certain sort of thing need not, and 
often does not, involve any separate mental operation of considering propositions 
and inferring from them instructions to oneself. But the same thing is as clearly true 
of one's manifestations of knowledge that certain propositions are true, especially 
one's knowledge of truths that answer questions of the form 'How can one...?' or 
'How should one...?' I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door 
open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as my knowledge that there is a 
door there) by performing that operation quite automatically as I leave the room; and 
I may do this, of  course, without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that 
proposition or any other relevant proposition.”170  
 
I take it Ginet wants us to see that since for the anti-intellectualist the manifestation of  
knowledge-how is uncontroversial and automatic, without prior or simultaneous 
contemplation of  a regulative proposition, then manifestation of  propositional knowledge 
should likewise be uncontroversial and automatic, without simultaneous contemplation of  a 
regulative proposition. Regardless of  what know-how is, one must provide an explanation of  
the manifestation of  that know-how. According to Stanley, “as Ginet brings out, there is no 
intuitive phenomenological difference of  this kind between manifesting one’s knowledge of  
how to open the door and manifesting one’s knowledge that one can open the door by 
turning the knob … [thus Ryle draws] and unwarranted asymmetry between manifesting 
propositional knowledge and manifesting knowledge how.”171 So, neither the intellectualist 
nor the anti-intellectualist requires the contemplation of  regulative propositions to manifest 
know-how. The intellectualist makes no commitment to contemplation but only maintains 
the weaker claim that intelligent acts manifest propositional knowledge. In fact, most of  our 
                                                 
170 Ginet (Knowledge, Perception: 7). Stanley and Williamson (“Knowing How”) rely heavily on this short passage 
from Ginet in generating the dilemma they present for Ryle’s argument. 





beliefs are like this; we never put into words everything we accept, but we do manifest that 
we accept it. 
 The anti-intellectualist disagrees. Since know-how on her view is dispositional in nature, 
she maintains that the manifestation of  know-how is either sui generis or perhaps intrinsic to 
the dispositions one has. Ryle himself  argues that to know how to φ is to possess a multi-
track disposition to φ; such a manifestation could perhaps be triggered by a wide range of 
stimuli. Since the anti-intellectualist does not require regulative propositions to manifest 
one’s know-how, she does not fall prey to the same kind of worry facing the intellectualist 
here. So the asymmetry is not phenomenologically based, but instead the consequence of 
theoretical requirements on what it would take to manifest one’s know-how.  
 What, then, does the intellectualist mean by “exercise” or “manifest” when she maintains 
that we can manifest our knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the knob and 
pushing it? In order to stop the regress, she needs to explain how knowing some 
proposition(s) translates into some piece of  behavior. Recall that according to intellectualism 
to know how to φ is to have some propositional knowledge that (at least partially) 
constitutes φ-ing. Now this leads to a regress unless the intellectualist can explain how a 
propositional attitude can be manifest. 
 Presumably, we manifest a piece of knowledge by doing something, or else how could 
we be said to manifest it? Ginet’s own example is instructive. He maintains that in opening a 
door, one “exercises (or manifests)” knowledge of a proposition whose content is (would 
have to be) a description of turning the knob and pushing the door. On the surface, this 
appears to be an example of know-how reducing to know-that. Further, this is supposed to 
be illustrative of a larger point that all such know-how reduces to know-that. Why? Know-




propositional knowledge and knowledge-how is that in the latter we do something that 
demonstrates the former in particular ways, we manifest it.   
 Others following Ginet have expanded on this by highlighting the syntax and semantics 
of sentences ascribing know-how.172 The standard view of knowledge-how ascriptions is 
taken to be uniform with the syntax and semantics of knowledge-wh ascriptions. In 
particular, knowledge-wh ascriptions contain an embedded question the answer to which is 
some proposition.  
 
1)  (a)  Erin knows where to the find the latest research on measles outbreaks. 
 (b) Justin knows when the big game will begin. 
 (c) Danielle knows whether to take side streets or the freeway to avoid traffic. 
 (d) Debi knows what to do to make dying plants healthy. 
 (e) Jessica knows who the president of Myanmar is. 
 (f) John knows why the gas leaked. 
 (g) Jason knows which arguments Ginet uses to object to Ryle.  
 (h) Jordan knows how to cite a resource appropriately. 
 
Each of the above, have an embedded question and the verb “knows” appears to function 
the exact same way. The explanation of the syntactic structure of these sentences is 
theoretically simple. With the exception of (c) the embedded question is straightforward: (a) 
where does one find the latest research …?; (b) when is the big game?; (d) what do you do to 
make dying plants healthy?, and so on.173 It is claimed that in answering these questions we 
realize the propositional nature of our know-how. Since each of the various knowledge-wh 
ascriptions, when properly understood, points to an underlying bit of propositional 
                                                 
172 See Stanley and Williamson (“Knowing How); Bengson and Moffett (Knowing How and “Nonpropositional”); 
and Stanley (Know How, ch.2). Laura Michaelis (“Knowledge Ascription by Grammatical Construction.” in 
Bengson and Moffett (eds.) Knowing How (2011) 261–282) and Jonathan Ginzburg (“How to Resolve How to” 
in Bengson and Moffett (eds.) Knowing How (2011): 1–36) both argue that the syntax and semantics of  
knowledge-how ascriptions favor anti-intellectualism. 
173 Although “whether” is given the same syntactic treatment as other wh- constructions, it is sufficiently 
different from the others that we should at least flag this. For example, each of  the other wh-constructions 
contain embedded questions that begin with the interrogative whereas constructing the embedded question 
from sentences such as (c) by placing “whether” at the beginning is grammatically incorrect. Instead, we often 




knowledge and since knowledge-how ascriptions are syntactically equivalent to knowledge-
wh ascriptions, they too must point to an underlying bit of propositional knowledge. Of 
course, this assumes that the embedded questions in knowledge-how ascriptions can be 
answered in propositional terms, or at the very least in a way that clearly points to a 
proposition. Is this right? 
 
 Returning to Ginet’s example, we would say: 
 
  2) Carl knows how to open a door. 
 
The embedded question of which when directed at him is: 
 
  3) How do you open a door? 
 
 Two responses are open to him. He might reply with an ostensive demonstration while 
saying “like this”. Or, he might reply with a description: “by turning the knob and pushing 
the door." Before proceeding to examine each of these options, it is important to note at the 
outset that approaching the question of know-how from the putative linguistic evidence of 
the syntax of knowledge-wh appears to be divorced from what Ryle is interested in when 
talking about intelligent behavior and know-how. When Ryle talks of knowing how to φ, he 
aims to illuminate the distinction between an individual who can (has the ability to) φ and an 
individual who knows facts about φ-ing. His claim is that merely knowing facts about φ -ing 
does not and cannot translate into intelligent action. Thus, the burden of the intellectualist 
who attempts to marshal linguistic facts about syntax and semantics to provide an account of 




performances of φ-ing.174 Put differently, the concept that Ryle and subsequent anti-
intellectualists want to explain is inherently concerned with performance. Hence, if the 
linguistic evidence fails to explain an essentially performative notion of know-how, the anti-
intellectualist can justifiably maintain that such explanations have not, as they purport to do, 
escaped Ryle’s regress.  
 
b. Know-how, ostensive demonstration, embedded questions, and acquaintance 
 
One possible response to the embedded question in an ascription of know-how is that a 
demonstration suffices to illuminate the propositional content in a piece of know-how. But, 
to say “like this” while performing a task as an answer to the question, “how do you φ? 
invites the follow-up question, “how do you do that?” Since the intellectualist is supposed to 
take comfort in Ginet’s response, ostensive demonstration appears too weak a response 
precisely because it avoids illuminating the reduction of know-how to know-that at issue. In 
essence, the ostensive demonstration strategy for stopping the regress seems tantamount to 
dogmatically asserting that the regress stops without giving us any good reason as to why or 
how the demonstration really is a manifestation of know-that. We are left wondering what 
happened that turned a propositional attitude into a piece of observable behavior.   
 Let us unpack this. How might Ginet answer the follow-up question? He has already 
opened the door and replied to our initial question with a demonstration. If asked the 
follow-up question, "but, how do you do that?," it seems well within reason to respond (if 
somewhat annoyed), “I just showed you.” Similarly to how one demonstrates one knows the 
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color red by ostensively pointing to it, we might think some know-how is like that. At some 
point, we can only point or demonstrate. I agree with this last claim, but it remains to be 
seen whether this strategy is open to the intellectualist. Could an ostensive demonstration of 
know-how be understood as an exercise or manifestation of know-that? In order for the 
strategy to succeed, the intellectualist has to explain two things. First, she must explain what 
the propositional content in such a demonstration is such that in being related to that 
content in the appropriate way one has know-how. And, second, she must explain how 
being so related to that content is what know-how is. In other words, she must explain the 
“appropriate” relation between a knower and some propositional content in a way that 
illuminates how that content can be manifest, and she must do this in propositional terms.   
 One possible response open to the intellectualist is that when ostensively referring to 
opening the door, I am referring to some content I am acquainted with in that behavior. 
Similar to referring to red by pointing to a red object, in answering the embedded question 
in the ascription of know-how, I am referring to the fact that this is a way to open the door. 
When I ostensively point to the red stop sign and utter, “the stop sign is red,” there is some 
proposition I know—e.g., that color is red—with a content I am directly acquainted with—
e.g., a particular shade of red—in that demonstrative utterance (even if that content is not 
fully describable). So, too, when I ostensively demonstrate some piece of behavior there is 
some proposition I know—e.g., that is a way to open the door—involving a content I am 
directly acquainted with—e.g., a way of opening the door—in that demonstration (even if 
that content is not fully describable). And, if the anti-intellectualist balks at the idea of know-
how whose content cannot be descriptively articulated by the agent manifesting it, she places 
too high a demand on knowledge in general. Surely there is much knowledge that we 




grounds. But then, it should be possible in principle to have know-how (propositional know-
how) manifest that is likewise not fully descriptively articulable by the agent who possesses 
it. Thus, we can have know-how as constituted by know-that if we allow this ineliminable 
acquaintance.  
 Unfortunately for the acquaintance intellectualist, the inability to (fully) describe the 
content of know-how is not the crucial problem. Suppose we say that when Carl knows how 
to open the door the content he is acquainted with is a way w of opening the door and it is a 
fact that way w is a way to open the door. Now, this acquaintance relation is importantly 
different from a judgment, and hence different from a propositional attitude towards w. 
Acquaintance, whatever it is, is something akin to an immediate direct awareness of some 
content (e.g., a concept, a proposition, a sensory quality, or perhaps even an object). In the 
present case, the direct awareness would have to be of a way to open the door.175 We can 
even grant that there is way to explain all of this that avoids or overcomes standard myth-of-
the-given objections to acquaintance. And we can further strengthen the intellectualist case 
by suggesting that being so related to this proposition is sufficient for knowing it. Thus, Carl 
knows that w is way to open the door. Granting all of this, the intellectualist has provided 
only one part of the explanation needed—viz., the content of the proposition that knowing-
how is supposed to be such that in being related, in an appropriate way, to that content one 
has the relevant know-how. She still must explain how knowing that content is know-how.  
                                                 
175 Bengson and Moffett (“Know-How and Concept Possession.” Philosophical Studies 136, no. 1 (2007): 31–57; 
“Nonpropositional”) argue for something like acquaintance with a concept. Their view, which they call 
nonpropositional intellectualism, maintains that knowing how to φ requires reasonable conceptual mastery, or 
understanding, of  the complete concepts necessary to φ. Importantly, they claim that this is neither 
propositional nor ability-based.  Instead, knowing how to φ is an “objectual attitude relation” where the 
relatum is a nonpropositional item (i.e., a way of  φ-ing).  (“Nonpropositional: 164). I return to examine this 




 Any such explanation must preserve a pre-theoretic intuition about the distinction 
between knowing-how and knowing-that. It is commonplace that some of our knowledge is 
causally unrelated to our actions and behaviors and some of our knowledge is causally 
related to our actions and behaviors. The intellectualist must offer an explanation that at 
once satisfies the demand for an account of propositional know-how and simultaneously 
explains why being acquainted with some contents reduces know-how to know-that, while 
being acquainted with others does not. Are we dealing with different kinds of acquaintance? 
Given our inability to understand and articulate a basic acquaintance relation, how could we 
possibly distinguish between different kinds? The object of acquaintance cannot help here 
since it is not the content that is the know-how, but rather the relation to the content that 
manifests the actual know-how—i.e., that this way is a way to φ. Further, there are some 
propositions a subject might know, whose content is relevantly action-guiding, but who fail 
to know-how. For example, I know that a way to perform a gainer—a backwards somersault 
while moving forward—is to jump forward, throw my head back, and pull my knees to my 
chest. However, I have tried this for years and still do not know how to do a gainer. And 
here we come face-to-face with the fact my knowing that this is a way for me to do a gainer 
is not the same as my knowing how to actually do a gainer.  
 Interestingly enough, my knowing that to do a gainer an individual must jump with 
sufficient height and in rapid succession throw her head back and bring her knees to her 
chest while nevertheless being unable successfully to perform this stunt brings to light an 
ordinary language point that shall be important throughout this discussion. If my friend asks 
me if I know how to do a gainer, it seems reasonable for me to respond in each of the 
following ways: yes, no, yes and no, or in a way. In saying, “yes” I am not deceptively passing 




him, I can respond by saying that I haven’t yet been able to do one, but I know that do one I 
must … Likewise, if I answer no, but proceed to outline the steps for him to take, he would 
not be entitled to accuse me of lying. The concept of “know-how” is flexible and highly 
context sensitive.176 One reason for this is that our goals and practical interests fix the 
parameters of our inquiries and ascriptions. If I am a diving coach trying to determine if 
Lisette knows how to do a certain dive, then if she is unable to do that dive, I can justifiably 
say she doesn’t know how to do it. In other situations merely knowing what to do in order 
to do, e.g., a particular dive is sufficient to warrant the ascription of know-how. Yet, the 
context will settle relevant sense of “know-how” at issue; the context will make it clear 
whether merely knowing facts about, e.g., the dive, or having the actual ability to do it suffice 
for the warranted ascription. While the flexible nature of “know-how” alleviates some of the 
burden on the intellectualist vis-a-vis the distinction between performative and non-
performative concepts of know-how, she still must explain how being acquainted with facts 
can manifest performance.  
 Perhaps the intellectualist might argue that being acquainted with w in a way that explains 
know-how is something like what Stanley intimates about ways of thinking or modes of 
presentation.177 For once we understand this, he argues, we can see that entertaining (or for 
present purposes, being acquainted with) certain contents is not behaviorally inert; some 
ways of thinking are practical and some ways of thinking are not. He illustrates this with 
Heidegger’s example of thinking about a hammer.178 One might regard the hammer before 
one quite differently when merely looking at it than one does when using it. This illustrates a 
central piece of Stanley’s defense of intellectualist know-how. 
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 When I know how to φ, I know that w is a way to φ under a certain way of 
thinking/mode of presentation. That way of thinking is essentially de se; it is not merely 
knowing a way to φ. Rather, when I know how to φ, I know that w is a way for me to φ. To 
get back to embedded questions, ascriptions of know-how contain the embedded question, 
“how do you φ?” This can be reconstructed as, “in which way do you φ?” Stanley’s 
intellectualist, taking the ostensive demonstration response, denies more is needed; the 
follow-up question can be answered with more demonstration, perhaps. And, this is key, it 
can still be a manifestation of propositional knowledge for all of that. Know-how is, after all, 
not to be found in the content of one’s knowledge, but in one’s relation to that content.179  
 Stanley’s account of a mode of presentation fits in nicely with what I have been 
discussing as acquaintance intellectualism. Moreover, if he is right then other phenomena 
can be readily explained. Since the anti-intellectualist is committed to abilities-cum-
dispositions to account for know-how, it is puzzling to explain those cases where know-how 
and abilities appear to come apart. For example, Stanley and Williamson’s expert ski 
instructor who can quite reliably teach his students how to perform complex stunts but who 
is himself unable to do them (perhaps he was never able to perform them).180 Or, Ginet’s 
discussion of his son who knows how to lift 100 pounds but is unable to do so because he 
                                                 
179 A similar though slightly different account offered by Benson and Moffett (“Nonpropositiona”) relies on 
the objectual understanding. According to them, to know how to φ is to have an objectual understanding—
being acquainted with an object, a way of  φ-ing and having sufficient conceptual mastery of  φ-related 
concepts—of  a way of  φ-ing. Importantly, understanding requires propositional knowledge about the concepts 
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account of  concept possession requires supplementation.  
     Put most simply, the reliance on a propositionally-based view concepts and concept possession to account 
for know-how is not theoretically neutral as Bengson and Moffett appear to maintain. It is a substantial 
theoretical question whether concepts and hence the possession conditions of  them are best thought of  
propositionally or ability-dispositional. So to secure a fully intellectualist theory, they would need to show why 
competing abilities-based theories of  concepts and concept possession are false. Unless and until an argument 
for this is forthcoming, they have succeeded in merely pushing the anti-intellectualism/intellectualism debate 
about know-how into the propositional/abilities debate about concepts and understanding. 




simply lacks the strength.181 And finally, there is Snowdon’s counterexample of a world 
renowned omelet chef who loses both of his arms in a car accident, yet still knows how to 
make world class omelets182. (Though it is unclear, at best, how the world-renowned omelet 
chef enjoys the practical mode of presentation concerning making omelets anymore.) Each 
of these examples appears to present some fairly powerful evidence that a dispositional or 
ability account of know-how misses the mark.183 Not so with the intellectualist account. 
Since knowing how to φ is a different kind of knowing that, it is easy to explain the 
intuitions drawn out by the previous examples: knowing how to φ does not entail having the 
ability to φ.  
 But anti-intellectualists have resources here as well. On the more extreme side, one 
might hold that contrary to both case-based intuitions and linguistic intuitions, lack of ability 
entails lack of corresponding know-how184; once the renowned chef loses his arms, his 
know-how is gone as well. One wonders, though, whether case-based or linguistic intuitions 
are prompted by under-described cases. For example, suppose we ask about different 
intervals of time regarding the omelet chef’s ability and know-how; or, perhaps we stipulate 
the chef has remained at the restaurant training new chef’s; or, we stipulate that he hasn’t 
gone near a kitchen for years; or, suppose we suggest that a new technology has emerged for 
prosthetic arms functionally identical to the arms he lost. We can manipulate these cases to 
pump whatever intuitions we like. The fact remains that this is an empirical question and the 
case-based intuitions or the linguistic evidence cannot definitively answer the question.   
                                                 
181 Knowledge, Perception, 7. 
182 Snowdon, Paul. “I—Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered.” In Proceedings of  the 
Aristotelian Society, 104 (2003): 8. 
183 Bengson, Moffett, and Wright (“The Folk on Knowing How.” Philosophical Studies 142, no. 3 (2009): 387–401) 
argue that a presumption in favor of  anti-intellectualism is empirically false. In a series of  surveys, they found 
that participants were more likely to deny that know-how entails ability. The lesson from this is that the so-
called intuitive appeal of  anti-intellectualism falls away. see §4.2a below for my response. 
184 Noë (“Against Intellectualism.” Analysis 65, no. 288 (2005): 278–290) appears to recommend this with his 




 On the less extreme side, one might think that being prevented from doing something 
either naturally (by loss of arms or lack of strength) or circumstantially (by failing to be near 
a kitchen or snowy mountains) does nothing at all to undermine the thesis that know-how is 
distinct from know-that. Abilities are dispositional which means certain enabling conditions 
must be met for a given ability to be manifest or exercised. Know-how and ability 
ascriptions are tightly connected to subjunctive conditionals. What’s more, the putative 
intellectualist counter-examples fail to recognize that an ability to φ is more often than not 
constituted by a constellation of other abilities, many of which may not require full (or any) 
functionality that the full ability does. For example, the fact that the world-renowned omelet 
chef lost his arms does not entail that he does not have a host of other abilities that 
constituted the full ability to make delicious omelets; the loss of his arms does not mean he 
no longer has the ability to recognize when to melt the butter in the pan, how much cream to put 
into the egg mixture, when to pour the egg mixture into the pan, etc. The intellectualist 
counter-examples confuse and/or conflate several abilities and then conclude that loss of 
one (e.g., the ability to fold the egg at the right time, say), while retaining the others, shows 
that know-how must be propositionally constituted. Although the omelet chef loses his arms 
and is thus no longer able to actually make the omelets, he nevertheless retains the majority 
of abilities that constitute the ability to make delicious omelets; indeed, he can still teach 
others how to make the omelets even if he cannot demonstrate it.  
 There is additional worry about the omelet chef example that undermines Stanley’s 
appeal to practical modes of presentation. If the omelet chef continues to enjoy the practical 
mode of presentation regarding the way(s) to make delicious omelets, it is unclear appeal to 
that mode of thinking satisfies the pre-theoretic intuition about the distinction between 




appropriately related to performance? It is clear the chef can no longer make delicious 
omelets; he has the lost the ability to execute such a performance. But, practical modes of 
thinking are meant to show that know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge 
precisely because such modes of thinking are what explains the translation of know-that to a 
performance. If, on the other hand, the chef ceases to enjoy the practical mode of 
presentation, then the intellectualist has failed to satisfy the pre-theoretic distinction between 
know-how and know-that by appeal to practical modes of presentation. Recall, the example 
is meant to show that an individual can retain know-how absent ability; although the chef 
lost his arms and thus the ability to make delicious omelets, he is nevertheless supposed to 
have retained his know-how. The only way for him to have retained know-how absent ability 
is by being presented with the way to make delicious omelets practically.   
 Couple the more or less extreme response with the observation that know-how 
ascriptions are sometimes ambiguous between knowing how to φ and knowing how one φs 
and the putative counterexamples are readily explained. The ski instructor knows how one 
ought to do the stunts; he knows what is involved and what it takes to do them. A similar 
move is available in other cases as well. However, intellectualists deny there is any ambiguity 
in ascriptions of knows how. While a prima facie case can be made that points to ambiguous 
uses of “knows-how to” upon closer inspection this falls apart.185 In particular, Bengson and 
Moffett show that “knows how to” constructions fail tests of semantic ambiguity.186  
 
4)  a) John hit a grand slam to win the game and on seventeen at the black jack 
tables. 
 b) Jason saw her rat, but Stephen didn’t. 
 c) Katrina swung the bat, but she didn’t swing the bat. 
 
5)  a) John knows how to hit a fast ball and play Black Jack. 
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 b) Jason knows how to identify a rat, but Stephen does not. 
 c) Katrina knows how to bunt, but she doesn’t know how to bunt. 
 
The tests in the constructions in 4—conjunction reduction (a), verb phrase deletion (b), and 
eliciting contradiction (c), respectively—each present a different test for semantic ambiguity 
that the corresponding “knows how to” constructions in 5 fails. The sentence in 4a is 
awkward because the verb “hit” expresses two different concepts, one modifying each 
disjunct. Not so with 5a. The ambiguity of “rat” in 4b allows for a non-standard reading that 
might mean John saw her tell on someone, but Stephen did not see her pet rat. Again, there is 
no such ambiguity in 5b. Finally, because “bat” has multiple lexical meanings, there is a 
reading of 4c that elicits no contradiction—Katrina swung the baseball bat, but she did not 
swing the flying nocturnal rodent. There is no corresponding reading of 5c that dissolves the 
putative contradiction.187 Notice, the linguistic ambiguity issue is irrelevant to the accusation 
that intellectualists confuse or conflate several different abilities (a point we shall return to 
from a slightly different angle in §4.2a, below.) 
 What, then, are we to make of the case for anti-intellectualism? In light of the preceding, 
the intellectualist case for know-how appears to avoid the first direction of Ryle’s regress. 
But this avoidance is only apparent. Consider again the notion that when a subject knows 
how to φ she knows that a way, w, is a way to φ. Even if we can fully grasp the de se 
interpretation that Stanley offers, there is a deeper worry.  
 On the intellectualist account offered by Stanley, to say that Susan knows how to type 
the word “the” is to say that there is a way, w, such that w is a way to type the word “the” 
and Susan knows that w is a way for her to type “the”. Suppose we say that w consists of 
some instructions like “depress the “t” key with the left index finger (this is an 
                                                 




oversimplification since it is more like “flex left index finger at 15 “degrees”, flex first 
knuckle of left index finger to depress “t” key, but the simplified instructions will suffice for 
the present point). For the intellectualist, there is no essential connection from knowing w to 
knowing how to depress a key with the left index finger. In other words, Susan may very 
well know that she can type “the” by depressing the “t” “h” “e” keys and for all that still fail 
to know how. Unless Susan knows how to depress the “t” key, her knowing w is still not 
knowing how to type “the”. So, she needs some further bit of propositional knowledge y. 
Again, knowing that y is a way to type “t” will not count as knowing how to type “t” unless 
she knows how to manifest the content of y.188  
 Further, the failure can occur in the other direction from manifestation to knowledge 
that w is way to φ. Suppose that Susan knows that the way to type “the” is to depress “t-h-e” 
on the keyboard in front of her. Suppose also that she can do this, but that in depressing 
those keys correctly she fails to know that she is doing so. Perhaps she has some kind of 
severe dyslexia. By analogy, I might know my co-worker’s brother Adam really well—we get 
drinks regularly, and so on—but I might not know that Adam is my coworker’s brother. 
Why cannot this occur in cases of knowledge how as well? I might know that the way to φ is 
to w, but fail to recognize that my φ-ing is a manifestation of w. 
 There are two problems that the intellectualist needs to overcome here. First, she needs 
give an explanation of  knowing how to φ despite the failure of  knowing that w is a way to φ 
entailing that she knows how to φ. Since, her account relies on knowledge of  a way, this 
failure is the equivalent of  the failure of  the view. Second, assuming she could explain this, 
she needs to explain where know-how enters into the picture. Since for each way w that one 
knows, there is a further way y that one must know in order to manifest w, the intellectualist 
                                                 




must provide an explanation as to what generates the actual know-how at issue. These 
problems are insurmountable. Not so for the anti-intellectualist. Because know-how is 
dispositional or ability-based, when you know how to type “the”, you automatically know 
how to type “t”. Discussing Ginet’s example of  knowing how to open a door, Fantl nicely 
captures the point. 
 
“Intellectualist know-how requires a bottom up guarantee that can never come; your 
knowing how to open the door by turning the doorknob does not entail that you 
know how to turn the doorknob, so whether you know how to open the door, even 
when you know that you open the door by turning the doorknob, waits on a 
guarantee that you know how to turn the doorknob. Anti-intellectualist know-how 
provides a top-down guarantee that is there at the beginning; if  you know how to 
open the door by turning the doorknob, you of  course must know how to turn the 
doorknob in order to know how to open the door. But, fortunately, that you know 




The intellectualist position we have been discussing maintains that knowing-how is (at least 
partially) constituted by knowing-that. In other words, the position is a pure form of  know-
how. All know-how is (at least partially constituted by) know-that. This strong thesis runs 
into the problems we have just seen. However, intellectualists about know-how have not 
contented themselves with merely answering objections to their view, they have presented 
objections of  their own. So, before I can offer my own reasons arguing for at least a modest 





                                                 




4.2. The Intellectualist Case(s) for Know-how Without Ability 
 
The pure intellectualist takes an all-or-nothing approach to know-how; all know-how is or 
reduces to know-that.190 So, if we can have know-how without know-that, pure 
intellectualism is false. Or, even more weakly, if any knowledge-how is constituted by some 
kind of non-propositional knowledge, then pure intellectualism is false.191 Since standard 
accounts of anti-intellectualist know-how are ability-based, what we need to show is that 
abilities and propositional knowledge come apart while retaining know-how. Or, more 
weakly, that there are some instances of know-how that do not involve propositional 
knowledge. I shall argue that pure intellectualism cannot explain some kinds of knowledge-
how because the propositions that would have to be the content of those instances of 
knowledge-how, if intellectualism were true, are simply not present. In order to set up my 
argument, it is necessary to present the intellectualist case for knowledge-how without 
ability. 
 Several proponents of intellectualism have taken themselves to have shown that know-
how and abilities come apart, and that know-how is retained even in the absence of ability. 
Furthermore, there may even be some empirical evidence to suggest that know-how 
ascriptions remain despite the absence of ability. In a survey conducted by Bengson, Moffett, 
and Wright participants were presented with different cases and asked both if the individuals 
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constituted by knowledge-how. See Hetherington (op cit.) for a defense of  pure anti-intellectualism. 
191 And, if  any knowledge-how is at least partially constituted by some bit of  propositional knowledge, then 




in the cases know how to φ and if the individuals have the ability to φ.192 Here are the 
vignettes the participants were asked about: 
 
1) Pat has been a ski instructor for 20 years, teaching people how to do complex ski 
stunts. He is in high demand as an instructor, since he is considered to be the best at 
what he does. Although an accomplished skier, he has never been able to do the 
stunts himself. Nonetheless, over the years he has taught many people how to do 
them well. In fact, a number of his students have won medals in international 
competitions and competed in the Olympic games.193 
 
2) Jane is an Olympic-caliber figure skater practicing a complex jump called the 
Salchow. When one performs a Salchow, one takes off from the back inside edge of 
one foot and lands on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after one or more 
rotations in the air. A single Salchow requires one complete rotation. A double 
requires two. A tripe requires three. A quadruple requires four. And a quintuple 
requires five. Like virtually all Olympic skaters, Jane is consistently able to perform a 
triple Salchow. Although Jane can land a quadruple Salchow one out of every three 
attempts, she is unable to do a quintuple Salchow. In fact, at the present time, 
nobody is able to perform one. Nevertheless, Jane want to be the first skater to ever 
land a quintuple Salchow and so she occasionally practices them in her free time. She 
knows that in order to do a quintuple Salchow, she must take off from the back 
inside edge of one foot and land on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after 
five complete rotations in the air. Whenever she attempts this, however, she cannot 
make it around the full number or rotations without falling.194 
 
In each case, a vast majority (81% in (1) and 76% in (2)) judged that the subject has 
knowledge-how despite being unable to do the stunt. Bengson, et al. went further and tested 
intuitions about the sufficiency of ability for know-how with the following vignette: 
 
3) Sally who is an inexperienced hiker with extremely poor vision, decides to go 
snow shoeing through the mountains in February. As she is hiking along, an 
avalanche suddenly starts and a rush of snow sweeps down the mountain and over 
Sally. Sally, however, mistakenly takes the snow to be a body of water (she believes 
incorrectly that a nearby damn has broken) and so she responds by making rapid 
swimming motions. Sally aims to swim through the water towards the surface. 
Though Sally has never heard of this fact before, making swimming motions is a way 
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to escape avalanches. As a result of her lucky mistake, Sally is able to escape from the 
avalanche.195 
 
In this case, again, an overwhelming majority of participants judged against anti-
intellectualist intuitions. These participants maintained both that Sally had the ability but did 
not know how to escape an avalanche. Finally, anticipating an objection from some anti-
intellectualists, Bengson, et al. tested whether having a reliable ability to φ is sufficient for 
know-how.196 To test the folk on this, they presented participants with one last case: 
 
4) Irina, who is a novice figure skater, decides to try a complex jump called the 
Salchow. When one performs a Salchow, one takes off from the back inside edge of 
one skate and lands on the back outside edge of the opposite skate after one or more 
rotations in the air. Irina, however, is seriously mistaken about how to perform a 
Salchow. She believes incorrectly that the way to perform a Salchow is to take off 
from the front outside edge of one skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the front 
inside edge of the other skate. However, Irina has a severe neurological abnormality 
that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how she actually thinks she is 
acting. So, despite the fact that she is seriously mistaken about how to perform a 
Salchow, whenever she actually attempts to do a Salchow (in accordance with her 
misconceptions) the abnormality causes Irina to unknowingly perform the correct 
sequence of moves, and so she ends up successfully performing a Salchow.197  
 
Even on this more sophisticated version of anti-intellectualism, which requires reliable 
ability to φ, participants judged that both Irina had the ability and she did not know how. 
Since the description includes the fact that whenever Irina tries to do a Salchow, she 
succeeds (though in a bizarre sort of way), it is clear that she is reliable in successfully 
performing the stunt. What should we make of these results?198 This appears to be a fairly 
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intuitions. Noë (“Against Intellectualism”), says, pace Stanley and Williamson (“Knowing How”), that if most 
English speakers were polled about Pat’s know-how despite lacking ability in (1) they would deny that Pat 
knows how to do the stunts. Bengson, et al. did just that and found overwhelming evidence to support Stanley 
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strong case for intellectualist claims. However, it is telling that each of the tested cases 
contained quite high-level know-how, typically involving very many coordinated movements 
at precise times in precise ways, not to mention the possession of particular concepts such as 
<outside edge>, <inside edge>, etc. We might wonder whether the same would be true of 
skills and abilities on a “lower” level.199 
 
 
a. A response on behalf  of  modest anti-intellectualism 
 
In replying to these vignettes and the results of the surveys, we must recall the fact that both 
the concept and ascriptions of know-how are flexible. Sometimes the appropriate response 
to whether an individual knows how to do something is, “in a way.” We must also recognize 
that ability and know-how are threshold concepts. As such, ascriptions of know-how will 
turn on the context and practical interests of the ascriber. Additionally, for very many 
abilities when an individual has an ability to φ, there is not one discrete ability that the 
individual has. Recall the omelet chef and the many abilities he has. The flexible nature of 
know-how shall be important once we consider whether intuitions regarding the connection 
between know-how and ability on display in the Bengson, et al., study are the result of the 
kinds or level of know-how their vignettes highlight. 
     Suppose instead of testing these cases they tested the connection between know-how and 
abilities with cases involving elementary addition and subtraction, simple inference, 
                                                 
199 Interestingly enough, in a different paper, Bengson and Moffett appeal to such lower level abilities in their 
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They argue that for select activities—activities that entail having the ability to do them—a subject knows how 
to do a select activity only if  the subject “minimally understands” that activity, and a subject has minimal 
understanding just in case she has “reasonable mastery of  certain concepts” related to that activity. For some 
activities, ability-based concepts (and the corresponding abilities) are not necessary for understanding the 




attention, and the like.200 I suspect that most people would be unwilling to attribute know-
how when there is a lack of ability, or unwilling to attribute lack of ability when there is 
know-how. Consider how bizarre it is to say that “Johnny knows how to add, but does not 
have the ability to add”.201 Note, this is not to be read as “Johnny knows how to add, but is 
unable to add right now” (due to being asleep or thoroughly distracted trying to navigate the 
streets of NYC during rush hour). Nor should we read this as “Johnny knows what it takes 
to add, but is unable to add.” Knowing how to add just is to have the ability to add.202 
Likewise for other very basic activities: knowing how to draw a simple inference is nothing 
more than being able to draw a simple inference, knowing how to attend, say, to certain 
features in one’s visual field just is to have the ability to do so. In the next chapter, I shall 
give a fuller account of abilities, but as a rough sketch for current purposes we can say that 
to have an ability is to be reliable at succeeding in the goal of the ability when trying.  
 If there are instances of knowing how to do something that are abilities this raises 
questions about the poll taken by Bengson, et al. In each of  the tested cases the subject was 
attributed either know-how without ability or ability without know-how. But notice the 
know-how at issue is highly complex. It is not the case that in each of (1)-(4) the subject 
possesses no relevant ability, rather the subjects in (1) and (2) are said to be experts in the 
general category of performance under which the specific stunts fall. To test intuitions of the 
folk on the basis of these examples to build a case for intellectualist know-how is equivalent 
to testing whether young children and animals have propositional knowledge based on the 
folk’s intuitions about extremely complex mathematics and physics knowledge in children 
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and animals. Just because our intuitions (even rightly) judge that young children and animals 
cannot know that the area of a circle is calculated by squaring the radius and multiplying by 
pi, it in no way follows that young children and animals are incapable of having any 
propositional knowledge.  
 Similarly, we should not base conclusions about knowledge-how on intuitions regarding 
very complex activities. It in no way follows that because our intuitions (even rightly) judge 
that Pat knows how to do the ski stunts or Irina knows how to do a quintuple Salchow even 
though neither have the specific ability that all knowledge-how is propositional. First, 
because many instances of know-how entail abilities as was discussed above. Second, there 
are very many abilities that Pat and Irina do possess that are not only related to the stunts, 
but also constitutive of them. Pat’s expert skiing ability surely plays a constitutive role in his 
knowing how to do the stunts. It is as if Bengson, et al. have come to the very end of a chain 
every previous link of which contained an ability necessary to the subsequent link and 
decided to ignore everything before it.   
Recall the discussion of Ginet’s example of knowing how to open a door by turning the 
doorknob and pushing the door discussed in the previous section. Knowing how to turn the 
doorknob is constitutive of knowing how to open the door by turning the doorknob and 
pushing it. Likewise, knowing how to twist my wrist in the appropriate way is constitutive of 
knowing how to turn the doorknob, which is constitutive of knowing how to open the door 
by turning the doorknob and pushing the door. By parity of reasoning, knowing how to do 
the expert stunts is constituted by very much background know-how. It is implausible in the 
extreme that Pat would know how to do the stunts and teach the stunts without any kind of 
ability to ski whatsoever, let alone an ability to ski expertly. The most we can draw from the 




not entail (and thus are not constituted by) the specific corresponding ability to φ. But to move 
from this to all instances of knowledge-how are instances of propositional knowledge is 
unwarranted.203 To reiterate, their findings do not commit one to the irrelevance of ability to 
knowledge-how.  
Despite the methodological worries we have discussed, it seems that there can, indeed, 
be instances of knowledge-how without the corresponding ability, provided we qualify this 
with the claim that it does not follow that no abilities are required.204 As we have just seen, 
the kinds of knowledge-how that might lead us to intellectualist intuitions of the sort 
brought out by the judgments in the Bengson, et al. survey are so fine-grained and high-level 
as to be implausible without coarser-grained abilities to constitute them. Case (4) involving 
reliable ability is dealt with slightly differently.  
Bald reliability is not sufficient for having an ability; one must also try to bring about the 
end result. The trying component ties the activity to the agent—it makes the activity the 
agent’s own. If this is right, then Irina in (4) does not have the ability, since she does not try 
to bring about a Salchow, she tries to bring about a different maneuver altogether but ends 
up doing a Salchow; being able to φ (even reliably) is not the same as having the ability to φ. 
We shall return to this in more detail in the next chapter. For now we may wonder how 
these strange and marginal cases can illuminate our ordinary practice of attributing know-
how. Neurological disorders involving concept confusion are irrelevant to the ordinary case 
of knowing how to do a Salchow. These issues notwithstanding, I want to turn to my 
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better for my view. All I really need to defend is that there are some instances of  knowledge-how that are not 




arguments against intellectualism. In so doing, I shall be providing arguments for a modest 





4.3. Three Arguments Against Intellectualism (and For Modest Anti-
Intellectualism) 
 
So far, the case for intellectualism, as well as the case against (modest) anti-intellectualism 
has not fared very well. The chief  objection to intellectualism—Ryle’s regress—has not 
adequately been addressed and the argument based on the possibility of  knowledge-how 
without ability relies on high-level or quite complex cases of  know-how. Despite this, I have 
yet to make my case for anti-intellectualism. In this section, I remedy that lacuna. 
Furthermore, my arguments for modest anti-intellectualism take the form of  arguments 
against intellectualism. Put differently, I shall present insurmountable problems for 
intellectualism by appeal to three separate kinds of  know-how that could only be constituted 
by abilities. Specifically, we will briefly look at evidence in neuroscience and psychology, 
abilities and know-how in children, and linguistic proficiency. 
 
 





There is strong empirical evidence in neuroscience and psychology that establishes 
knowledge-how without knowledge-that and knowledge-that without knowledge-how. This 
double dissociation, it is argued, provides a better explanation of  the findings in 
neuroscience, and hence is a better epistemological account. Marcus Adams discusses the 
relation between different kinds of  memory and the knowledge-how/knowledge-that 
distinction.205 Note that the following arguments do not rely in any way on linguistic 
maneuvers involving the syntax and semantics of  ascriptions of  know-how.  
 Experimental psychologists talk about two types of  memory,206 declarative and 
procedural. The former “stores declarative knowledge, i.e., knowledge of  facts and episodes” 
and the latter “stores procedural knowledge, i.e., skill knowledge.”207 Studies208 have shown 
that individuals with certain declarative memory impairments—e.g. the inability to store new 
declarative memories—are nevertheless unaffected when it comes to procedural knowledge 
and memory. That is, subjects with the inability to make new memories of  facts and episodes 
are still able to create new memories about skills; they can gain more and more skill 
knowledge. Alternatively, patients suffering from neurological disorders such as Huntington’s 
disease and Parkinson’s have strong difficulty in acquiring or developing skill knowledge, but 
not declarative knowledge.209  
 
 
                                                 
205 Adams, Marcus P. “Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction.” Synthese 
170, no. 1 (2009): 97–114. 
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propositional knowledge whereas non-declarative memory stores procedural, perceptual learning, among other 
things. Since my focus is on knowledge-how, I will follow Adams and simply distinguish between declarative 
and procedural memory. 
207 ibid, 104-5. 
208 See Adams, “Empirical Evidence,” for discussion and citation of several studies. 




b. Abilities and know-how in children 
 
Whatever one’s view of  whether young children (ages 2-5) are capable of  having 
propositional knowledge, it is clear that for some abilities (or know-how) children do not 
(and perhaps cannot) have the propositional knowledge involved. Consider a young child 
(say 3 years old), Ellie, running down a small hill while pulling a wagon her friends are in. At 
the bottom of  the hill she makes a turn to continue running with the wagon. Now, 
considering the complex physics involved that explain how this can be done without tipping 
the wagon over, it is extremely implausible that young children have the corresponding 
propositional knowledge. Yet, any parent will attest to the fact that children become quite 
adept at this very quickly. What is more, they are able to reliably make the turn without 
tipping the wagon across different hill sizes and grades as well as different weights of  the 
wagon. The question the intellectualist needs to answer is: what is (are) the proposition(s) 
that the child knows that constitute her knowing how to make the turn without tipping the 
wagon?   
 Let us attempt to answer this using Stanley and Williamson’s account.210 S knows how to 
φ iff  there is a contextually relevant way w of  φ-ing such that S knows that w is a way to φ 
and S entertains w under a practical mode of  presentation. Hence, Ellie knows how to turn a 
wagon without tipping it if  and only if  Ellie knows some contextually relevant way w of  
turning a wagon without tipping it and Ellie entertains w under a practical mode of  
presentation. Perhaps the contextually relevant w is coarse-grained enough not to require 
knowledge of  the physics involved; perhaps it is enough to maintain some kind of  
demonstrative proposition as doing the work. In this case, the child needs only to know that 
I must do this to not tip it. Or, a bit more fine-grained, I must make a wide turn or the 
                                                 




wagon will tip. Fair enough, but this move leads to the obviously false conclusion that I 
might know how to do the complex stunts that Pat teaches even though I have never skied a 
day in my life, simply by knowing, e.g., that to do the stunt one must rotate their torso in one 
direction, tilt one’s head back, pull one’s legs toward one’s head, and rotate their torso the 
other direction. So, either the propositional knowledge is so fine-grained that it rules out 
clear cases of  knowledge-how, or it is so coarse-grained that anyone can know how to φ by 
possessing rather general propositional knowledge. 
 Here is another example: Evie knows how to find Elmo on the page of  a book. To know 
how to do this, Evie must attend to various items (features and objects) in her visual field, 
focus on those items, discriminate them one from another, etc. Further, she must engage 
some recognitional capacity that picks out Elmo. Evie is only two years old. If  asked, “Evie, 
what are you doing?” she would respond with something like, “ooking Emmo book” (her 
“L”s are not great just yet). Again, what is the content of  the w such that knowing that 
content constitutes knowledge-how? In order to grant that she knows how to find Elmo in a 
book, the intellectualist must say something like Evie knows that to find Elmo she has to 
scan her eyes over the book until she sees the furry red monster. But this already is far too 
abstract for her two-year-old brain. So perhaps it is that she must scan to find Elmo (where 
she knows Elmo by some acquaintance or the exercise of  a recognitional capacity). Even 
here, the content is far too abstract for Evie to know. The last recourse is to deny Evie 
knowledge-how; Evie does not know how to find Elmo, she merely has the ability to find 
Elmo. Or, weaker still, she is simply reliable at finding Elmo. Both of  these responses beg 
the question at issue since it is only to the extent that one is committed to pure intellectualist 
know-how that one is inclined to deny knowledge-how to Evie.211  Absent the prior 
                                                 




theoretical commitment, there is no hindrance to attributing to Evie the knowledge how to 
find Elmo.  
 
 
c. Linguistic proficiency 
 
The fact that individuals become proficient speakers fairly early on and without 
metalinguistic knowledge about grammar demonstrates that pure intellectualism cannot be 
true and thus (at least) a modest anti-intellectualism is. Speakers of  English become highly 
sophisticated in their sentence construction well before any metalinguistic knowledge about 
grammar. Michael Devitt212 argues against any propositional assumptions in this linguistic 
proficiency.213 Instead, he urges a skill assumption for such proficiency.214  
 There are two philosophical arguments that, if  sound, would justify the propositional 
assumption that linguistic proficiency is propositional knowledge.215 Unfortunately, each of  
these arguments begs the central question at issue. According to Devitt, Chomsky argues 
that since grammar is a scientific theory and scientific theories ought to be treated 
realistically, then given “a speaker’s knowledge of  her language”216 we have good evidence of  
a grammar’s truth, hence reality. But, says Devitt, there are two ways in which rules can 
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govern; in the linguistic case, there are two ways in which the rules of  grammar can govern, 
i.e., issue in linguistic proficiency. First, rules may govern through explicit representation as 
when a speaker consciously tries to break colloquial habits—e.g., remembering to use the 
adverb to modify a verb rather than an adjective: “are you feeling well” instead of  “are you 
feeling good.” Second, rules may govern simply by being embodied without being 
represented—e.g., when a child without thought uses the irregular “caught” instead of  
“catched”.217 What an advocate of  Chomsky’s view needs is a separate argument to establish 
that the rules of  grammar govern by being represented in competent speakers. Absent such 
an argument, treating a speaker’s knowledge of  her language as evidence for propositional 
knowledge of  its grammar begs the question against the skill or ability assumption.218 
The next argument for a propositional assumption in linguistic proficiency, again 
proffered by Chomsky, maintains that the fact that people differ in their ability to speak (e.g., 
due to public speaking courses) and use language (e.g., a writer or poet as opposed to the 
ordinary speaker) and that some injury may lead to loss of  ability without loss of  knowledge 
points to underlying propositional knowledge. Both of  these examples show that linguistic 
proficiency is propositional knowledge only if  one already assumes that it cannot be mere 
knowledge-how—i.e., a skill or ability.  Consider the first example. The effective orator and 
the ordinary speaker may have the same knowledge-that of  grammar but only the former is 
effective at persuading an audience to her view. Why should we assume that there is core 
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propositional knowledge they both share but differ only in abilities? Is it not just as likely as 
there being two different kinds of  knowledge-how, two different skills or abilities? The 
public speaker knows how (has the ability) to speak competently just as the ordinary speaker 
does, but the public speaker also has the different (ability) know-how to choose and 
emphasize the right words, pause for effect, and so on. Why can there not be two different 
kinds of  (ability) knowledge-how at play, the one requiring the other? As the response 
shows, this argument like the last begs the question against the skill or ability assumption of  
linguistic proficiency. Devitt’s reply to the second case—the loss of  ability without loss of  
know-how—is more complex.  
According the second kind of  case, since the loss of  ability does not entail the loss of  
knowledge-how, that knowledge-how cannot be an ability. Further, in some cases, the ability 
is easily recovered. This implies that the knowledge-how was retained. But what could that 
know-how be if  not propositional? Hence, the best explanation of  this is that knowledge-
how is knowledge-that. Applied to linguistic proficiency, knowledge how to use a language 
(speak and write) is propositional knowledge. I quote Devitt’s discussion at length. 
 
“Chomsky rightly insists that “to know a language … is to be in a certain mental 
state, which persists as a relatively steady component of  transitory mental states” 
(1980b, 5). But he writes as if  taking this knowledge as mere knowledge how must 
saddle it with a whole lot of  irrelevant features of  performance (1986, 10) and must 
make behavior “criterial” for the possession of  the knowledge, not merely evidential 
(1980b, 5). This is not so. A person’s knowledge how can be an underlying steady 
state abstracted from features of  performance. It can be, as Chomsky insists our 
knowledge of  language is, “a cognitive system of  the mind/brain” (1988, 10) and yet 
still be akin to a skill or ability. Usually, such an ability gives rise to certain behavior 
that then counts as evidence for the ability. But the ability may not give rise to the 
behavior. The behavior is not criterial. 
 That was my response to Chomsky’s argument in Ignorance of  Language (2006b, 92-
93), and it still seems right to me. However, more needs to be said. It looks as if  the 
ability to F cannot be simply identified with knowing how to F because, as we have 
just seen, one can lose the ability, perhaps even permanently lose it, without losing 
the knowledge how. We should see the knowledge how as the necessary underlying 




components of  the full ability are lost; to take an example mentioned by Stanley and 
Williamson (2001, 416) it is arguable that a master pianist who loses both of  her 
arms in a tragic car accident still knows how to play the piano, even though she is no 
longer able to play it… I have preferred to talk of  linguistic competence as simply a 
skill or ability; that’s the skill assumption. However, if  we must talk of  it as 
knowledge, we should see it as mere knowledge how (of  the Rylean kind). In light of  
the present discussion, that knowledge how should be seen as the necessary 
underlying part of  the full skill or ability.219 
 
 
There are two parts to this response. The first is a restatement of  an earlier argument 
and the second is an expansion on that earlier argument. The strategy is similar to what we 
have already seen. Namely, that Chomsky has simply assumed that knowledge of  a language 
cannot be mere knowledge-how. He needs an additional argument to show that only 
propositional knowledge can be a steady underlying mental state and that behavior can be 
evidence for propositional knowledge, but must be criterial for mere-knowledge how or ability. Absent 
that argument, it is within the epistemic rights of  the opponent of  the propositional 
assumption to maintain that mere knowledge-how can be both an underlying steady state 
(i.e., a cognitive system of  the mind/brain, as Chomsky urges) and that behavior can be 
evidence of  mere knowledge-how, and hence not only criterial for know-how. But unless there 
are further arguments to support this, then the advocate of  the skill assumption is likewise 
begging the question against the propositional assumption. Fortunately, Devitt argues that 
there is evidence in the psychology of  skills and in psycholinguistics that does just this. But 
first, we need to look at his expansion of  the earlier argument. 
Here, he maintains that cases of  sudden loss of  ability where knowledge-how is retained 
give us reason to reject the identity of  know-how with abilities. Instead, “we should see the 
knowledge how as the necessary underlying part of  the ability.”220 It looks as though he 
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wants to say that abilities are constituted by mere knowledge-how plus some other feature 
(what he calls the “more overt components”).  
Let us walk through this a bit more slowly, first taking the expert pianist as an example 
and then linguistic proficiency. The claim is the pianist loses the ability to play, even though 
we would still judge (rightly) that she knows how to play.221 More accurately, she loses the 
ability to manifest the ability to play; there may be many abilities she retains (such as timing 
recognition, what sound the key should make when struck with the appropriate strength, and 
so on). So, whatever the underlying part of  the ability is, it cannot be a skill or ability to 
actually play since that is now gone. But, Devitt wants to maintain that the underlying part is 
mere knowledge-how. After we have ruled out two candidates—propositional knowledge 
and ability—the only thing left is some sort of  disposition. 222  This much is hinted at by his 
qualification “of  the Rylean kind”.223 Mere know-how is then a sort of  disposition to φ and 
only becomes a full skill or ability when something is added to it.  
Further, this mere knowledge-how is not just a state of  the mind/brain, it can be a cognitive 
system of  the mind/brain. Presumably, the encoding such that this mere know-how becomes 
a system makes it more stable and therefore know-how rather than just a mere disposition. 
Applying this picture to the pianist we get the following. The pianist has a disposition to 
“play” the piano, where “playing” is more than simply pressing the keys in the correct order 
and in the correct way. According to Ryle’s understanding of  the dispositions that are our 
know-how they are multi-track; they may be instantiated in a number of  ways: physically 
                                                 
221 Like the omelet chef, it is a substantial empirical question whether she retains the ability. Stanley (Know How, 
ch. 6) addresses the issue of whether science or linguistics should settle the question of what kind of state 
know-how is. My account of modest anti-intellectualism avoids his arguments since I am concerned with 
instances of know-how that could not be separated from ability. 
222 Perhaps not. In fn. 179 I alluded to Bengson and Moffett’s account of knowledge-how as objectual 
understanding, but whatever we make of that view, I think it is clear that Devitt does not have this in mind. 
223 Ryle speaks of know-how as a multi-track dispositions; knowledge-how is to be disposed to behave in 




pressing the keys in the right order and right way, imagining that one is striking the keys in 
the right order (e.g., when working through a difficult technical movement of  a complex 
piece before attempting to perform it), instructing others which keys to strike when, and so 
on.) In which case, one might have the knowledge-how to play the piano (even expertly) 
absent hands to do so; the disposition to play may be instantiated in a number of  ways. 
Similarly with linguistic proficiency, one knows a language when one knows how to use 
the language reasonably effectively. That proficiency might be instantiated in speech or 
writing. It might be instantiated in understanding as well. Dumas’ Monsieur Noirtier de 
Villefort communicates quite adeptly with Valentin despite his inability to actually speak or 
write.224 Thus, thinking about linguistic proficiency as mere knowledge-how (of  the Rylean 
kind) can answer the kinds of  cases that Chomsky has in mind.  
To shore up his case for mere knowledge-how, Devitt turns to psychology and (to a lesser 
extent) psycholinguistics. As we noted above, psychologists distinguish between declarative 
and procedural knowledge, identifying knowledge-how with procedural knowledge. Since 
there are instances of  know-how constituted by both propositional knowledge and abilities, 
Devitt urges it is best to think of  procedural knowledge as mere knowledge-how.225 But 
psychologists also line up the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge with 
explicit and implicit memory and learning. The latter is characterized as “domain-general and 
capable of  capturing the kinds of  complex structural relationships found in language … 
functioning “largely independent of  conscious modulation and [operating] effectively during 
                                                 
224 Dumas’ character appears to suffer from Locked-in syndrome, a condition of complete paralysis of 
everything but the eyes. A recent example of a person with locked-in syndrome exemplifies the present point. 
Jean-Dominique Baby suffered from locked-in syndrome and through a frequency-of-use ordered alphabet was 
able to compose his memoir, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly (1997). 
225 This does not appear to be controversial since psychologists are interested in the kind of knowledge that 




infancy,"226 and as “extracted from experience … rather than from explicit rules."227 There is 
a fair amount of  literature dedicated to implicit learning and language acquisition.228 The 
evidence points to mere knowledge-how as opposed to propositional knowledge about 
language.  
Devitt draws the following conclusion. The empirical evidence shows that linguistic 
proficiency is implicit and therefore procedural. This vindicates a skill assumption—that 
what accounts for our knowing how to use a language is not rule-based, but rather more akin 
to an ability. But given the reflections on loss of  ability above, Devitt would probably be 
more comfortable with claiming that linguistic proficiency is mere knowledge-how without 
going into the details of  whether is this a “full skill or ability” or a disposition. The central 
point is that there is a kind of  knowledge—manifest in linguistic proficiency—that does not 






The arguments of  this chapter demonstrate that there is a type of  knowledge that is not 
constituted by propositional knowledge. When we recognize the complex nature of  the 
                                                 
226 Reber, Arthur S. “An Epitaph for Grammar: An Abridged History.” in Rebushat, Patrick (ed.) Implicit and 
Explicit Language Learning: Conditions, Processes, and Knowledge in SLA and Bilingualism (Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins, 2011): 25. 
227 Ellis, Nick C. “Implicit and Explicit SLA and Their Interface.” in Rebushat, Patrick (ed.) Implicit and Explicit 
Language Learning: Conditions, Processes, and Knowledge in SLA and Bilingualism. (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2011) 
35–47. 
228 See Cleeremans, Axel, Arnaud Destrebecqz, and Maud Boyer. “Implicit Learning: News from the Front.” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2, no. 10 (1998): 406–416;  
Sanz, Cristina, and Ronald P Leow. Implicit and Explicit Language Learning: Conditions, Processes, and Knowledge in 




examples of  knowledge-how that do not require the corresponding ability, we find that (1) 
such examples do not require any ability, and (2) such examples are constituted by both 
abilities and factual knowledge. The tendency to conflate sophisticated know-how into a 
simple unit obscures the complex nature of  such examples of  know-how. If, instead we 
focus on less complex and relatively low-level knowledge-how, we find that know-how and 
ability do not come apart. In the next chapter, I shall continue to develop my account of  an 
abilities-constituted view of  epistemic competence by focusing on low-level cognitive 
abilities. Specifically, I articulate a view of  cognitive abilities and argue that (at least some of) 
these abilities constitute know-how. In the final chapter, I home in on those abilities that 














Modest anti-intellectualism maintains that some kinds of  know-how are constituted by the 
corresponding abilities. This is most evident in what I have called low-level abilities, or 
abilities that are perhaps more basic or foundational for higher-level abilities. For example, 
the ability to do basic arithmetic like adding and subtracting is required for the ability to do 
long division. In chapter four, I illustrated modest anti-intellectualism with linguistic 
competence and recognitional abilities. In this chapter, I want to further defend this idea by 
arguing that basic mental activities, namely, the exercise of  cognitive abilities can be instances 
of  knowledge-how.  
Since my focus for the remainder of  this work will be on cognitive abilities, I need to 
clarify what I mean by this term and, importantly, distinguish it from nearby or related 
concepts. In particular, I shall present an account of  cognitive ability as a cognitive 
process/capacity/faculty that one can exercise guidance control over. Put differently, a 
cognitive ability is a cognitive capacity that: (i) an individual owns (i.e., recognizes as 
something they exercise or manifest—or at least they recognize themselves as doing 
something which entails that they have exercised or manifest the capacity), and (ii) the 
exercise of  that capacity can be motivated by reasons that would reliably cause her to 




abilities serves the further purpose of  explaining how intention might reasonably be a part 
of  belief-formation without committing me to doxastic voluntarism.  
I begin by presenting the tension between my repudiation of  doxastic voluntarism and 
the idea that having an ability entails sufficiently reliable success when trying in §5.1. 
Dissolving this tension requires that we have a clear grasp on what cognitive abilities are. In 
particular, how are cognitive abilities different from mere capacities/processes/faculties? In 
§5.2, I maintain that the former are instances of  the latter that the subject owns and can 
exercise or manifest for reasons. Finally, in §5.3 I examine the cognitive ability of  attention 






5.1. Cognitive Ability and Intention 
 
Abilities in general, and cognitive abilities in particular, can constitute knowledge-how. Some 
kinds of  know-how, what I call mere knowledge-how, are nothing over and above having 
certain abilities. In chapter 4, I argued for that claim in general. In this chapter, I want to 
argue that cognitive abilities can be instances of  knowledge-how. But there is a prima facie 
worry that must first be addressed, especially when it comes to cognitive abilities. Stated 
simply, abilities appear to require that one intentionally try to φ whereas mere capacities are 
activated or not automatically, i.e., without intention. Since I have argued that belief  is not 




constituted by cognitive abilities, then I need to address this worry.229 The account of  
cognitive abilities, I develop below entails that we exercise a kind of  control—guidance 
control—over capacities and faculties but not over belief. But this claim requires that we first 
understand what I mean by cognitive abilities and the role that guidance control plays in 
having them. 
 Broadly understood, an individual S has an ability to φ just in case S is sufficiently 
reliable at succeeding in φ-ing across a range of  situations when S intends to φ.230 This is 
true of  abilities in general. For example, when we speak of, say, intending to ride a bike, or 
make stir-fry, we often imply that a decision, even a subconscious one, has been taken. I have 
the intention to ride a bike, make stir-fry, and so on, and I execute that intention by 
exercising the ability (abilities) that will bring about that end; my goal is to bring about a 
specific end. But we cannot execute an intention to believe; beliefs are produced by our 
cognitive faculties through various interactions and experiences with the world. If  this is 
right, then perhaps the general sketch of  abilities we have before us will not do for belief. 
However, there are two important ideas central to understanding both what role know-how 
plays in epistemic competence and why we should think of  that know-how as constituted by 
cognitive abilities that alleviate these worries. First, the fact that belief  is not under our 
control does not entail that intention, for some sense of  that term, has no place in belief  
formation. This is because there are events or episodes that we bring about that are not full-
blown actions—and since we bring them about, they are not mere happenings either. 
Second, beliefs are caused or produced by the exercise of  cognitive abilities distinct from the 
                                                 
229 To foreshadow, the ability to recognize and assess justifying reasons for belief is manifest in our choosing to 
think harder about an issue, gather more evidence, evaluate whether we weighed the evidence correctly, and so 
on. Though, some of the ways we do this are rather sophisticated and nuanced. 





belief  itself. Hence, the fact that beliefs are not under our control does not entail that the 
cognitive activity that produces belief  is not under some kind control, a kind that satisfies 
the broadly intuitive account of  abilities offered above. Let us briefly deal with the first point 
(returning to the second in §5.2.b).  
 
 
a. Know-how and intention 
 
We can distinguish between actions, activities, and happenings. For example, when I stretch 
my arm to reach a book I need on the top shelf  I perform the action of  raising my arm. 
This is contrasted with my arm’s rising in the air due a sharp pain, say. In each case an event 
<the arm going up> occurs, but in one the event is an action that I bring about and in the 
other the event is a mere happening; my arm happened to go up. We might also say that in 
the one, I voluntarily raised my arm and in the other my arm involuntarily rose. In chapter 
two, I argued that belief  is not under our voluntary control. It would seem, then, that forming 
beliefs is not an action; it is not something we do intentionally.  
Nor should we think that beliefs are mere happenings either. It is not as though all belief  
formation is wholly passive. To be sure, some beliefs appear to be (perhaps wholly) passive, 
but others seem to involve activity on the part of  the believing subject. For example, I 
cannot help but believe that I see this computer monitor in front of  me when my eyes are 
open and directed towards it. In this case, I passively receive some visual stimuli and it is 
interpreted in some mental operations as being appeared to computer monitor-ly, and thus 
the belief  that there is a monitor before me forms. For other beliefs, I do seem to play a 
significant causal role. My belief  about who is a more qualified candidate for president in the 




candidate's policies, their past record, their experience, and so on. If  I find myself  forming 
beliefs about this without doing any of  this work, I can step back and evaluate my reasons 
for thinking, e.g., Hillary Clinton is more qualified and more in line with my values than is 
Donald Trump. Examples like these illustrate that not all belief  formation is wholly passive.  
Fortunately, the categories of  action and happening do not exhaust the possibilities. To 
say that a piece of  behavior is not properly a full-blown action like intentionally raising my 
arm does not imply that it is not purposeful. Much of  our behavior is purposeful without 
being intentional. As I write this, I am aware of  my leg rapidly bouncing up and down. Is 
this something that I do or is it something that is merely happening to my leg? Clearly, 
assuming some external force is not currently stimulating my leg (which it is not), it is 
something I am doing. Does this mean that I have a reason for bouncing my leg? Not at all; 
it may be mere habit (which, in my case, it is). Nevertheless, it does appear to be something I 
am doing. I want to suggest that belief  formation is a purposive activity but not an 
intentional action.231 Part of  this is explained by the fact that the cognitive abilities we 
exercise or manifest that (partially) cause beliefs are, when they become abilities, so deeply 
ingrained and integrated in our cognition that we exercise them without thinking, rather like 
we walk and keep our balance without thinking. And part of  this is explained by the fact that 
exercising or manifesting abilities only influences what we believe.  
If  we assume that the aim of  acquiring beliefs is to gain accurate information about the 
world,232 we need only maintain that cognitive abilities play a constitutive role in that 
endeavor. It does not follow from this that we must exercise those abilities to come to 
                                                 
231 For excellent discussions of action and reasons see Mele (“Agency and Mental Action.” Philosophical 
Perspectives 11 (1997): 231–249. 
232 We need not enter into the controversy over the aim of belief—and whether there is an aim or many aims 
and what those are—in order to recognize that we form beliefs in order to, as it were, live and move and have 
our being in the world. Quite obviously we attempt to gain information—form beliefs—in order to meet goals, 




specific beliefs. By analogy, the goal or aim of  playing sport is to win the game and though 
we exercise or manifest athletic skills and abilities to accomplish that aim, it does not follow 
that any exercise or manifestation of  those abilities is brought about for the specific purpose 
of  winning the game. For example, I do not pass the ball to the midfielder to <win the 
game>, though that may contribute to that goal. Or, more accurately, when passing the ball 
to a teammate, the exercise of  my abilities is not for the specific goal of  passing the ball in 
exactly the way that I am passing it. When I kick the ball to the midfielder, my goal is not 
<place the ball exactly 5 feet in front of  the inside of  his right foot>. Returning to belief, my 
exercise of  the ability to evaluate my evidence does not have the intention of  producing, 
pecifically, the belief  that p. Rather, if  I intend anything in exercising that ability it is to have 
an accurate or warranted or reasonable belief  about the subject matter of  p. 
What follows from this is that belief  formation is a kind of  mental activity. A mental 
activity preceded by the exercise or manifestation of  cognitive abilities.233 This brings us to 
the second point that what we control—in some sense—in belief  formation is not the belief  
itself, but the cognitive abilities that produce the belief. In developing this idea more fully we 
shall have to address the nature of  cognitive abilities, the control we exercise over them, and 






                                                 
233 Later I shall argue that at least some of these abilities underwrite the appropriateness of epistemic reactive 
attitudes. For exercising these abilities is something that epistemic agents do. This is to foreshadow the second 
consideration mentioned above. The discussion in the remainder of this and the following section is meant to 
elaborate and defend the idea that Sosa’s intuitive characterization of abilities applies to cognitive abilities and 




b. Marks of  abilities 
 
When we ascribe an ability to someone there are three common senses we use. Sometimes 
we mean only that she is “able to φ” as in, “your daughter has the ability to become an 
Olympic caliber swimmer.” This sense refers to a capacity that is presumably not being 
exercised. Related to this sense we sometimes mean that present circumstances (dis)allow 
one to exercise the ability. “Jerry’s cupcakes are delicious, if  only she were able to make some 
right now.” Here we attribute or deny ability because features of  the situation make it 
(im)possible to perform.234 Finally, sometimes we mean that she has a kind of  skill, as in, 
“your daughter’s ability to swim the butterfly is spectacular.” The kinds of  abilities that are 
know-how are those referred to in the last way.235 To have an ability to φ is to be reliable at 
achieving φ’s aim across a range of  situations when intending to do so.236 There are other 
marks of  abilities relevant for my purposes as well. 
When we attribute abilities to others, that attribution “is not shorthand for a longer 
statement to the effect that the person has the ability to do that thing provided that237…;” on 
the contrary, we typically have a grasp of  what those conditions are because we have a grasp 
                                                 
234 This example also highlights the similarity between ascriptions of ability and affirming that one could do 
something. In some ways, “Jerry’s cupcakes are delicious, if only she could make some right now” is more 
natural. However, this does not undermine the fact that we do use ability to imply a capacity to perform.  
      Part of the difficulty with distinguishing the senses of “ability” is that in some cases the natural language 
substitute is the modal auxiliary, in others the natural substitute is “able”, and in still others the substitute is 
“knows how”. The example of ability as capacity could easily be rewritten, “your daughter could become an 
Olympic swimmer”. The sense of “ability” that implies propitious circumstances is more commonly referenced 
by “able to” or “could”. So, “Jerry’s cupcakes are delicious, if only she could make some right now” is much 
more natural. 
235 They are the innermost skill as Sosa (Judgment, ch 4) would say. (See also Glick (“Two Methodologies for 
Evaluating Intellectualism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 2 (2011): 131) for a similar distinction 
between internal ability and opportunity.) With this in mind we shall avoid the alleged counter-examples to 
anti-intellectualist ability-based know-how discussed in “section 4.2 above. 
236 Notice that thinking of know-how along these lines allows us to make sense of the common phenomenon 
of being completely unable to articulate or otherwise explain how one does a certain thing. We often know how 
to do something that we cannot articulate at all. This lends credence to the idea that some know-how is not 
propositional. 




of  the ability and not vice versa. Our understanding of  what would hinder or enable the 
exercise of  an ability is not prior to an understanding of  the ability in question as we may 
never consider a certain situation in which a particular ability would be impeded and yet still 
know what it involves. It is in knowing what the ability to recognize certain colors is that I 
know that one is unable to do so in the presence of  non-standard lighting (e.g., under a 
blacklight). I need never have thought of  this, however, before I understood what the ability 
to recognize certain colors was an ability to do. 
Moreover, in understanding what an ability is an ability to do we are also aware that 
different individuals have varying degrees of  mastery over that ability. “Ability” is a threshold 
concept. Thus, in attributing the ability to recognize colors to my young daughters I do not 
imply that they are able to discriminate between colors as say an artist or an interior 
decorator could. In this way, “our ascriptions of  abilities tend to underdetermine the 
character of  those abilities … so it would be wrong to suppose that an ascription of  the 
ability to [φ] is shorthand for a longer statement that specifies the level of  the ability.”238 This 
is because the context, our goals, and practical interests play a central role in attributing an 
ability to an individual.239 To say that my young daughter has the ability to kick a ball is not to 
imply that she can kick a ball like Cristiano Ronaldo or David Beckham. What’s more, it 
would be infelicitous at best, and rude at worst, for one of  my interlocutors to bring up 
David Beckham’s ability as the reason why the attribution to my daughter is wrong. So 
context matters for ability attribution. But so does one’s practical interests. If  I want to get 
my friend invited to a friendly poker game, I may rightly say that he is a good player 
(implying he has the ability to play well) even if  I know he does not play as well as the others 
in the game. The relative strength of  the other players does not undermine my friend’s 
                                                 
238 Millar, “Cognitive Abilities,” 63. 




ability. Going forward we should keep these marks of  ability in mind as we consider specific 
abilities.  
The following descriptions of  abilities highlight these marks. In addition, they raise an 
important question: if  the sense of  ability I focus on implies reliable success when trying, 
then presumably there is an explanation of  how or when a mere capacity to φ becomes an 
ability to φ. Let us briefly look at the mundane ability of  riding a bicycle, then quickly turn to 
cognitive abilities to make both marks of  ability and the question about capacities more 
salient. 
I have been riding bicycles for over 30 years. For several years as an adolescent, I 
engaged in some fairly advanced BMX stunts and also some medium-level mountain biking. 
By contrast, my neighbor’s son learned how to ride his bike last fall. He has been riding a 
bicycle for a little less than a year. Sometimes, though very rarely, he falls while riding not 
because he is attempting anything particularly difficult. Rather, he has not yet fully mastered 
the balance required for very slow turns. Now when I think of  his ability to ride a bicycle 
and my ability to ride a bicycle, I never think that his ability is just like mine. Moreover, if  I 
were to tell someone that I have the ability to ride a bicycle and my neighbor’s son does as 
well, only in very rare circumstances (e.g., they believe that I just learned how to ride a 
bicycle as well) would they think of  our abilities as being the same. Nevertheless, we both 
have the ability in question. Likewise, no one would be surprised or even tempted to deny 
the ability were they to learn that no matter how hard we try, neither my neighbor’s son nor I 




Consider the ability of  attention maintenance,240 which includes the ability to attend to 
the various features of  one’s environment. Presumably, this ability is an ability to recognize 
and discriminate certain features, to call patterns to awareness, and so on, in a sustained way. 
As is the case with other kinds of  ability, attributing this ability is not shorthand for a longer 
description of  the enabling and hindering conditions of  maintaining one’s attention, nor is it 
shorthand for the precise degree of  the ability one has. Moreover, even in presumably low-
level cognitive abilities like attention maintenance there is a distinction to be drawn between 
having the ability (akin to a skill)—i.e., the ability to make oneself  pay attention for a 
sustained period of  time—and merely having the capacity to do so—i.e., with some amount 
of  effort and training one can develop the ability to make oneself  pay attention for a 
sustained period of  time.  
This is the well-known distinction between first-order and second-order capacities. An 
individual who can focus her attention to find hidden objects in a game has acquired a first-
order capacity to focus her attention. Every individual who is physically and psychologically 
capable of  developing that ability has a second-order capacity to focus their attention. Now, 
especially, though not exclusively, when it comes to low-level capacities and abilities, 
sometimes an individual who has not yet acquired the ability performs in such a way that is 
indistinguishable from someone who has acquired (and manifest) the ability. The young child 
who normally skips over numbers counts correctly; the first-time archer hits the bulls-eye, 
etc. In these cases, it seems like the individual has the second-order capacity successfully to 
manifest the first-order capacity, but it seems equally true that it would be inappropriate to 
                                                 
240 Attention maintenance, sometimes called endogenous or executive attention or even attentional control, is 
an ability to control what we attend to and how long.  Peterson and Posner (“The Attention System of the 
Human Brain: 20 Years after.” Annual Review of Neuroscience 35 (2012) argue there are three subsystems of 
attention: “(a) orienting to sensory events; (b) detecting signals for focal (conscious) processing, and (c) 




ascribe the first-order capacity (i.e., the skill or ability) to them. The fact that an individual φ’s 
does not entail that she has the ability to φ, though it does seem to be a good indication that 
she can develop the ability to φ. To keep this distinction clear going forward, when a subject 
successfully manifests attention (or any other capacity) where it would be inappropriate to 
the ascribe the skill or ability, I shall say that the individual manifests the cognitive process or 
capacity. Where it is appropriate to ascribe the first-order capacity, I shall say that the 
individual manifests/exercises the ability—in the sense of  something akin to skill.  
 This distinction is important. Young children manifest capacities while failing to have the 
ability. In some activities, the child is so engrossed that little else penetrates to their 
awareness (attested to by every parent who has called their child’s name while she obliviously 
played on). But the same child is incapable of  searching for or finding her socks, or water 
bottle, or … So to have the ability, it is not sufficient that the individual merely has the 
capacity to φ, but rather, having the ability requires direction or guidance. One must be able 






5.2. Cognitive Ability and Guidance Control 
The idea that having an ability to φ implies reliable success when trying to φ suggests that 
exercising or manifesting an ability is something an individual can exert control over. To 




this means that when it comes to the exercise or manifestation of  an ability, I exercise some 
kind of  control. 
 
 
a. Guidance Control: Reasons-Responsiveness 
 
What does this control amount to? I take my cue from John Martin Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza’s work on moral responsibility.241 They distinguish between guidance control and 
regulative control. The latter involves genuine open alternatives of  action242 whereas the 
former involves capacities of  action that are both reasons-responsive and owned by the 
agent.243 In this section, I shall focus on the notion of  reasons-responsiveness and return to 
ownership in the following section. To be clear, I shall speak of  reasons-responsive capacities 
rather than abilities because I am here focused on how these capacities become abilities. 
Since it is possible, though in practice probably quite rare, that a capacity could be responsive 
to reasons and not appropriately owned, and vice versa, I reserve discussion of  abilities until 
both pieces—reasons-responsiveness and ownership—are sufficiently clear. 
                                                 
241 Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control; Fischer, My Way; Deep Control. 
242 Their purpose is to offer a compatibilist account of moral responsibility—that moral responsibility is 
compatible with determinism. As such, their distinction amounts to a kind of control necessary for libertarian 
freedom/responsibility over action—regulative control—and a kind of control that is necessary for 
compatibilist—actually semi-compatibilist in their view—responsibility for action—guidance control. 
243 See Fischer and Rivizza (Responsbility and Control, ch 3); Fischer (My Way, ch 1; Deep Control, ch 1-2 and 10-12) 
for a detailed discussion of guidance control (later called deep control) and the components of reasons-
sensitivity and ownership. My discussion of guidance borrows heavily from Fischer and Ravizza. The most 
significant divergence is that the ownership condition of guidance control for cognitive abilities does not 
require either beliefs based upon evidence or that the agent must see themselves as apt targets of reactive 
attitudes on the basis of those abilities. The reason for this is that my ability to guide, say, my attention is not 
something I need have beliefs about at all. I can simply guide my attention on the basis of overarching goals I 
have. I realize that in order to φ, I must shift my attention and so I do. But this does not imply that I think of 
myself as being responsible for my attention ability or even that I am shifting my attention; may simply think, I 
need to look over there. Chiefly, the difference derives from Fischer’s interest in responsibility and my interest 
in a broader range of epistemic reactive attitudes. In this sense, when Fischer uses “reactive attitudes” he refers 




 When we say a capacity C is reasons-responsive, we might think C must to be responsive 
in the following way. First, we determine what capacity C was causally sufficient for bringing 
about some action A and then ask whether given sufficient reasons to act differently if  C 
was operative would the individual act differently (~A). As stated, there is a strong and weak 
reading of  reasons-responsiveness.   
 
Strong Reasons-Responsiveness: A capacity is strongly reasons-responsive just in 
case given sufficient reason to do ~A then the actual capacity that in fact issues in A 
would, in an alternative situation most similar to the actual situation, issue in ~A.244  
 
Weak Reasons-Responsiveness: A capacity is weakly reasons-responsive just in 
case given sufficient reason to do ~A, then the actual capacity that in fact issues in A 
would, in some alternative situation, issue in ~A.245 
 
Strong reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for responsibility, but not necessary. It fails 
adequately to capture responsibility in the weak-willed.246 Even though I might have 
sufficient reason to do ~A, I might, due to weakness of  will, nevertheless still do A. But 
then we have a case of  responsibility without strong reasons-responsiveness.247 The 
reasoning applies to more general reactive attitudes as well. Consider Joe’s belief  that climate 
change is a hoax. Suppose he came to this belief  by an evaluation of  the evidence available 
to him. If  Joe would persist in his belief  that climate change is a hoax even if  presented 
                                                 
244 Cf. “Strong reasons-responsiveness obtains when a certain kind K of mechanism actually issues in an action 
and if there were sufficient reasons to do otherwise and K were to operate, the agent would recognize the 
sufficient reason to do otherwise and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise” (Fischer, My Way, 66-7; 
Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 41).  
It is important to note that Fischer’s use of “mechanism” does not imply a mechanistic picture of action. As he 
states, “by ‘mechanism’ I simply mean ‘way’—I do not mean to reify anything” (ibid, 17). My use of capacity is 
relevant to my discussion of abilities. 
245 Cf. “under weak reasons-responsiveness, there must exist some possible world in which there is a sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, the agent’s actual mechanism operates, and the agent does otherwise. This possible 
world need not be the one (or ones) in which the agent has a sufficient reason to do otherwise (and that actual 
mechanism operates), which is (or are) most similar to the actual world” (Fischer, My Way, 68; Fischer and 
Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 44). 
246 Of course, failure to exercise some abilities given strong reasons to do so would not undermine evaluation 
for that ability. This kind of response really only affects the exercise of abilities in robustly normative domains. 
For example, we can imagine scenarios in which an individual has strong reasons to throw a curve ball (say, 
because he knows his friend can’t him them at all), but cannot help throwing a fastball (maybe it’s a friendly 
game at park and he really enjoys seeing how hard his friend can hit). 




sufficient reason to reject this, we are entitled to target him with negative reactive attitudes 
(e.g., attribute carelessness or close-minded dogmatism to him). But, the capacity (capacities) 
he manifests in coming to the belief  that climate change is a hoax is not strongly reasons-
responsive and yet Joe is nevertheless evaluable. Given that strong reasons-responsiveness is 
unnecessary for reactive evaluability, then, we must mean something different when we say a 
capacity must be reasons-responsive. The key feature of  strong reasons-responsiveness is the 
idea that the alternative “test” scenario is “most similar to the actual situation.” To require 
we test the operative capacity against situations very close to those in which we actually 
evaluate the individual invites the problems we have seen with weakness of  will, or the 
relevant epistemic failing. But this makes strong reasons-responsiveness too strong.  
Weak reasons-responsiveness is too weak. It seems that we can think of  cases, admittedly 
bizarre, where an individual acts on a weakly responsive capacity and yet remains non-
responsible.248 If  Glen irrationally believes that world is going to end at midnight on August 
13th, 2017 because the last few cheerios in his cereal seemed to spell “end”, we are right to 
think he is stupid for holding such a belief. Suppose he would not believe this if  his cheerios 
spelled “no”. In this case, whatever capacity he manifests in forming his apocalyptic belief  is 
weakly reasons-responsive. Yet, any reactive attitude we direct at Glenn is inappropriate. (Of  
course, we could, rightly, judge him to be mentally unstable, but this is not to target him with 
a reactive attitude.)249   
Thus, a capacity must be reasons-responsive in a way that is neither too strong nor too 
weak. Call this moderate reasons-responsiveness. In other words, we need only require that 
                                                 
248 See Fischer and Ravizza (Responsibility and Control, ch. 3) for a full discussion what kinds of reasons or 
patterns of reason recognition are required for moral responsibility. 
249 Fischer, My Way, ch. 3 Fn. 11 addresses these kinds of cases. He suggests that either the capacity in the 
alternative situation is different from the actual sequence capacity or that built into the notion of weak reasons-
responsiveness is a constraint on the kinds of reasons that matter. Regardless of how this is settled, moderate 
reasons-responsiveness is functionally identical to the modified version of weak reasons-responsiveness 




the capacity be reliable. Alternatively, we might say that a capacity is moderately reasons-
responsive just in case not too easily would it then fail to issue in action/belief  given 
sufficient reason to do so;250 in some situations—understood this requires neither that the 
situations are most similar to the actual situation nor that that there is some possible, 
perhaps extremely different, situation—where there is sufficient reason to do otherwise, the 
agent does otherwise. The sufficiency threshold will vary due to the context, the goals and 
interests one has, and so on. The point generalizes to performances broadly. Hence, a 
capacity is moderately reasons-responsive just in case not too easily would it then fail to 
motivate performance given sufficient reason to do so. Of  course, we must allow for 
external factors to intervene; just because I have the capacity to φ it does not follow that I 
shall successfully φ when I intend to. Sometimes the environment intervenes and sometimes 
alternative capacities undermine the success of  the original capacity. 
 This is to characterize the sensitivity threshold rather than the nature of  reasons-
responsiveness. Apart from the degree to which a capacity is responsive to reasons, we must 
briefly comment on what reasons-responsiveness is. To say that a capacity C is responsive to 
reasons is to say that C (or, more precisely, the manifestation/exercise of  C) would be 
motivated by an awareness of  reasons for (against) manifesting/exercising C.251 To 
characterize reasons-responsiveness in this way runs the risk of  running together genuine 
reasons-responsiveness and differential stimulus/input response. To clarify, mere capacities 
and processes are not reasons-responsive, though they are responsive to stimuli and inputs. 
                                                 
250 This way of thinking about moderate reasons-responsiveness bears striking similarity to Sosa’s basis safety 
requirement in epistemology (Virtue Epistemology; Reflective Knowledge; Knowing Full Well; and Judgment). One might 
think that one’s basis of belief must be safe—not too easily fail in producing true belief—in order to have 
knowledge. My purpose is not to defend Sosa’s view of knowledge, but to suggest that there is a place for 
thinking about cognitive abilities along the lines that Sosa does. Instead of requiring basis safety for knowledge, 
I suggest that the abilities constitutive of epistemic competence are safe—i.e., moderately reasons-responsive. 




My visual processes react differently to different stimuli. However, knowers are responsive to 
reasons. Thus, I can be motivated to manifest/exercise a capacity by an awareness of  reasons 
for doing so. Importantly, to have an ability to φ is to have a capacity to φ that an individual 
can be motivated to manifest/exercise by an awareness of  reasons for doing so (or, to have a 
capacity to φ that an individual can be motivated to not manifest/exercise by an awareness 
of  reasons for not doing so).  
 This distinction helps us to understand better the shift from mere capacities and 
processes to abilities. Although it seems like we can cultivate, develop, and train cognitive 
processes to be affected by “reasons” differently, this is only apparent. Once we get to the 
point of  being able to affect our cognitive processes in these ways, they become cognitive 
abilities—processes we exercise or manifest for reasons—rather than processes that are 
manifest in us. Moreover, mere cognitive capacities/processes are not moved by an 
awareness of  reasons; they are manifest because they are well functioning or not, reliable or 
not. They are differentially activated by inputs and stimuli. My eye cannot be motivated by an 
awareness of  reasons to be affected by stimuli anymore than can the electric sensor above 
my grocery store’s entrance be motivated by an awareness of  reasons to open; the way my 
eye takes in a stimulus and the electronic sensor causing the door to open (close) is a matter 
of  (mal)functioning.  
Since the activation of  cognitive processes or capacities is not reasons-responsive, those 
processes are subject to a different kind of  evaluation than the interpersonal reactive 
attitudes that are the subject of  this work. Consider the kinds of  evaluations appropriate at 
an eye exam. In testing my vision, my optometrist determines how well my eyes take in 
stimuli and not whether my visual system has reasons for “reporting” to me what it takes in. 




do not report anything. Rather, they take in stimuli, which are interpreted by other systems in 
my mind. The problems with the metaphor highlight the difference between capacities and 
abilities. Capacities/processes take in various inputs and give various outputs whereas I 
exercise my abilities to put those outputs to use. Being in a state of  exercising or manifesting 
a cognitive ability, by contrast, is the kind of  thing that can be motivated by an awareness of  
reasons, e.g., justifying reasons.252 As such, the kinds of  evaluations exercising or manifesting 
cognitive abilities are subject to are the interpersonal reactive attitudes that I am interested in. 
This, then, is one necessary condition for guidance control, that the exercise of  a 
cognitive ability be reasons-responsive. Of  course, more needs to be said here about the 
kinds of  reasons253 and the kinds of  awareness that are relevant, but what I have said about 
reasons-responsive thus far is sufficient for the account of  cognitive ability as know-how I 




b. Guidance control: ownership 
 
We can see that reasons-responsiveness is not sufficient for guidance control by thinking 
about alien processes. For example, we can consider Laurence Bonjour's famous example of  
                                                 
252 One might object here that processes can be justified as well. For example, we might think that, say, an 
investigator is unjustified in examining the evidence in twenty-year-old case of fraud in order to solve a current 
murder investigation. It looks like this process is indeed assessable as justified or not. On closer examination, 
what we evaluate is not the process of, e.g., attending to and assessing the evidence in the fraud case, but the 
investigator’s exercise of those abilities in the current case. The process is not under scrutiny, the investigator 
is. In particular, we think that his exercise of those abilities is unjustified. But this is just to say that whatever 
state(s) he is in that motivated him to look into the fraud case is not justified. 
253 In chapter six I shall argue that epistemic competence is constituted by the ability to believe for normative 
reasons. This ability is made up of several different nested abilities including attention maintenance, the ability 
to assess reasons, and the ability to withhold assent. It follows strictly from the ability to assess reasons that I 





Truetemp, a man who unbeknownst to him has a completely reliable tempucomp implant in 
his brain.254 It is often argued that even though Truetemp's temperature beliefs are 
completely accurate due to the total reliability of  the tempucomp, he fails to be justified or 
warranted in those beliefs.255 In the present context of  epistemic reactive attitudes, we might 
further add that he is exempt from those attitudes as well. As others have pointed out, the 
problem with Truetemp is not that the belief  mechanism is strange, but that it is not 
integrated into his other cognitive abilities.256 As it stands, the tempucomp is a capacity or 
process but not an ability. Notice, that Truetemp could come to have justified or warranted 
temperature beliefs if, in a sufficient number of  cases, he checks his spontaneous beliefs 
about the ambient temperature with known reliable thermometers. Over time, he will have 
enough evidence to avow his spontaneous beliefs. But then that process, even if  unknown in 
name to Truetemp, would be an ability of  his; in owning the beliefs he would own the 
process. In this way, the capacity or process would be related to Truetemp in the right way. 
In other words, in addition to reasons-responsiveness, a cognitive ability (to be an ability and 
not just a cognitive process) must be owned by the agent. To think through ownership, we 
can again turn to Fischer (and Ravizza). They offer three conditions necessary and sufficient 
for ownership of  the mechanism(s) of  action:257 
 
First, an agent must view himself—when acting from certain mechanisms—as an 
agent; he must see that certain upshots in the world are the results of  his choices and 
actions. Second, an agent must view himself  as an apt target for the reactive 
                                                 
254 Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, 163-164. 
255 It is not accurate to call such spontaneous states beliefs. Ordinarily, we would say such fleeting states are 
mere thoughts or fancies. Belief requires some kind of endorsement or commitment. My argument here does 
not turn on whether such states are beliefs or merely fleeting thoughts. Regardless of how one characterizes 
Truetemp’s states, the point I am making about integration holds. 
256 Greco, Skeptics, §7.3; Achieving, ch 9); and Breyer, D., and J. Greco. “Cognitive Integration and the 
Ownership of Belief: Response to Bernecker.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76, no. 1 (2008): 173–184. 
257 Again, his purpose is to explain moral responsibility. As such, his conditions will be stronger than those 




attitudes, and … the cluster of  beliefs specified by the first two conditions must be 
based, in an appropriate way, on the individual’s evidence.258 
 
To have guidance control over our cognitive abilities is not as demanding.  While I see no 
reason to require anything more than moderate responsiveness, the ownership condition on 
cognitive abilities—one of  the conditions that turns a cognitive capacity/process into a 
cognitive ability—is far less strict. Let us call the three conditions of  ownership the agent 
condition, the apt target condition, and the evidence condition. Accordingly, we get 
 
Cognitive Process Ownership: A subject S owns a cognitive process C if  and only 
if  S:259 
(i) sees herself  as exercising/manifesting C or sees herself  as doing 
something that entails exercising or manifesting C (agent condition);  
(ii)  thinks of  herself  as being subject to evaluation on the basis of  her 
exercise/ manifestation of  C (apt target condition); and 
(iii) both (i) and (ii) are (at least partially) constitutive of  beliefs about herself  
that are based upon evidence (evidence condition). 
 
Some of  these notions are unfortunately, and probably intractably, vague. What exactly 
does it mean to "see oneself" as exercising/manifesting a cognitive process? Similarly, what 
does it mean to “think of  oneself" as subject to evaluation?  These are difficult questions 
that seem to motivate the evidence condition. After all what else could it mean to see 
oneself  as manifesting a cognitive process other than having a belief  about oneself  doing 
so? I think this is too quick. We have certainly experienced being aware of  certain things 
without having beliefs about them. One might retreat to the idea that we have tacit beliefs 
about them, to be sure, but this is to explain a vague phenomenon with a different vague 
phenomenon. In any event, rejecting or accepting that we have beliefs about ourselves as 
manifesting/exercising a cognitive process does not affect the main argument about 
                                                 
258 Fischer and Ravizza (Responsibility and Control, 238). 




cognitive abilities. If  one thinks that we have tacit or implicit beliefs about ourselves that is 
fine. The real worry is the evidential claim.  
If  all one means here is that we have justifying reasons for thinking about ourselves in 
this way, perhaps by manifesting the capacity to take part in the evaluation on the basis of  
the ability or by offering one’s credentials in answer to a challenge, then I am happy to grant 
that ownership requires evidence. However, if  something more robust is meant, then we 
must part ways. Suppose having evidence means something like information or reasons from 
which I infer some conclusion from that information. This cannot be a condition on 
ownership since presumably my ability to infer conclusions on the basis of  evidence requires 
that I have the ability to infer, which requires that I have some evidence for thinking of  
myself  as having, and being an apt target on the basis of  exercising, that ability. But I cannot 
have that ability without evidence about my ability to infer. This is a non-starter. No, there 
must be (at least) some cognitive abilities that we have—that is, cognitive processes that are 
moderately reasons-responsive and sufficiently owned—that do not require further cognitive 
abilities.  
(However, if  one means only the weaker idea that one has some justifying reasons for 
seeing oneself  as exercising, and being an apt target of  evaluations on the basis of, a 
cognitive process, the first personal experience of  seeing oneself  that way (the agent 
condition) is sufficient. Hence, the third condition (the evidence condition) is superfluous. A 
non-reflective awareness seems necessary and sufficient for one to “see” oneself  as 
exercising or manifesting a cognitive process, notwithstanding.)  
One might object to my characterization of  ownership on the grounds that it is too 
demanding. Most individuals do not see themselves as exercising or manifesting cognitive 




individuals own their capacities, which implies that very few individuals are epistemically 
competent. The first disjunct of  condition (i) above is meant to allay these worries. One 
need not think of  oneself  as exercising or manifesting cognitive processes/capacities. 
Rather, one need only think of  oneself  as doing something that entails that exercise or 
manifestation. This also captures the intuitive idea that we take ownership (or are disposed 
to do so) for the results of  that exercise. For example, when I say to you that you should take 
a different route to get where you are going, a proper response to a challenge about that 
suggestion is not that I manifested my ability to deduce that your most likely route would be 
X and then I later tuned into the radio whilst engaging my attention to find that there was a 
major accident on that route and that I then deduced that a major accident would be an 
impediment to your likely intention to taking that route. Rather, I would likely simply reply, I 
heard that there was a major accident on route X, you should probably take route Y to avoid 
traffic. In this way, I see myself  doing something, namely hearing the traffic report, which I 
take to be a good reason to tell you to go a different route. It should be remembered that 
whatever it is that underwrites epistemic reactive attitudes—competence—must be general 
enough to encompass all competent knowers of  which the vast majority are not 
psychologists or philosophers. My account of  ownership does this. 
I shall proceed, then, by thinking of  cognitive abilities as reasons-responsive cognitive 
processes that are sufficiently owned in the following sense. When we ascribe to someone an 
ability we imply something about them. Specifically, we imply that the processes that make up 
the ability do not just randomly happen, but that the individual manifests them in the right 
kind of  way with sufficient reliability, with openness to correction, responding to challenges, 
or having second thoughts, etc. Further, since we are saying something about the individual 




relationship between the individual and the process; that the individual either sees herself  as 
being related to the process or is actually related to the process in an intimate and deeply 
ingrained way. This captures the idea that possessing an ability requires that an individual see 
themselves as being the one who exercises or manifests the process. In so doing, she likewise 
comes to see herself  as being subject to certain kinds of  attitudes and evaluations based on 
(the failure of) such an exercise or manifestation of  the process or capacity—whether 
because she takes herself  to be exercising/manifesting the ability or doing something that 
entails the exercise/manifestation of  the ability. In other words, she thinks of  herself  as 
having the ability, even if  she does not think about it in those terms. What goes for abilities 
in general, goes for particular kinds of  abilities as well.  
Of  importance here is the idea that seeing ourselves as being capable of  exercising or 
manifesting certain abilities entails that we exercise or manifest them. This is nothing more or 
less than being able to guide a process that is responsive to reasons and owned. Here are a 
few marks of  guidance control over cognitive abilities. First, the exercise of  a cognitive 
ability is deployed to solve problems or meet goals. Abilities are abilities to do something; 
they have an aim. Cognitive abilities aim at some cognitive goal. It does not matter how 
coarsely or finely we carve out abilities, it will always be true that what the ability is an ability 
to do will be fixed by the nature of  the it.260 For example, the ability of  attention 
maintenance will be deployed to solve a multitude of  problems (e.g., to find someone in a 
crowd, to get to the meeting on time, to discover a new book, to complete a puzzle, and so 
on). Next, for a cognitive ability to be responsive to reasons we require only that the exercise 
of  that ability (or lack thereof) is or would be motivated by an awareness of  reasons for 
(against) its exercise. Keeping in mind the idea that the counterfactual here refers to the 
                                                 




exercise or manifestation of  the ability as being moderately reasons responsive—i.e., not 
easily would those reasons fail to motivate it. Finally, guiding one’s (cognitive) ability implies 
that one can keep the ability on track. A young toddler, who may from time to time attend to 
her environment quite well, cannot guide her ability because she cannot bring it back when 
other things compete for her attention. So having the ability implies that one can be 
somewhat resilient in the exercise of  it.  
The idea that cognitive abilities are cognitive processes an agent exercises guidance 
control over satisfies intuitions about control and awareness. Obviously, to exercise guidance 
control over cognitive abilities is to exercise a kind of  control. So if  cognitive ability plays a 
role in epistemic competence, then so does control. Guidance control also requires 
ownership that entails awareness. Hence intuitions about awareness and epistemic 
competence are satisfied as well. Moreover, none of  the problems for awareness I raised in 
chapter three plagues the awareness involved in having a cognitive ability. The central 
objection to the idea that awareness constitutes epistemic competence is that reactive 
attitudes are apt in cases of  doxastic omission. That is, one can be rightly evaluated for a 
belief  that one does not have and is not aware they should (or for a belief  that one has and 
is not aware that they should not) have. However, if  (certain) cognitive abilities constitute 
epistemic competence, then by the very nature of  having a cognitive ability, one meets the 
ownership condition and therefore has a kind of  awareness.  
Moreover, doxastic omissions present no problem for reasons-responsiveness either. It 
might be objected that the appropriateness of  reactive attitudes in the light of  doxastic 
omissions likewise undermines my claim that being reasons-responsiveness requires an 
awareness of  reasons that would motivate one to be in the state of  manifesting/exercising a 




there is a tension between aptly evaluated omissions and the fact that competence requires 
awareness. Careful reading alleviates this tension. If  certain kinds of  cognitive abilities 
constitute epistemic competence, then the kind of  awareness required for that competence is 
not of  reasons for the belief, but for the possession of  a cognitive ability via awareness of  
reasons that favor the exercise or manifestation of  a cognitive capacity/process. Cognitive 
processes/capacities become abilities when they are under our guidance control—reasons-
responsive and owned. But, one need not be presently aware of  the reasons for a belief  in 
order to be the apt target of  evaluations based on it.261 Rather, one must have relevant 
cognitive abilities and having or owning those abilities does not entail that one 
exercise/manifest them in all cases where one is aptly targeted with reactive attitudes. On the 
contrary, it is precisely because one has the relevant cognitive abilities and failed to manifest 
them that one is an apt target. For if  they did not have the abilities in question, they could 
hardly be the appropriate targets of  attitudes directed at them for failing to manifest them. 
(Unless, of  course, they should have those abilities, but here the appropriate attitude would 
be directed at them for failing to exercise/manifest a different ability, one whose goal is to 
cultivate the first ability the individual should have had.) In the next chapter, we shall see that 
the issue of  reasons-responsiveness and awareness arises again but with regard to the ability 
to recognize and assess reasons. The arguments here will apply mutatis mutandis in that 
context as well. 
The resources provided by the notion of  guidance control notwithstanding, I have two 
hurdles to overcome. First, I need to argue that cognitive abilities can be instances of  
knowledge-how. Second, I need to isolate which cognitive abilities, hence know-how, 
                                                 
261 For a related discussion concerning a belief’s justification in the light of forgotten evidence see Huemer, 
Michael. “The Problem of Memory Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, lxxx (1999): 346–57, and 





constitute epistemic competence. I address the first task in the next section somewhat 
indirectly by discussing a particular example of  a cognitive ability and meeting objections to 
the idea that in having that ability one also has know-how. With that hurdle overcome, I turn 





5.3. Cognitive Ability and Know-How: Attention Maintenance 
 
In the previous section, I presented an account of  cognitive ability as a 
capacity/process/faculty that satisfies two jointly sufficient conditions. First, the exercise or 
manifestation of  that capacity is reasons-responsive, and second, that the agent who hosts 
that capacity is appropriately related to it by virtue of  owning it. I now want to argue that 
cognitive abilities can be instances of  knowledge-how. I shall approach this argument 
somewhat indirectly by focusing on the example of  attention maintenance. Specifically, it is 
argued that the ability to maintain one's attention is a kind of  knowledge-how. This is 
intimated in common practices of  ascribing to individuals the knowledge how to attend and 
it is defended by responding to two families of  objections to the idea that basic mental 
activity—and thus cognitive abilities—can be instances of  knowledge-how. Throughout the 
discussion, I shall also illustrate the possession conditions of  cognitive abilities.  
 I suggested that attention maintenance is an ability to attend to various features of  one’s 




maintenance as a cognitive ability in the way I have characterized them. If, as I intend to do, 
one wants to argue that having the ability to attend is to know how to attend, we need to 
address potential worries. On the one hand, to ascribe knowledge to someone implies they 
have acquired something. But, is the ability to attend something we learn how to do? Is there 
some equivalent to passing from ignorance to knowledge in the case of  knowing how to 
attend? On the other hand, are there not just certain abilities we have that implies only that 
we can(not) do what it is an ability to do but does not imply that we have a kind of  
knowledge, even if  we do acquire them? Why think of  basic mental abilities as kinds of  
knowledge-how? In particular, what do we gain from thinking about basic cognitive abilities 
such as attention maintenance as instances of  know-how?  
     These, then, are the two families of  objections to my claim that cognitive abilities are 
instances of  know-how: (i) knowledge implies the achievement of  a normative status and 
there is no achievement involved in acquiring basic cognitive abilities, and (ii) since there are 
abilities that are not instances of  know-how, unless one can give principled reason(s) to 
distinguish between abilities that are from abilities that are not know-how, the ability as 
know-how claim begs the question. In the remainder of  this section I shall address these two 
objections.262 
                                                 
262 Allow me to say something against what an intellectualist account of this ability would have to be. Assume 
that one wants to grant that attention maintenance is a cognitive ability. Then, the intellectualist would have to 
say that this reduces to or is constituted by propositional attitudes about attending. (Notice that the aspects of 
attention—recognition, discrimination, and recollection of patterns—only describe what happens when one 
attends and not how to attend.) Whatever these attitudes are, they cannot be about me. So the beliefs, if there 
are any, about myself as attending as discussed above would not suffice. Rather, the beliefs would have to be 
about attending. In particular, they would have to be beliefs or other propositional attitudes about how to 
attend. 
 Moreover, attempting to explain how one attends appeals to concepts or terms that appear to be nothing 
more than attention. Were I to ask you how do you attend to the situation in which you find yourself, the likely 
answer would be something along the following lines. All you have to do is focus or concentrate 
completely/solely/really hard on each item. Indeed, this is how I try to explain how to find things in a look-
and-find book to my young daughters. I give them instruction by appealing to the very thing I am trying to 
instruct them on. One might baulk at this by suggesting that attending to one’s situation is different from 




a. Know-how and achievement 
 
One of  the chief  motivations behind intellectualist accounts of  know-how is the idea that 
when we ascribe knowledge to someone we imply a genuine cognitive achievement.263 The 
honorific ‘knowledge’ applies to states that have attained a particularly valuable normative 
status. What’s more is that ascribing knowledge implies that one could be in a state of  not 
knowing. In other words, there is an achievement, however small, because one moves from a 
state of  not knowing to a state of  knowing, from a less valuable state to a more valuable 
one; one acquires knowledge. The current ability under discussion (as well as similarly basic 
cognitive abilities) appears to be no more than a process since it is not something we 
achieve.264  So the question before us is whether the ability to maintain one’s attention can be 
a genuine cognitive achievement. The answer to which is, yes. It is uncontroversial that we 
do actually evaluate individuals on their ability to attend. We often talk positively of  
individuals’ attention to detail and employers often seek out individuals who display it. 
Likewise, we negatively evaluate individuals for failing to attend (either to themselves or to 
the environment). Even those who would be unwilling to identify the ability to attend as a 
kind of  knowledge would grant that we often do appraise acts (failures) of  attention. 
                                                                                                                                                 
question for those sympathetic to intellectualist know-how. See chapter four above for further discussion of 
intellectualist know-how. 
263 See Bengson and Moffett (2011b: 165). 
264 Or at least, it is not something we achieve before we become more than epistemically competent. That is, 
the basic mental activity of attention maintenance is not an ability, but a more robust sense of attention might 
be. But then, that ability is achieved only after we are already generally epistemically competent. Further, the 
ability to attend in this way becomes entangled in our background knowledge, our linguistic and semantic 
competence, and other kinds of abilities. At which point, the ability is neither basic nor easily identified.  
The putative difference here between basic and non-basic abilities is misleading. It is akin to the difference 
between the writer’s special mastery over language and the young child’s “mastery”. In the case of language, it 
is appropriate to say both that the child and writer have the ability to speak English, e.g., and to say that they 
both know how to speak English. As we saw in §4.3c, the knowledge-how just is the ability. Additionally, why 
think there is only one ability exercised or manifested in the two cases? It seems more likely that the writer has 
several different abilities deployed. Perhaps these are no more than fine-grained descriptions of the general 





 The practice of  evaluating individuals on the basis of  their acts (failures) of  attention 
suggests that it is something that can be achieved. Why should we be concerned to evaluate 
such episodes if  we could not, in our evaluations, hope to influence the individual our 
appraisals are aimed at? When I try to correct my six-year-old about her failure of  attention, 
I am attempting to get her to attend better the next time, which implicates an ability to do so. 
Furthermore, this ability can be trained and cultivated in extremely sophisticated ways. Art 
historians can see immediately whether a particular work is genuine by attending to certain 
features of  the work. Often, these features can be unbelievably subtle (such as a particular 
brush stroke in one very specific area of  the work). To do this, not only must she be able to 
recognize what particular brush strokes look like—a distinct ability involving background 
knowledge—she must be able to attend to the line and shade of  the stroke itself—a subtly 
developed ability to attend to the color and shade pattern before her. What happens here is 
that she exercises her attention in a very acute way. But then, the difference between the 
seasoned Art Historian’s ability to attend and, say, the child who is just learning to do so is 
only a matter of  degree. So, the extent we are willing to attribute knowing how to attend to 
the Art Historian—and not just knowing how to spot a forgery—is the extent we ought to 
be willing to attribute knowing how to attend to the child as well (assuming she does have 
that ability, no matter if  she just reaches the threshold).  
As a final note on this point, we might think that there was no time when we could not 
attend and thus the ability to attend is not something we acquired. To which I respond, the 
fact that we do not remember acquiring the ability to attend does not entail that we did not 
acquire it. In fact, evidence for the fact that we did is that we can, once we have the basic 
ability, further develop and train it. Developmental psychology attests to this as well.265 The 
                                                 




idea that mere abilities could not amount to know-how, if  based on the assumption that 
knowledge is an achievement, is simply false. One need not even defend the more 
controversial claim that knowledge is not any kind of  achievement to arrive at this. Rather, 
the fact that we can develop and train mere abilities suggests both that they are acquired and 
achieved. As such, mere abilities can and do achieve the normative status of  knowledge.  
 
 
b. Abilities that constitute know-how 
 
The next objection, that the attempt to characterize attention maintenance as a kind of  
knowledge simply misuses that term or misapplies that concept, cuts a bit deeper. I suspect 
this way of  thinking about our basic abilities (either cognitive or otherwise) is likewise rooted 
in either tacit/explicit commitment to intellectualism or, as we have seen, the denial that 
basic acts/activities deserve the honorific “knowledge”. Those who reject the ability to 
attend as a kind of  knowledge-how because of  prior theoretical commitments to 
intellectualism simply beg the question.266 So, let us focus our attention (pun intended) on 
the second motivation behind the rejection.  
Exercising some abilities appears to be the kind of  thing it is appropriate to describe as 
knowing how to do, while exercising others does not appear to be the kind of  thing it is 
appropriate to describe as an instance of  knowledge-how. Sighted individuals have the ability 
to see (while blind individuals do not have that ability), but it does not seem right to say that 
sighted individuals know how to see while blind individuals do not know how to see. Of  course, 
John may use his ability to see in another kind of  act where it would be right to say he knows 
                                                 




how, though. For example, John knows how to find out if  it is raining by seeing if  it is. It 
would appear that some abilities are not know-how, even if  they are necessary for other 
kinds of  know-how. What distinguishes abilities that are mere abilities from those that are 
know-how?  
Recall the account offered above. To have an ability, and not just a process within us, we 
must be able to exercise guidance control over it—thus it must be reasons-responsive and 
owned.267 Even basic activity requires guidance control. The activity of  idly drumming one’s 
fingers is something we do, even if  it is not a piece of  full-blown intentional behavior. The 
basic activity of  attention maintenance, likewise, requires guidance control. That is, in order 
for attention maintenance to count as an ability one must be able (reliably) to exercise 
guidance control over the capacity to attend. We have already seen that this is something we 
acquire, develop, and train. As such, we can (and do) exercise guidance control over 
attention. I submit, therefore, that the demarcation between abilities that could be know-how 
and those that couldn’t (or, at least, those it would not be appropriate to think of  as know-
how) lies in guidance control. Those we exercise such control over are know-how abilities, 
while those we do (not) exercise such control over are, for lack of  a better term, mere 
process abilities.268 More precisely, the difference is between abilities and 
processes/capacities.269  
                                                 
267 This forestalls Stanley and Williamson-type (2001) objections that point to abilities to, e.g., digest food not 
implying know-how. My digestive system manifests the process of digesting food and in that sense is able to 
digest food, but I cannot exercise guidance control over this process and so I do not have this ability. 
268 Notice the difference between exercising some kind of control over seeing by, say, closing one’s eyes as 
opposed to exercising control over perceiving, say, by attending to particular features of the puzzle piece to 
determine if the colors and shades match up to the one next to it. In the first case, I block the mere the process 
from operating. In the second, I manifest/exercise a constellation of abilities to determine whether the pieces 
fit. Additionally, the former case is conceptually thin, whereas the latter case is conceptually thick. 
269 I do not say they are just processes because we do use the term “ability” to describe them. It is important to 
note, however, that the concept the term expresses in this case is not the concept of an ability in the sense 




When we use “ability” when discussing processes/capacities, the sense of  that term is 
tied up with the modal auxiliaries ‘can’ and ‘could’; when we use “ability” in a way that 
implicates guidance control, the term refers to something like a skill. That the sighted 
individual has the ability to see does not mean that the sighted individual has the skill of  
seeing, but instead has the sense of  "can see" or "is able to see." Once we recognize this, the 
distinction is not between abilities that are and those that are not know-how, but between 
abilities that are know-how and processes/capacities that are not. 
If  this is right, sight is not an ability, but a capacity or process. I do not exercise guidance 
control over my sight since it is not reasons-responsive. My manifestation of  sight—taking 
in various stimuli—is not motivated by reasons that would count in favor of  being visually 
appeared to. Even though I have really strong reasons to believe that the stick is not bent I 
cannot help but see it as bent. Sight is a capacity that is manifest in me due to my 
interactions in the world, but it is not something I manifest or exercise. By contrast, I do 
have a perceptual ability. What I perceive is guided by me because it involves reasons that 
count in its favor. I exercise perception to solve problems and to attain goals. Sight is the 
modular process of  taking in stimuli whereas perception is the ability to interpret and use 
that stimuli. I conclude that basic mental activity, like attention maintenance, can become 
cognitive abilities and hence instances of  know-how.270  
                                                 
270 I say can become because the fact that an individual attends to her circumstances does not entail that she 
has the cognitive ability to attend. This is due to three possible reasons. First, she may not have developed it 
yet. A young child two years of age may attend to the features of her visual field when searching for an item in 
a look-and-find book, but fail to transfer that attention over when attempting to put together a puzzle. Hence, 
an episode of attention may not be indicative of the possession of the cognitive ability to attend. The condition 
of ownership must be satisfied before a mere process becomes a cognitive ability. Second, attributing the ability 
to attend varies according to our goals and practical interests (See Greco 2007a and §5.2.1 above). I may 
attribute the ability to my six-year-old when speaking of her ability to put together puzzles, find people, and so 
on even though she fails spectacularly at attending to her surroundings when she is playing a with stick outside. 
She may reliably (almost) hit those around her and be completely oblivious to this fact. So, my interests in 
attributing the ability to her affects how and when I do so. Finally, abilities are surely threshold concepts. An 
individual can manifest the cognitive act/activity without thereby having the ability because she falls just under 




To summarize the argument of  this section, beliefs are the result of  the exercise or 
manifestation of  cognitive processes. Some of  these processes are such that we can exert a 
kind of  control over them, guidance control. We exercise guidance control over a process 
when it can be motivated by an awareness of  reasons that count for (against) its exercise and 
it is sufficiently owned—we see ourselves as exercising these abilities (or doing something 
that entails the exercise of  the ability). When we are capable of  exercising guidance control 
over a capacity or process it becomes an ability that we can (at least try to) exercise according 
to our goals or reasons.  At which point we then have the relevant knowledge-how. Hence, 






Allow me to summarize the argument thus far. After clarifying the question of  epistemic 
competence, I turned to the negative project of  repudiating two possible candidate answers. 
In rejecting doxastic control and doxastic awareness as the ground of  apt evaluation, one of  
my chief  complaints was the idea that attempting to explain epistemic attributability in terms 
of  control and awareness failed to adequately address the deep and holistic ways we evaluate 
others. Moreover, not even if  we try to account for attributability by requiring both control 
and awareness can we capture the nuanced and wide-ranging reactive attitudes we deploy in 
our common practices. This led to the idea that what accounts for our epistemic competence 
                                                                                                                                                 
attribution. However, it should be noted, that even here there will be norms that proscribe attributing abilities 




must be some deep and integrated feature(s) of  our cognitive capacities. Given this, a natural 
place to look would be our cognitive virtues.  
These virtues, by their very nature, are: reasons-responsive, stable and reliable 
dispositions and traits of  epistemic agents the manifestation/exercise of  which express 
evaluative judgments—i.e., express our tacit judgments and commitments to having true 
beliefs, wanting to guide our inquiries by a desire to believe things for the right reasons and 
in the right way, and so forth—that individuals can cultivate and develop over time. 
Epistemic virtues (conceived as abilities cultivated from natural or hard-wired capacities and 
integrated with other abilities) are exactly the features about an individual that ground apt 
evaluation. They influence not only what, but also how, we believe and since they are stable 
features of  the individual who possesses them, reactive attitudes are appropriate even in 
cases where they fail to be exercised or manifest. Recent work in virtue epistemology has 
been more comfortable with discussing such intellectual virtues as cognitive or intellectual 
abilities and so I followed suit. Although cognitive abilities suggest a natural ground for 
epistemic competence, asserting this is a far cry from explaining how they do so.  
 I then turned to the positive project of  this work. In order to explain how cognitive 
abilities underwrite epistemic evaluability, I needed to clear away potential objections and lay 
the appropriate groundwork. Since I want to argue that certain cognitive abilities are 
constitutive of  knowing how to know and that knowing how to know is necessary and 
sufficient for epistemic competence, I defended the claim that some knowledge-how is 
constituted by an ability (or abilities). Finally, in this chapter, I presented two central 
arguments. First, I argued that cognitive abilities are capacities or processes or faculties that a 
subject can exercise guidance control over. And, second, I demonstrated that cognitive 




two claims of  this dissertation: that certain cognitive abilities ground the appropriateness of  












The goal of  this chapter is to present my account of  epistemic competence as a kind of  
ability-constituted knowledge-how. As I have suggested, a subject knows how to know just in 
case she has the ability to recognize, attend to, and assess normative reasons—i.e., justifying 
reasons—for belief  as well as the ability to revise her belief  on the basis of  that assessment. 
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, in §6.1, I begin by presenting four features this 
ability must have. It must be a: (i) reasons-responsive, (ii) meta-level cognitive ability (iii) that 
is capable of  influencing belief  (formation) (iv) owned by the subject. I next discuss several 
cognitive abilities and argue that these ground epistemic reactive attitudes in §6.2. My focus 
in §6.3 is that the abilities that ground reactive attitudes constitute knowing how to know. 
Finally, in §6.4, I test my theory of  epistemic competence against several of  the recurring 
















The discussions of  control and awareness in chapters two and three point to different 
features of  epistemic competence. Although we do not exercise control over our beliefs we 
do nevertheless influence them. Moreover, our ability to influence belief  seems to play a role 
in connecting us to our beliefs (or lack thereof  in the case of  doxastic omissions). This 
suggests that epistemic competence is (partially) explained by the abilities we (fail to) exercise 
that causally influence what we believe. Another clue is provided by reflection on the role of  
awareness in epistemic competence and doxastic omissions. If  one can rightly be targeted 
with evaluations in cases of  doxastic omissions,271 the implication is that one could (and 
should) have exercised one's cognitive abilities but failed to do so. In other words, the 
exercise of  the cognitive abilities causally responsible for belief  formation must be sensitive 
to the reasons for their exercise. Alternatively, we must be sensitive to the reasons for 
exercising those cognitive abilities. Background beliefs, the environment, and awareness of  
our cognitive capabilities fix whether or not to exercise relevant cognitive abilities. If  we 
construe these broadly as reasons, then we can conclude that epistemic competence requires 
a kind of  sensitivity or responsiveness to reasons. In a case where one is simply incapable of  
being moved by different reasons to form different beliefs or to exercise the cognitive 
abilities that produce beliefs, one seems to be exempt from epistemic reactive attitudes on 
the basis of  that (those) belief(s). I have already said what it means to be responsive to 
reasons in §5.2a.     
 Two additional features of  epistemic competence come from further reflection. In the 
first place, responsiveness to reasons does not require that one actually exercise a particular 
cognitive ability or faculty. Since we can be subject to evaluation on the basis of  beliefs we 
(fail to) acquire without exercising the relevant ability, it follows that those evaluations are 
                                                 




grounded in the mere possession of  the relevant ability. If  an individual does not have the 
relevant ability, then they can hardly be faulted for (failing to) form the belief  in question.272 
Alternatively, if  an individual does have the ability but fails to exercise it, we rightly fault 
them for that failure precisely because they should have (and hence could have) exercised the 
relevant ability. So possession (or, more precisely ownership)273 of  certain cognitive abilities 
is what matters for epistemic competence.    
In the second place, recall the distinction between cognitive abilities and 
capacities/processes discussed in §5.2. A cognitive ability is a capacity/process the exercise 
or manifestation of  which is responsive to reasons by the agent who owns it. But this is not 
to imply that all cognitive abilities constitute epistemic competence. The abilities constitutive 
of  epistemic competence must be general enough that all (properly functioning) mature 
humans have them, but specific enough so as not to include the noncompetent. Our brief  
discussion above concerning capacities and abilities points us in the right direction. The role 
of  some of  our cognitive abilities is to guide other cognitive abilities. These second-order, or 
meta-level, abilities act as a check on the deliverances of  our first-order capacities and 
abilities. Exercising them leads to endorsement, rejection, adjustment, and so on. If  this is 
right, then these abilities are precisely what are necessary for epistemic competence. 
Individuals whose second-order abilities are inefficacious, whose first-order cognitive 
abilities override all else are nothing more than epistemic wantons.274  
I submit, therefore, that the abilities constitutive of  epistemic competence must have the 
following four features: they must be reasons-responsive, second-order abilities that causally 
                                                 
272 Unless, of course, they ought to have had the ability. In which case, the failing is traceable to the (failure) to 
exercise a different ability. 
273 The idea of ownership is developed in §5.2b above. 
274 See Frankfurt (“Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in Frankfurt, Harry. The Importance of What We Care 




influence belief  and are owned by the subject. Since the concept of  a cognitive ability 
contains reasons-responsiveness and ownership, we can instead focus on the remaining two 
desiderata. The cognitive abilities I propose as constituting epistemic competence will be 
shown to be abilities of  the second-order that causally influence not only what, but also how, 





6.2. Cognitive Ability, Epistemic Competence, and Knowing How to Know 
 
In this section, I complete my argument that knowing how to know is constituted by an 
executive cognitive ability, the ability to believe for normative reasons (ANR). This ability is 
itself  constituted by three nested abilities, the abilities to recognize and assess (justifying) 
reasons for belief, and the ability to revise belief  according to the reasons and evidence for 
(against) it. The rough idea is that one knows how to know just in case one would be 
motivated to form (withhold/modify/reject) beliefs by an awareness of  the reasons for 
(against) them; it is to be able to recognize and assess the normative reasons in favor of  
belief  as well as to revise one’s belief. Throughout the discussion, we shall see that what 
underwrites epistemic reactive attitudes is ANR and thus knowing how to know. Cognitive 
abilities entail ownership, doxastic influence, and reasons-responsiveness. ANR is an 
executive or second-order ability that operates on the deliverances of  first-order abilities. 
Hence, if  I can show that ANR underwrites the appropriateness of  epistemic reactive 




about control and awareness via a meta-level or second-order reasons-responsive cognitive 
ability, capable of  influencing belief, that the subject owns. 
  
 
a. Knowing how to know: some preliminary remarks 
 
In an effort to forestall some possible objections, I should like to clear away a few potential 
roadblocks. First, contrary to appearances, the idea of  believing for reasons does not imply 
we have control over belief. We exercise control over cognitive abilities that form beliefs. To 
exercise these abilities is to engage in the activity of  believing. Second, the role of  awareness 
plays out on two levels: the ownership condition required for guidance control—and hence 
cognitive abilities—and a modal requirement on the reasons that (would) move one to 
believe if  one were aware of  them. This role of  awareness is more about the nature of  the 
reasons for belief  than about the nature of  the awareness involved. Third, to suggest that we 
have an ability to believe for normative reasons is to contrast normative reasons with other 
kinds of  reasons. The discussion of  control and awareness in the previous section, with the 
brief  remarks above, should be sufficient to allay any worries about doxastic voluntarism as 
well as putative objections to the nature and role of  awareness in epistemic competence. I 
shall therefore turn to the third point concerning the kinds of  reasons involved in belief  
formation. 
In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly interested in the role that reasons 




motivation and justification of  action.275 Of  particular interest is the distinction between 
motivating and normative reasons. Briefly, a motivating reason for φ-ing is a reason that 
moves one to φ. If  you like, it is a reason that causes one to φ. A normative reason to φ 
counts in favor of  (against) φ-ing. In the context of  belief, a motivating reason to believe 
that P moves one to believe that p whereas a normative reason to believe that P is a reason 
that counts in favor of  believing that P.276 In other words, a normative reason is a justifying 
reason.277  
I want to call reasons that move one to belief  motivating reasons because it highlights 
the fact that merely believing something for a reason is not sufficient for epistemic 
competence. An individual may have a reason to believe that P, have a pro-attitude toward 
that reason, believe on the basis of  that reason, provide that reason as an explanation as to 
why she believes it, and yet still be non-competent.278 There are different ways this may 
occur. Young children form such beliefs quite often; for example, my daughter may believe 
that Mama will be home soon because I told her so. If  asked when is your Mama coming 
                                                 
275 see Reisner, Andrew, and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. Reasons for Belief. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
276 We should be careful not to confuse another distinction that epistemologists use with this one. 
Epistemologists speak of doxastic and propositional justification for belief. The orthodox view of the latter 
concerns not the reasons on the basis of which one believes but whether those reasons justify the belief. The 
former concerns only the reasons on the basis of which a subject believes. For detailed discussion of the 
doxastic vs. propositional justification distinction see Turri, John. “On the Relationship between Propositional 
and Doxastic Justification.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80, no. 2 (2010): 312–326; Engel, Mylan. 
“Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 67, no. 2 (1992): 133–150; Williams, 
Problems: 21-25). 
277 I am not completely comfortable with using “justifying” reason. Since competence requires assessing 
reasons for or against a belief, some of the reasons are not justifying reasons, but undermining or detracting 
reasons. Nevertheless, they are normative in that they provide motivation to withhold/modify/reject a belief. 
278 One may argue that whatever that state is in such a case it is not a belief. At least, it is not what we mean by 
belief when we speak of individuals being apt targets of evaluation on the basis of beliefs. Call them “ur-
beliefs”. Ur-beliefs are analogically related to competent beliefs and we treat them as beliefs for pedagogical 
purposes in order to train, e.g., children to be full-blown epistemic agents.  
 Contrary to appearances, this presents no real challenge to the present point. Either, they are beliefs, but not 
the kind that we can be evaluated on the basis of, in which case we still need to explain what it is about 
evaluable beliefs that is different from beliefs formed for mere motivating reasons; or, they are ur-beliefs, in 
which case we still need an explanation of evaluable beliefs—proper belief. Either way, that state produced by 




home, she would likely reply, “very soon”. If  pressed why she thinks this, she would likely 
reply, “papa told me.” Or perhaps it may be the case that one has been brainwashed into 
having pro-attitudes towards certain reasons. And, if  the individual is not culpable for the 
brainwashing, the resultant belief  is motivated by the pro-attitude towards the reason and yet 
she remains exempt from evaluation. Note, this may be true even if  she is otherwise 
evaluable; perhaps she has been brainwashed in one particular domain of  reasons, but in 
most others she is generally competent.  
It is, however, a bit odd to contrast motivating reasons with normative reasons for the 
simple fact that all reasons are normative. When one explains belief  in terms of  reasons, one 
is, at least, implying that those reasons rationalize the belief; they make the belief, in some 
sense, appropriate to have rather than simply describing how it came about. What is more, 
there is oddness in the other direction. To suggest that one believes that P for the normative 
reason R is to suggest that R is one’s motivating reason to believe that P. After all, motivating 
reasons move one to believe and, in this case, R moves one to believe that P. Finally, I 
characterized normative reasons in terms of  what seem to be pro-attitudes. If  a normative 
reason to believe that P is a reason that counts in favor of  believing that P, how is this 
different from the pro-attitudes involved in being moved to believe that p? 
The sense of  “normative” in the ability to believe for normative reasons is not meant to 
imply that motivating reasons are not also in some sense normative. It is rather to highlight 
norm recognition. I take it that a minimal condition on epistemic competence is to be able 
to recognize and be moved by norms governing belief  formation. Recall, the norms I have 
in mind are quite general. Equally clear is the fact that one could be moved to belief  both 
without recognizing the relevant norms governing the formation of  that particular belief  




of  “normative” and “reason” that applies when speaking of  mere motivating reasons. The 
aforementioned example of  my daughter’s belief  about when her mother is coming home is 
a case in point. When one believes for a normative reason in my sense, by contrast, part (or 
perhaps all) of  the explanation is that one is moved to belief  because the reason conforms 
to the relevant norms (for example, norms concerning motivations to believe true things, or 
norms concerning ruling out relevant inconsistent possibilities, or norms requiring weighing 
of  real probabilities, and so on;279 one’s pro-attitude toward the reason for belief  is grounded 
in some (often tacit) recognition that believing is acceptable, permissible, obligatory, 
expressive of  careful thought, measured, rational, and so on. Note, it is sufficient (and 
necessary) that one only have the ability to believe for normative reasons not that they 
exercise it in the particular case.  
We can illustrate this further by returning to the example from chapter three of  Joe, our 
Fox News-loving climate science denier. Joe's belief  that P is motivated by his beliefs (and 
perhaps conative states) about Fox News. That is, what causes Joe to believe that climate 
change is a hoax is his trust in Fox News. So his motivating reason(s) to believe that climate 
change is a hoax is his implicit and dogmatic trust in Fox News. However, there are 
normative reasons that Joe does not possess that count against this belief. For example, the 
fact, if  it is a fact, that Fox News is an unreliable news source. If  we assume that Joe is a 
generally competent adult, then it is because his motivating reasons for belief  do not 
conform to the norms of  belief  formation that we find fault with him, because he is 
                                                 
279 Of course, an individual need not explicitly think in these terms. More often than not, in the course of 
ordinary development, we swallow these guiding norms down as consequences of other things. As such, we 
have a general awareness that we want to avoid wishful thinking and base our beliefs on good reasons (i.e., 
reasons that increase the likelihood that our belief is true), or that we need to rule out claims inconsistent with 
our own. None of this need be consciously endorsed; the general practice of acquiring beliefs is typically 
governed by such norms and our conforming to those norms happens more or less automatically. Where one’s 
ability to believe for normative reasons—be governed by belief norms—is on greatest display is when 
something goes wrong. Competent individuals revise their beliefs (again, conforming to a belief norm) when 




blinkered in his attitude towards Fox News we evaluate him critically. Since he could so easily 
discover that Fox is unreliable and yet refuses to do so we rightly target him with reactive 
attitudes. Here is another fact Joe does possess that counts as a normative reason for 
rejecting the climate change belief  (or at the very least withholding it): he does not 
understand the arguments about climate change.280 This is a normative reason that we are 
right to insist should factor into his forming the belief.281 That it does not evinces his 
problematic disposition towards belief  acquisition.  
So, epistemic competence requires that we have the ability—reliably to succeed at 
achieving the end of  that ability across a sufficient range of  situations when intending to—
to believe for normative reasons. This suggests that we have the ability to align our 
motivating and normative reasons. How do we do this? I intimated above that the governing 
ability to believe for normative reasons is constituted by three other abilities. And now we 






                                                 
280 We need to be careful here. I am not claiming that Joe is subject to negative reactive attitudes merely 
because he trusts an unreliable source he has not checked out. Rather, I am suggesting that Joe is sufficiently 
aware that there is a heated debate about climate change, he is aware that he does not understand the 
arguments or data being presented either by those who affirm climate change or those who deny it or even why 
those data matter, and yet he still denies climate change because of his implicit trust in Fox News. It is one 
thing to implicitly trust a news source without ever having checked on it. It is another to trust that source on 
topics that one is not even passingly adept at understanding. This would be true of an individual forming 
beliefs on the basis of reliable sources on subject matters that are beyond the pale for them. For example, it 
would be misleading (at best, and flat out wrong, at worst) of me to pass myself off as knowing, e.g., Godel’s 
incompleteness theorems since no matter how hard I try, I simply do not understand either what the theorems 
are, what their proofs are, or how to go about proving them. Even if I just sat in a course where we discussed 
the theorems and went over those proofs in detail, I should not think that I know them. 
281 The fact that it does not factor into his belief formation even though he has that reason points towards a 
solution to nonculpable doxastic omissions and how we might still be evaluated on the basis of them. See §6.4 




b. The ability to believe for normative reasons 
 
In order to align our motivating and normative reasons for belief, we must have the ability to 
revise our beliefs in light of  the reasons for (against) them. If  there were no way to do so 
then we would be completely subject to the vicissitudes of  whatever our subpersonal 
cognitive faculties and processes delivered. What is entailed by having this ability? Primarily it 
involves the ability to assess reasons and evidence in favor of  those beliefs and this requires 
we have the ability to recognize and attend to those reasons and that evidence. So the ability 
to recognize and attend to reasons and evidence is nested in the ability to assess reasons and 
evidence. The ability to assess reasons and evidence is nested in the ability to revise belief. And 
finally, the ability to revise belief  is constitutive of  the ability to believe for normative 
reasons.282  
The ability to attend to reasons/evidence partially constitutes the ability to assess reasons 
and evidence. Two questions remain. What is the ability to assess reasons/evidence an ability 
to do and what else besides an ability to attend is required? Answering the first question will 
point us in the direction of  what is needed to answer the second. Let us approach this by 
thinking through an example.  
 
Murder: David's body is found in his locked car inside his closed garage with the 
windows slightly cracked open and the car running. The police take this to be an 
open and shut case of  suicide and are about to rule it as such, when they realize that 
the driver's side seat is pulled uncomfortably close for David's 6'3" frame. Later, it is 
discovered that David did not die of  carbon monoxide poisoning, but instead he 
froze from inside out after ingesting liquid nitrogen. All evidence pointed to David's 
wife, especially when it was revealed that she was having an affair, stood to gain a 
significant amount of  money from life insurance, and her credit card was used to 
purchase the thermos used to deliver the liquid nitrogen. However, the lead 
                                                 
282 To be clear, having the ability to attend to the features of a situation—the reasons and evidence for (against) 
belief—is different than de facto attending to one's situation. The epistemically non-competent may very often 
attend to the relevant features of a situation and reliably form accurate beliefs because of it. For example, small 
children can reliably form accurate beliefs about who is in the room with them and even demonstrate this 




investigator, Tony, reexamines the evidence and finds that the wife could not have 
purchased the thermos. He sees that the wife's stepdaughter from a previous 
marriage used the card by examining the security footage of  the store. This leads him 
to find that if  the wife were to be sent to prison, the stepdaughter's trust fund would 
immediately open. 
 
What is going on here? Obviously, Tony manifests his ability to attend to the evidence, 
which explains why he decides to reexamine it. But, he also must have thought something 
was amiss, else why reexamine it? This suggests an awareness of  his degree of  confidence 
and/or an awareness of  some kind of  standard, of  which he fell short. Further, why would 
his awareness of  his confidence cause him to reexamine the evidence if  he did not think that 
his lack of  confidence was an indication of  not meeting an appropriate standard? And if  this 
is right, it seems that one must be aware of  standards that govern belief. I raise this point 
because it appears it might threaten the view I am advocating since it may imply that one 
must possess propositional knowledge about norms and standards in order to know how to 
assess one’s reasons and evidence. Allow me to set this aside in order to continue the 
discussion about the abilities constitutive of  ANR. I shall return to it at the end of  §6.2c 
below. 
The ability to assess reasons is related to another cognitive ability, the ability to revise 
belief  in light of  the reasons/evidence that count in its favor (or against it). The latter ability 
appears to be manifest in the ability to assess reasons. If  a set of  reasons points to a 
particular conclusion and yet we are unsure (for whatever reason), not only does this lead us 
to assess our reasons, it just is an episode of  revising belief—in this case withholding until 
more reasons are in favor. Whenever an individual is in a state of  not believing that P and 
not believing that not-P when she considers whether P, she is withholding a belief  that P. To 
be in that state is tantamount to not being moved to believe that P and not being moved to 




either no reasons that a subject has are sufficient to motivate belief  or the reasons that one 
has one finds insufficient to motivate belief. In the former case, one’s subpersonal processes 
and faculties simply do not induce belief. In the latter case, one occurrently thinks about the 
claim and the reasons for it but finds no reason strong enough to induce belief. And, of  
course, this can come in different degrees; I might think that P is more likely than not-P, but 
not enough to induce full-blown belief. Withholding belief  is just one particularly salient way 
we revise our beliefs. We also adjust our level of  confidence and even reject belief  altogether. 
These three distinct abilities—the ability to attend to reasons and evidence, the ability to 
assess reasons and evidence, and the ability to revise one’s belief  in light of  those reasons 
and that evidence—greatly influence what and how we believe. Separately, they play a 
significant role in belief  formation, but together they form an ability that acts as a kind of  
check and balance to the deliverances of  our first-order cognitive capacities. Why consider 
this to be a separate ability at all? Simply put, because very many of  our abilities, cognitive 
and otherwise, are constituted by other abilities. For example, the ability to play chess is 
constituted by a constellation of  abilities including recognitional abilities, movement abilities, 
and so on.  
I call the ability constituted by the abilities to recognize, assess, and revise belief  the 
ability to believe for normative reasons (ANR), or a general reasons-responsiveness within 
the domain of  belief  formation. More accurately, one believes for normatively assessable 
reasons. Reasons are inextricably bound up with interpersonal interactions; they are given 
and taken to support or undermine claims of  knowledge. As such, the reasons themselves 
can be subject to the same kinds of  questions and challenges as the original claim.  
I shall now argue that this ability is necessary and sufficient for epistemic competence by 




In other words, to establish the necessity of  ANR, let us imagine cases where reactive 
attitudes are appropriate and abstract away each of  the more basic abilities to show that 
reactive attitudes would be inapt. To establish the sufficiency of  ANR, we simply ask what 
else could be required.  
 
 
c. The necessity of  ANR 
 
The inability to recognize reasons for belief  in general entails that normative evaluation 
centered on the social epistemic practice of  giving (or being prepared to give) reasons to 
support one’s claim to knowledge is inappropriate. The inability to assess reasons for belief, 
in general, entails that individual would be unable to think of  a reason as good or bad and 
therefore unable to recognize normative standards governing belief. In other words, it entails 
that being unable to meet belief  norms, the individual is not subject to epistemic constraints 
and thus not subject to the evaluations arising from those norms. Finally, the general or 
global inability to revise belief  in light of  assessing one’s reasons for belief  reduce one to 
purely mechanistic or subpersonal “belief ” systems. Allow me to illustrate each of  these 
points. 
  If  an individual is globally unable to recognize reasons for believing something, no 
reactive attitude could be appropriate. In such a case, the individual is only capable of  
objective attitudes, clinical evaluation and the like. This leaves the abilities to assess reasons 
and to revise belief  in light of  that assessment. I am unclear what it would mean to be able 
to recognize reasons and revise belief, but not assess those reasons globally. Of  course, in 




position to assess whether P is a good reason to believe that Q. For example, I may 
recognize that current understanding of  quantum physics gives me reason to reject a belief  
in a deterministic universe, but due to my lack of  understanding of  quantum physics not be 
able to defend my belief  or revise that belief  in light of  an assessment of  current views on 
quantum physics. Presumably, I would hold my belief  about the indeterministic nature of  
the universe rather tentatively though since I could recognize that my lack of  understanding 
of  quantum physics undermines my ability to defend my beliefs about indeterminism. But, if  
I did not have the ability to assess reasons for belief, in general, I could never believe for 
good or right reasons. Being unable to assess whether a reason was good or bad, I would 
effectively be unable to recognize reasons for belief. 
 Lastly, the inability to revise belief, again globally or in general, makes epistemic 
evaluations inapt. If  I believe that P, if  I do not have the ability to revise my belief  in the 
light of  new evidence, say, then I will always believe that P. My belief  that P becomes hard-
wired. But, if  there is a global inability to revise my beliefs, then all of  my beliefs are thus 
hard-wired. Moreover, belief  formation then becomes a matter merely of  subpersonal 
processes and I contribute nothing. It is hard to see how I can be subject to reactive attitudes 
when I am not involved in the formation of  the belief.  
In addition to these general points, reflection on the lack of  one or more of  these 
abilities in young children also explains why epistemic reactive attitudes are inappropriate 
(either globally in very young children, or locally within different domains in older children). 
An older child may be able to see that P is a reason for Q in some domains, but due to a 
failure to understand something in another domain fail to see that P* is a reason for Q*. For 
example, we would be wrong negatively to evaluate a seventh-grade child who is just learning 




axiomatic set theory over naive set theory. In the absence of  compelling argument against 
the necessity of  the ability to believe for normative reasons, I shall proceed to the sufficiency 
of  this ability for epistemic competence. 
 
 
d. The sufficiency of  ANR 
 
The question of  the sufficiency of  ANR for epistemic competence concerns whether, in 
addition to ANR, anything else is required to ground the appropriateness of  epistemic 
reactive attitudes. One might think that since epistemic competence is a competence in 
knowing—i.e., the epistemically competent are competent knowers—that what is required 
over and above ANR to ground reactive evaluability is an ability to fulfill a subset (or all) of  
the epistemic conditions on knowledge. My strategy will be to argue that ANR reliably yields 
the fulfillment of  conditions on knowledge or that one’s belief  need not fulfill that condition 
in order for one to be an apt target of  epistemic reactive attitudes. Either way, there is 
nothing over and above ANR required for epistemic competence. Thus, ANR is also 
sufficient.  
 Recall that to have an ability to φ one must be sufficiently reliable at achieving the goal 
of  φ-ing when trying. So an individual has the ability to believe for normative reasons just in 
case she is sufficiently reliable at recognizing, attending to, and assessing reasons for belief  
and revising beliefs in the light of  the assessment of  those reasons. To determine whether 
this is sufficient for reactive evaluability, we must ask whether manifesting/exercising ANR is 
sufficient reliably to achieve knowledge. Notice this is not to commit myself  to reliabilism; a 




belief. As I have already argued cognitive abilities require ownership and this entails a kind 
of  awareness of  the manifestation/exercise of  a capacity, even if  that awareness is merely 
tacit (or, even if  there is no occurrent awareness for a particular belief). Nevertheless, if  an 
individual periodically and inconsistently arrives at the truth—if  she is unreliable at arriving 
at the truth, assuming she is not the victim of  an evil deceiver who manipulates the world to 
make it turn out that she does not arrive at the truth—it is not accurate to ascribe knowledge 
to her, at least for the kinds of  knowledge that implicate epistemic competence.  Suppose 
knowledge is constituted by true belief  plus some further truth-conducive factor (or factors). 
When we ask whether anything other than ANR is required reliably to yield knowledge, we 
are asking either whether ANR reliably fulfills these conditions or whether it need to. Hence, 
if  believing for normative reasons can plausibly be thought to be the truth-conducive factor 
of  knowledge, or, if  believing for normative reasons can plausibly be thought reliably to 
fulfill that condition, then having the ability to believe for normative reasons (as opposed to 
manifesting/exercising the ability to believe for normative reasons) will be sufficient for 
competence. 
 Pretty obviously, the manifestation/exercise of  ANR reliably yields the belief  condition. 
Also obvious is the fact that failure of  the exercise of  ANR to reliably fulfill the truth 
condition does not detract from competence. Whether a belief  is true or not is largely out of  
my hands (absent world-state-tracking beliefs discussed in §2.2b). So the fact that my 
exercise of  ANR cannot reliably make a belief  true does not undermine the claim that ANR 
is sufficient for epistemic competence. That leaves us with the "final" condition on 
knowledge, the truth-conducive factor (or factors). This condition in all its forms, broadly 
understood, makes it likely that the belief  is true and that the individual forms the belief  




thinking that a belief  is true. If  anything is going to undermine the claim that ANR is 
sufficient for competence by maintaining something else is required to reliably yield 
knowledge other than ANR, it will be a feature that satisfies this condition. So, does ANR 
reliably yield the truth-conducive factor condition on knowledge or does it even need to? 
Suppose my vision is bit nearsighted and I think I see and form the belief  that I see a 
colleague walking away from his office down the hall seconds before his student asks me if  
he is in his office; suppose I am situated such that I am in a better position to see him exit 
the office and the student just barely glimpses him as he turns a corner. There are three ways 
this could go and in each of  them nothing more than ANR is needed to underwrite the 
reactive attitudes of  the student. First, I might be aware that am a bit nearsighted and take 
this as a reason to hedge my reply. “I think I saw him just leave his office, but you might 
want to go check for yourself.” Here my ability to recognize and assess my reasons for 
believing my colleague has left his office manifests in my recognition that my vision is not 
good enough to fully endorse this belief. If  I ignore my beliefs about my vision and reply 
that he has just left his office, the student’s frustration towards me when she later finds that 
he had not left his office is quite appropriate. Failing to use my beliefs about my poor vision 
is a failure to exercise ANR. But, when I recognize my poor vision as a reason to at least 
hedge, then I exercise ANR. In so doing, my ability to believe for normative reasons not 
only increases my reliability, it partially constitutes it. These considerations apply mutatis 
mutandis to other possible truth-conducive conditions on knowledge (other than the belief  
condition or the truth condition). 
The second way this scenario might go is that I am unaware that I as nearsighted as I am. 
If  I respond that my colleague has just left his office and the student later discovers he was 




that I had no idea my eyesight was so bad. Even here, the student’s reactive attitudes could 
be appropriate. It would be completely understandable if  she were nonplussed by my lack of  
awareness about my vision. This reaction would imply not only that I had reason to at least 
hedge my reply but that I ought to have recognized that reason. And this follows only if  she 
could reasonably expect that I could have recognized that reason, otherwise her attitude is 
inapt. So either I should have been aware of  my poor vision (and thus taken it into account) 
or I should not have been. If  the former, then all that is required is that I had the ability to 
be aware. Implied in this is that in addition to having the ability to recognize my poor vision 
as a reason to (at least) hedge my reply, this reason would factor into my beliefs about 
whether my colleague was in his office. In other words, the student’s reactive attitudes are apt 
if  and only if  I have ANR. If, on the other hand, there is no reasonable expectation that I 
should have been aware that my vision was so poor—which, admittedly, is quite 
implausible—then the student’s attitudes are inapt. 
In both of  the preceding cases, ANR keeps my belief  formation in check and thus 
partially constitutes my reliably satisfying the truth-conducive condition on knowledge. 
Moreover, my competence is reflected in the responsiveness to reasons implied by ANR. 
The third and final way this case might go is that both my vision is poor and that I do not 
have ANR, because I am either globally or temporarily unable to recognize, assess, or revise 
my beliefs. Since we have already seen that ANR is necessary to underwrite epistemic 
reactive attitudes, once we remove that ability the associated attitudes are inappropriate. 
I think the best explanation of  the preceding case is that ANR plays a constitutive role in 
fulfilling conditions on knowledge (other than truth or belief). While I only focused on 
reliability, my comments apply equally to other possible conditions on knowledge as well. 




belief, it follows that the exercise or manifestation of  ANR will reliably yield justified beliefs. 
In fact, even in cases where a person has misleading evidence and she believes on this 
evidence, if  she exercises/manifests ANR in the acquisition of  this belief, then she 
competently, though incorrectly, acquires this belief.283 Further, default entitlements to belief  
can be called into question and even revoked when it is clear that one did not assess the 
reasons for belief—i.e., did not exercise/manifest ANR.284 
One other likely candidate for epistemic competence in addition to ANR might be 
responsible believing. Either ANR is constitutive of  responsible believing or the requirement 
of  responsible believing for epistemic competence begs the question. In the latter case, if  
one tries to argue that epistemically responsible behavior is required before one can be 
epistemically competent, and since as we have seen accountability presupposes evaluability, 
then one is attempting to argue that epistemically responsible behavior—the kind involved in 
accountability judgments—is required for competence—the appropriateness of  reactive 
attitudes. But this is impossible; before one can be accountable one must be competent. So 
then, competence is a necessary condition on epistemically responsible behavior. The upshot 
is that epistemically responsible behavior cannot be a constituent of  epistemic competence 
in addition to ANR since the latter is a precondition of  the former.  
I conclude, therefore, that having ANR is necessary and sufficient for epistemic 
competence. Put differently, when we exercise the cognitive ability of  believing for 
normative reasons, we manifest epistemic competence. So, to be epistemically competent—
to be the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes—is nothing over and above being 
able to recognize, attend to, assess, and revise belief  in response to the evidence and reasons 
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for (against) it. Just like other dispositions one need not exercise those abilities in order 
either to have them attributed to one or to be evaluated on their basis. (Of  course, if  an 
individual never (or only in extremely rare circumstances) manifested those abilities our 
attributions and evaluations would be inapt.)  
To be clear, ANR is not necessary and sufficient for knowledge, but rather for 
competence. It is true that generally competent individuals are reliable at attaining 
knowledge, but there is always the possibility that the world does not cooperate. I may 
manifest or exercise ANR in my attaining the belief  the P, and yet not know that P. This is 
because P is false. My reasons for thinking that P, however, may be good reasons; they just 
happen to be wrong. Moreover, my evaluation of  those reasons could be thorough and 
induce belief  that P on that basis. It is important to be clear on this since in the next section 
I shall argue that ANR is knowing how to know. If  knowing how to φ implies reliable 
success at φ-ing when trying, then competence will be the ability to reliably achieve 






6.3. The Ability to Believe for Normative Reasons as Knowing How to Know 
 
Once we understand that having the ability to believe for normative reasons underwrites the 
appropriateness of  epistemic reactive attitudes and that to be epistemically competent just is 




constituted by the ability to believe for normative reasons. To establish that this ability just is 
knowing how to know, we can investigate the latter concept. If  it can be shown that knowing 
how to know is likewise constituted by the abilities to recognize, attend to, and assess 
reasons/evidence and to revise belief, then I shall have shown that one is the appropriate 
target of  epistemic reactive attitudes just in case one knows how to know. 
 When we attribute know-how to an individual, we imply that the individual is sufficiently 
reliable at achieving the goal or the end of  the knowledge-how. So for example when an 
individual knows how to ride a bicycle, she is sufficiently reliable at succeeding in riding a 
bicycle. When we say an individual knows how to add, we imply she is sufficiently reliable at 
succeeding in adding numbers correctly. The object of  the know-how under present 
discussion is attaining knowledge. In the last section, I argued that ANR is sufficient for 
reliably satisfying the truth conducive condition on knowledge. So, we may wonder what 
other abilities would be required in order to know how to know. Perhaps someone may think 
that not only do we need the ability to recognize, attend to, assess reasons for belief, and the 
ability to revise belief  in the light of  those reasons, but additionally the ability to recognize 
reasons as such. It is not unless I think of  the reasons/evidence for belief  as reasons/evidence 
for belief  that I could attend to, assess, and perhaps find those reasons wanting.  
 On one reading of  this, having the ability to recognize reasons/evidence is nothing more 
than the ability to recognize that some things make other things more or less likely to be the 
case. This may be either explicit or implicit. Moreover, this seems to depend rather heavily 
on what concepts the individual possesses. I may, because of  the concepts and background 
knowledge I possess, see the coloration of  the clouds in the sky as a reason to bring my 
umbrella to work. Younger children may see it as a reason to ask Mom and Dad about the 




to φ. If  so, then knowing how to attend to reasons/evidence amounts to knowing how to 
attend to the various features of  a situation one finds oneself  in, which is what I have 
advocated all along. If  one wants to argue that in addition to attention, assessment, and 
revision, one must have certain recognitional abilities specifically with regard to reasons and 
evidence, then the burden is on them to refute the picture of  reasons/evidence I have just 
presented. I have only advocated that in some cases our recognition of  reasons/evidence is 
nothing more than the perhaps tacit recognition that some things make other things more 
likely. It is not enough for an opponent to present an alternative view to this; one must show 
that the view I advocated is wrong. Therefore, my account of  reasons/evidence recognition 
is not unrealistically onerous.  
Are there any other abilities or perhaps propositional knowledge that one must possess? 
It seems unlikely, but here is one possibility. In coming to know that P, it seems I must have 
other kinds of  knowledge. In coming to know that the coloration of  the clouds indicates 
rain, I must know what rain is, what coloration indicates rain, and so on. Does this imply 
that knowing how to know is not just the ability to believe for reasons? No. The abilities 
constitutive of  knowing how to know (assuming that it is the ability to attend to, assess, and 
revise) may likewise, indeed probably do, require propositional knowledge for their exercise, 
but that propositional knowledge does not constitute the knowledge-how. Knowing how to 
know is a general or meta-level ability, presupposed in particular instances of  its exercise. 
Knowing how to know, in general, is presupposed in knowing how to know if  it is raining. 
Similarly, I must know how to play piano before I know how to play Beethoven’s Für Elise.  
In addition, knowing how to φ does not imply completely reliable success. I may know 
how to φ —have the ability to φ —and nevertheless fail to φ in some cases. Achieving the 




cannot know that the world is flat because it is not. I may think I know this, but am I 
mistaken. Unless the world cooperates, namely by being such that the proposition justifiably 
believed is true, I cannot have knowledge that it is. Granted, the cooperation of  the world in 
cases of  know-how is more tenuous. I could know how to φ as long as in a sufficient number 
of  cases I succeed. This leaves room for cases where I fail and nevertheless retain the know-
how. Neither the failure of  ANR to attain knowledge nor the fact that propositional 
knowledge may be required in particular instances of  exercising/ manifesting ANR 
undermine the thesis that ANR constitutes knowing how to know.  
To refute that claim, one would have to show that in addition to ANR one possesses 
propositional attitudes the content of  which prescribe how to do what I am doing, viz., 
acquiring knowledge. It is not enough to show that when I exercise my know-how I must 
have related propositional knowledge. Of  course I must have some knowledge-that in order 
to exercise my knowledge-how in certain ways. Consider that my knowing how to ride a bike 
requires that I know that is a bike in front of  me. I cannot exercise my knowledge how to 
ride a bike on a Ferris wheel. The exercise of  an ability, cognitive or otherwise, needs the 
appropriate medium and that will require that I have some knowledge of  what that medium 
is. None of  this constitutes the knowledge-how. Though, this does raise a potentially more 
troubling problem.  
At the beginning of  chapter four, I suggested that one of  the reasons why know-how 
could not be propositional is that presumably we are subject to evaluation on the basis of  
our knowledge-that. So if  we must possess some propositional knowledge in order to know 
how to know, my account would run into circularity. In a footnote, I suggested that this 
might not be quite right.285 I would now like to flesh this out. The reasoning behind this 
                                                 




objection is based on a false assumption—that we are subject to evaluation on the basis of  
each piece of  knowledge we possess. However, particular beliefs are reactively evaluable only 
in the context of  a range of  abilities that bring with them a range of  beliefs. We can see this 
normatively or practically (i.e., based on our common practices).  
Normatively, we might suggest that we should be subject to evaluation on the basis of  
each piece of  knowledge we possess. This does not seem right. In chapter two, I argued that 
some of  our beliefs, and thus some of  our knowledge, comes to us unbidden and yet we are 
subject to evaluation on that basis of  it. I want to clarify that here. We are subject to 
evaluation on the basis of  beliefs and knowledge that come to us unbidden only after we are 
in general subject to evaluation; that is, only after norms and standards apply. But some 
beliefs and knowledge come to us unbidden for which we are not subject to evaluation. The 
distinction lies in whether we are already competent or not. The epistemically noncompetent 
are not appraised or evaluated, nor should they be, before the standards of  belief  and 
knowledge apply to them. Yet, we do have beliefs and knowledge prior to being competent. 
Of  course, once we attain competence we can be questioned on the basis of  pre-competent 
beliefs and knowledge.286 Pragmatically, as a matter of  actual practice we do not target the 
noncompetent with epistemic reactive attitudes, even though we do attribute knowledge to 
them. This alone shows that, if  we are attempting to explain and understand an actual 
practice (which I explicitly stated this work is trying to do), the assumption that we are 
subject to epistemic reactive attitudes on the basis of  each piece of  knowledge we possess is 
false. 
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These considerations show us that knowing how to know is constituted by the ability to 
believe for normative reasons. Having ANR makes us reliably successful at attaining 
knowledge. This is what I mean by knowing how to know. Since ANR constitutes epistemic 
competence, I conclude that one is epistemically competent if  and only if  one knows how to 
know. Before ending this section, I would like to address the worry I raised at the beginning 
of  §6.2b about whether the ability to assess one’s reason and evidence depends on 
propositional knowledge about norms and standards.    
 
 
a. Belief  norms, anti-intellectualism, and cognitive abilities 
   
In order to assess one’s reasons for belief, it seems that one might need to have prior 
propositional knowledge about epistemic standards since the ability to assess reasons and 
evidence, which is partially constitutive of  the ability to conform our beliefs to the reasons 
for (against) them, seems to require that one be aware of  or know the standards that govern 
belief  and belief  formation. Once we recall Devitt’s distinction between represented and 
embodied rules this worry falls away.287 Moreover, we can use this distinction to put a 
different spin on Ryle’s regress that intellectualist responses cannot overcome.  
 According to Devitt, a rule might govern in one of  two ways, by being explicitly 
represented or by being embodied without being represented. If  awareness of  the norms 
and standards that govern belief  formation must be explicitly represented, then my account 
would indeed be guilty of  smuggling in propositional assumptions. However, if  those norms 
                                                 




could be embodied without explicitly being represented, then the objection fails. Let us 
investigate this further.  
Two independent considerations lead to the conclusion that at least some norms of  belief  
are embodied rather than represented rules; a methodological point and a conceptual point. 
As a methodological point, “if  we fail to posit representations where there are some, we are 
likely to come across evidence that there are some: our explanations are likely to be 
inadequate. In contrast, if  we posit representations where there are none, it may be difficult 
to come across evidence that there are none, because with enough representations almost 
any behavior can be explained."288 This, Devitt maintains, is to apply what he calls Pylyshyn's 
razor—the idea that representations ought not to be multiplied without necessity—which he 
draws from observations Pylyshyn has made in cognitive science: 
 
one must attribute as much as possible to the capacity of  the system...to properties 
of  the functional architecture...one must find the least powerful functional 
architecture compatible with the range of  variation observed”289  
 
However one is disposed to react to so-called Pylyshyn's Razor, the conceptual argument for 
embodied belief  norms is far more difficult to undermine.  
Suppose that all belief  norms govern by being represented. We must ask what that 
representation amounts to. Those friendly to intellectualist accounts of  knowledge-how 
would maintain that they must be represented propositionally. After all, they are rules for 
clear/responsible/permissible/virtuous/etc. belief  formation. But surely applying the rule 
when one forms a belief  is something that can be done well or poorly. In which case, there 
would need to be a further represented (propositional) rule, and so on ad infinitum. This is 
                                                 
288 Devitt, Michael. Ignorance of Language. (Oxford: University Press, 2006.: 52). 
289 Pylyshyn, Zenon. “Rules and Representations: Chomsky and Representational Realism.” The Chomskian 




just a different way to see Ryle's regress, but with a further problem for the intellectualist. If  
there are no merely embodied rules of  belief  formation, then not only does a response like 
Ginet's in the knowledge-how/ knowledge-that debate fail, it does not even make sense. 
Recall, the strategy was to appeal to the fact that knowledge-that is manifest in action (what 
we typically call knowledge-how) without prior or even simultaneous contemplation.290 The 
anti-intellectualist could grant this, but then point out that this response could not work in 
case of  represented vs. merely embodied rules.  
 What could it possibly mean to say that we manifest a represented rule when we form a 
belief  other than the manifestation of  a rule itself  is governed by rules for the manifestation 
of  represented rules? It is either representations all the way down or it is not. If  it is not, 
then some rules govern behavior or thought without being represented at all.291 A 
particularly salient example of  this is language. Acquiring one's first language does not 
involve representing phonemes (and morphemes, etc.) by following a further represented 
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belief formation) commit one to an untenable innatism? Are all of these rules (or a sufficient number of them, 
at least) simply hard-wired into us? If one means by this, are these rules fixed and immutable, then the answer 
is clearly no. A rule can be "hard-wired" and still be changeable. (The rule might be better thought of as a 
capacity that manifests in different scenarios and can be cultivated over time. For example, we might have 
embodied rules concerning simple inferences, but still be subject to bias that affects those rules until we train 
ourselves—hence, cultivate the ability—to recognize when we are being asked. Kahneman and Tversky’s 
("Extension versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment". Psychological Review. 
90(4) (1983): 293–315) and Kahneman (Thinking, Fast and Slow. (New York: Macmillan, 2011) presents detailed 
discussion of a variety of different cognitive biases that appear to support the idea that many belief formation 
rules are hard-wired as capacities.) At most the idea of hard-wired rules commits us to nativism—or, that 
certain skills and abilities are in some sense built into the mindbrain (Chomsky, N.  ‘Some Conceptual Shifts in 
the Study of Language’, in L. Cauman, I. Levi, C. Parsons and R. Schwartz (eds) How Many Questions?: essays in 
honor of Sidney Morgenbesser, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983); that is, the architecture of the mindbrain is so 
situated as to have certain capacities built-in. But, those skills and abilities need an environment to "activate" 
them. However, one need not commit to nativism to get the same result. It is an empirical question whether 
these rules are part of the native architecture of the mindbrain or whether the cognitive system merely develops 
in such a way that as a matter of fact "writes" those rules due to environmental conditions. However this 
question is settled and does not affect the general point about the distinction between rules that are represented 
and rules that are embodied without being represented. See Dummett (The Seas of Language, (Oxford: Oxford 
Clarendon, 1993) chs 1-4) for discussion about language and how we acquire it without representing the rules 
of grammar; Devitt (Ignorance) for a different take on first language acquisition without representation; and, 
Pylyshyn (“Rules” and Computation and Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) for general 




rule. If  it did, then the appropriate model of  acquiring our first language would have to be 
something like how we learn our second language, by pairing phonemes (and morphemes) 
with corresponding first-language terms. That is, it would require translating the second 
language into the first language and internalizing that translation. But there is no prior 
language to translate our first language into.292 Instead, our first language is acquired through 
exposure to competent language users and subtle correction over time—e.g. using standard 
past-tense constructions when irregular constructions are grammatically appropriate. Is this 
not how we acquire basic epistemic norms (or, more generally, most basic norms)?  
A young child first learns the difference between the various shapes by repeated use and 
correction. In doing so, she begins to reinforce a natural tendency to trust Mom and Dad as 
good sources of  information (assuming the parents are not abusive). A slightly older child 
subtly acquires the same lesson with regard to other adults, e.g., teachers. Slowly she gains 
more and more norms about justifying claims by giving reasons in favor of  them and that 
some claims are more important than others and require stronger/ better/ more reasons. 
Along the way she acquires comparative rules, consistency rules, and so forth. Notice that 
this could all take place without any representations of  those rules themselves. In fact, the 
most general rules, since they govern the more specific rules, would have to be embodied in 
the functional architecture of  the mind in order for later represented rules to find purchase. 
At least in some cases, early developmental stages being salient, individuals assess the 
reasons/ evidence for beliefs by manifesting embodied rules of  belief  formation. So, the 
ability to assess reasons, even if  it does imply awareness of  belief  norms, does not imply 
propositional attitudes about those norms.   
                                                 




I began this chapter with a sketch of  four features a theory of  epistemic competence 
would need to have in order to account for the appropriateness of  epistemic reactive 
attitudes. I argued that a proper theory of  epistemic competence would have to require the 
possession (and not the explicit exercise) of  reasons-responsive, meta-level cognitive abilities 
capable of  influencing belief. I have offered such a theory. To put it more exactly, an agent S 
is epistemically competent iff  she can exercise guidance control over her capacity to 
recognize, attend to, and assess reasons for belief  as well as revise her belief  in light of  the 
reasons/evidence for (against) it. Alternatively, epistemic competence is the ability to believe 
for normative reasons. I suggested that having this ability is to have a kind of  know-how. 
Specifically, when and only when one has these cognitive abilities, one knows how to know. 
Since competence is constituted by a cognitive ability (or abilities), it is a dispositional 
concept. Sometimes that disposition is exercised or manifest and sometimes it is not. 
However, because the cognitive abilities constitutive of  knowing how to know are 
dispositions, epistemic reactive attitudes are sometimes apt even when those dispositions are 
not exercised or manifest.293 Additionally, the very notion of  an ability implies reasons-
responsiveness. It does not imply perfect reliability. Nor does it imply that the reasons we 
have for exercising that ability are never sufficient. Rather, our (not) being in a state of  
exercising that ability must be reliably motivated by reasons for (against) being in that state. 
This, of  course, will vary with the ability in question as well as its domain of  exercise.  
 This leaves two more features to account for. Some of  our cognitive abilities 
immediately aim at true belief. Their goal is accurately to grasp the world. Other of  our 
                                                 
293 I restrict myself to only sometimes because their is an implicit “but should have been” qualifier attached. 
This, in turn, implies that the individual could have exercised or manifest the abilities in question. So, in those 
cases where one’s cognitive abilities are impaired due to unknowingly ingesting psychotropic drugs, our 
epistemic reactive attitudes are inapt. They are inapt not because one does not exercise the relevant cognitive 




abilities immediately aim at assessing the content taken in by the former abilities. And still 
others aim at knowledge.  For example, the goal of  our perceptual capacities is to accurately 
represent the world, and the goal of  our ability to assess reasons and evidence—ANR—is to 
determine whether the representation we have is good enough. The latter meta-level, or 
reflective, abilities function to ensure we minimize mistakes by providing a way for other 
information and background knowledge to enter into the process of  belief  formation. The 
cognitive abilities constitutive of  knowing how to know are such meta-level abilities. ANR is 
a governing ability, one which, when exercised or manifest, affects what and how we believe. 
In other words, ANR, being constituted by the abilities to recognize, attend to, and assess 
reasons as well as revise belief, influences what we believe. But then, to know how to know 
one must only possess (and need not explicitly exercise) reasons-responsive, meta-level 
cognitive abilities capable of  indirectly influencing belief. This concludes the articulation of  
my account of  epistemic competence. In the final section, I shall test my account of  





6.4. Control and Awareness 
 
Throughout the earlier chapters, I raised cases meant to bring out intuitions about epistemic 




order to illustrate how my account of  knowing how to know fares against our common 
ground-level epistemic reactive attitudes. Allow me to restate the cases:294 
 
Lunar skepticism: Walter is in his mid-twenties, graduated from college, and now 
works as a mid-level manager. In his spare time, Walter is an astronomy enthusiast.  
Recently, after watching a program on the history channel about the conspiracy 
behind the lunar landing, Walter has become an evangelist of  sorts denying humans 
have ever landed on the moon.   
 Emma is a five-year old, the daughter of  one of  Walter’s good friends. Emma 
loves the Air and Space Museum and is fascinated by the moon. Her parents read to 
her all about the moon including stories about the lunar landing. One day when 
Walter is over for dinner, he becomes enthusiastic about his newfound skepticism 
about the lunar landing and tells Emma all about it. Now Emma tells everyone that 
the lunar landing never happened. 
 
Bipolar Belief: Thom suffers from bipolar disorder but has yet to be diagnosed. 
Paranoia presents in Thom’s manic states. He has just had his first manic break and 
believes that his wife is cheating on him and begins to accuse her forcefully while 
hurling terrible insults at her. 
 
Climate Science Denial: Joe S. Pack implicitly believes whatever Fox News reports. 
As a result he fails to believe that humans are causing climate change. In fact, he 
believes the contrary that humans are not causing climate change and the 
temperature and weather fluctuations are the result of  a solar cycle. His implicit trust 
in Fox News causes him to be blind to any contrary evidence. If  pressed, Joe would 
claim to be well informed and have fair and balanced opinions about the matter. He 
would report what he has heard on Fox News all the while thinking he was 
reasonable. He might even think that he does not trust Fox News in everything but 
attempts to get a well-rounded perspective. In fact, he does not look anywhere but 
Fox News for his information, including his information about climate change.295  
 
These cases involve individuals that are the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes 
and individuals that are not the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes and some 
of  these cases present counter-examples to the idea that it is control or awareness that 
underwrites epistemic competence. I shall argue my account of  knowing how to know nicely 
                                                 
294 This is not to suggest that my account of knowing how to know cannot meet the demands of all the cases 
we have discussed. The cases we examine in this section will be illustrative of how the various features of 
knowing how to know would meet those other cases that space does not allow us to discuss. 
295 To modify this case make his lack of awareness be about contrary views or about his failure to recognize the 




handles each of  these cases as well as the intuitions behind the motivation for control 
and/or awareness requirement. Let us first focus on the role of  control and awareness and 
then look at each of  the cases in turn. 
 
 
a. Knowing how to know: control and awareness 
 
In chapter two I suggested there is an intuitive connection between control and 
responsibility, but that we do not have control over belief. In chapter five I argued that there 
is indeed a kind of  control we exercise in the epistemic realm, but that it is not control over 
belief. Rather, we exercise guidance control over our cognitive abilities, some of  which are 
constitutive of  epistemic competence. There is a subtle but very important difference 
between exercising control over belief  and exercising control over our cognitive abilities. To 
exercise control over belief, either directly or indirectly, is to be able to bring it about that I 
form a belief  that P.296 But as we saw in chapter two, we simply cannot do this for either 
conceptual or for contingent psychological reasons. Further, what "control" we exercise over 
                                                 
296 Meylan (Foundations, ch 3) argues that to have control over the acquisition of a determinable belief is to 
exercise what she calls theoretical control. This kind of control requires “performing one or several more basic 
action(s) consisting in a truth-oriented modification of [one’s] current set of evidence … motivated by a desire 
to acquire true belief” (68). Importantly, this could involve an indirect modification of “my cognitive habits or 
competencies” (fn). Where we differ is in thinking of this as the kind of control that grounds epistemic 
responsibility. I agree that we do exercise this control over our cognitive abilities (what she calls our habits and 
competencies), but this is not to exercise control over belief, not even determinable belief. I may have never 
considered the question of whether p and still come to believe that p on basis of an exercise of my cognitive 
abilities. But, if I must be able to indirectly control my belief acquisitions in the way Meylan maintains in order 
to be responsible for them, I must have some determinable belief in mind.  
 Moreover, as we saw in chapter two, exercising indirect control over belief is insufficient since control and 
awareness come apart. I could hardly be responsible for even an action I was wholly unaware of, even if I was 
in full control of it. For example, in a particularly troubling episode of the television series CSI, investigators 
are led to a website that shows a victim being buried alive. Every time they look at the website (which they do 
in order to gain clues as to the victim’s whereabouts), a fan kicks on that sucks the oxygen out the casket, thus 
hastening the victim’s death. Even though the investigator’s fully control this flow of oxygen, they are unaware 
of it. The possibility for control without awareness as in this case is why my account of knowing how to know 
requires awareness of cognitive capacities in order for them be owned in the way they need to be for us to be 




beliefs is restricted to indirect causal influence. When I exercise guidance control over my 
cognitive abilities, I do not control my beliefs, I merely influence them. 
This is not to say that control is not a part of  the story, though. When a subject knows 
how to know, they are able to exercise guidance control over their cognitive abilities; their 
beliefs are the result of  exercising or manifesting cognitive abilities they could guide. This 
qualifier is important because it allows evaluation for cognitive habits. The effort it takes to 
exercise our cognitive abilities, to be hesitant in light of  scant evidence, to be diligent in fact-
checking, and so on often costs a lot. We have to take in and assimilate vast amounts of  
information in order to solve simple problems and meet mundane goals. If  we stopped to 
scrutinize every belief  and decision we would get little done. Our cognitive systems create 
shortcuts and we form beliefs by manifesting cognitive habits. However, since knowing how 
to know requires only that we have the ability to assess reasons and evidence and to revise 
beliefs; the epistemically competent are the appropriate targets of  epistemic reactive attitudes 
even if  they failed to exercise those abilities. The upshot is that control plays a part in 
epistemic competence because it plays a part in what it means to have a cognitive ability. 
Awareness, too, plays a role. 
The discussion in chapter three of  the searchlight view Sher repudiates provided a clue 
to understanding epistemic competence. Recall that Sher’s goal is to try to understand and 
explain the knowledge condition on responsibility. The basic idea is that it is not enough that 
one voluntarily chooses to φ, but one must also knowingly φ. This has been taken for 
granted as a kind of  awareness of  the act or the wrongfulness of  the act. But Sher argues 
that this cannot be right since we might (rightly) be morally responsible for omissions, in 
which case there is no awareness of  the act or the wrongfulness of  the act since there is no 




omissions, agents are responsible not just because they are aware of  the act or the 
wrongfulness of  the act, but because they failed to meet norms that their constituent 
psychology could have met. As we noted in chapter two, mere awareness is tantamount to 
passive observation of  what is happening, like the “awareness” an operating system has of  
the programs it is running. So when it comes to belief, my being merely aware of  the 
formation of  beliefs is not sufficient. 
Yet, structural features of  one’s psychology—namely one’s cognitive abilities—are the 
central feature of  knowing how to know. That is, some of  those abilities constitute knowing 
how to know. So when I fail to believe something I should have believed or, I believe 
something I should not have believed, my failure is traceable to my cognitive abilities. It is a 
failure to manifest or exercise abilities to recognize the wrongfulness of  the belief  or that the 
reasons/evidence for it falls below an applicable standard. But, again, to have those abilities 
is to recognize that I can exercise them; it is to be aware (at least non-reflectively) that I have 
them and because knowing how to know requires the ability to recognize and assess 
reasons/evidence, it is to be aware of  when to exercise them. Thus, the failure in a doxastic 
omission is traceable to me. Notice that neither control nor awareness by themselves 
underwrites epistemic competence because neither are necessary nor sufficient. Control 
without awareness is blind, while awareness without control is lame. But even together they 
fail to explain epistemic competence unless they are understood as facets of  a more 








b. Knowing how to know: the cases 
 
Now that I have elaborated on the role of  control and awareness in knowing how to know, I 
want to return to an examination of  the cases. I shall proceed by first stating what intuitions 
the case is meant to bring about and why these matter. Then, I will present the reasons why 
my own account of  knowing how to know both satisfies the intuitive judgments we have 
about the cases as well as how it overcomes the difficulties alternative accounts face. 
Let us begin with the case that began this inquiry into epistemic competence. In lunar 
landing, we have two individuals with beliefs about the moon landing. One is an adult who 
has graduated from college (and therefore we can assume is generally competent) and the 
other is a five-year old. Accordingly, one is the appropriate target of  epistemic evaluation, in 
general, and the other is not. The range of  beliefs for which we may appropriately evaluate 
Walter is extremely large while the range of  beliefs for which Emma is evaluable is quite 
small. What explains this? Why is Walter the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive 
attitudes while Emma is not? A simplistic, but nevertheless unhelpful answer is that Walter is 
an adult and Emma a child. But, this does not answer the relevant sense of  the question. We 
might just raise the further question, what is it about being an adult that makes one 
epistemically competent?  
Walter, we can assume, knows how to know; as a college graduate, he is able to attend to 
and assess reasons for belief  as well as to revise his belief  in light of  those reasons. 
Alternatively, Emma does not have the cognitive abilities constitutive of  knowing how to 
know. In particular, she does not have the ability to assess reasons for belief; for a range of  
beliefs she would not be able to recognize a good reason to believe something from a bad 
reason to believe. But arguably she does not sufficiently own her cognitive processes either. 




trust in adults with whom she is acquainted. Walter is a good friend of  the family and has, 
we can assume, always been kind to Emma and talked with her about space. She trusts 
Walter and so she reports what Walter says about the lunar landing. Notice that we can fill 
out the story such that Emma asks Walter different questions each time she sees him. 
Suppose she does not understand something about what Walter has told her and so the next 
time she asks him about it. This shows that she is both aware of  her beliefs about the moon 
landing as well as their source (even if  she could not articulate that is what she is aware of). 
Further, it shows she has some control over the acquisition of  the beliefs about the moon 
landing. That is, it shows that she can act in such a way as to gather more information, which 
in turn shows that she knows where to go to gather more information. If  this is right, then 
what explains her non-competence is neither her awareness of, nor her control over, the 
relevant belief  acquisition. What does fit rather nicely into our intuition that she is not 
competent is that she lacks the ability to assess her reasons for belief  and that she does not 
own her cognitive processes.  
She believes (and acts on those beliefs) whatever someone she trusts tells her. Many 
reasons for belief, for Emma, are merely motivating reasons. They bring about or cause her 
to believe various things, but since for a wide range of  beliefs she lacks the ability to 
recognize reasons as reasons to believe, no reason within that range is a normative reason for 
her. But, if  no reason within that rage of  beliefs is a normative reason, she cannot assess 
whether the reason is a good (enough) reason to believe. The explanation of  this lies in the 
fact that Emma has not developed the relevant cognitive abilities; she mostly only causally 
interacts with the world, but to be the appropriate target of  epistemic reactive attitudes, one 
must also be able to normatively interact with the world. That is, one must be able to 




that assessment). To reiterate, abilities are dispositions. So being evaluated on the basis of  a 
belief  requires only that one has those abilities and that were they to be exercised, a salient 
cause—a central part of  the explanation—of  the belief  would be the exercise of  the ability. 
Cases like Lunar Skepticism are helpful in highlighting the importance of  general 
epistemic competence. They help to focus questions about epistemic evaluation on the 
question of  what makes an individual the appropriate target of  evaluation at all. Sometimes 
generally competent individuals—i.e., those who are the appropriate target of  epistemic 
reactive attitudes, in general—are exempt from those attitudes as well. Sometimes, that is, 
features of  one’s belief  formation undermine an individual’s competence. In which case, we 
would not just excuse their believing as they do, we would exempt or absolve them from 
evaluation altogether. Bipolar Belief, is meant to be an example of  a generally competent 
individual whose competence is temporarily and restrictedly undermined.  
I have argued that epistemic competence is constituted by the ability to believe for 
normative reasons. I have further argued that these abilities are dispositions and as such do 
not need to be exercised in order for an individual to be competent. It is enough that the 
individual only possesses the ability. This means that epistemic reactive attitudes are 
appropriate when directed at individuals who either exercise or manifest those abilities in 
forming a belief  or should have—and thus could have—exercised or manifested those 
abilities. The upshot is that a salient causal explanation of  the belief  is that those very 
abilities were exercised or manifested. In Bipolar Belief, the salient causal explanation of  
Thom’s belief  is not his ability to believe for normative reasons. Rather, it is a disorder in his 
brain that results in his belief. Further, that disorder simultaneously renders it impossible to 
exercise or manifest that ability. Hence, we could not say of  Thom that he should have 




It might be objected that cases like these support rather than undermine the role of  
control and awareness in epistemic competence. Thom fails to be the appropriate target of  
epistemic reactive attitudes precisely because he had no control over his belief  or belief  
formation and that he was unaware of  his mental disease. I think this response misses the 
real reason why Thom is exempt. Suppose we fast-forward a few years. Thom has been 
diagnosed and has become aware that his manic episodes have recurring features, one of  
which is powerful beliefs about his wife’s infidelity. We can imagine that when he finds 
himself  in such situations he diligently examines the evidence (and suppose that there is 
some evidence for this, but that any other reasonable adult would not be swayed by it) and 
that he is fully aware that his belief  is the result of  his disease. So he exercises some control 
and awareness. Still it seems he is exempt. Why? He lacks the ability to believe this for 
normative reasons. More exactly, his normally functioning ability to believe for normative 
reasons is undermined by the disease. It is true that he lacks control over his doxastic 
situation. It is not control over his belief, but control to exercise or manifest the relevant cognitive 
abilities that he lacks. The cognitive ability to assess reasons and revise belief  is ineffectual. As 
such, he ceases to be appropriately responsive to reasons. When in such manic episodes he 
ceases to know how to know (at least within certain domains, but perhaps globally as well). 
Finally, as should be clear from earlier discussions, a theory of  epistemic competence as 
knowing how to know explains the appropriateness of  epistemic reactive attitudes when it 
comes to doxastic omissions. There are two broad kinds of  doxastic omissions: one involves 
having a belief  one should not have (positive doxastic omission) and the other involves not 
having a belief  one should have (negative doxastic omission). On the one hand, sometimes 
we can be evaluated on the basis of  a belief  that, given our evidence, background beliefs, 




climate change is a hoax and he came to this belief  because of  his implicit trust in Fox 
News. Since his belief  is the result of  his trust in Fox News, we know it is not the result of  
his own scientific background. Hence Joe has beliefs that make it unreasonable for him to 
believe as he does. Specifically, he has beliefs about his own lack of  expertise or even above 
average understanding of  climate science, or beliefs about examining multiple sources of  
evidence. These beliefs about himself  make it unreasonable to believe what he does and yet 
his belief  persists. His failure to assess the reasons for/ against the truth of  climate change 
entails that he should have withheld the belief. That he does not opens him up to evaluation 
precisely because he failed to exercise those abilities. What explains the appropriateness of  
epistemic reactive attitudes directed at Joe is the fact that he does not exercise or manifest his 
competence in believing as he does. 
Additionally, we might find that Joe comes by his implicit trust in Fox News honestly. As 
a matter of  course, Joe was exposed to indoctrination that eventuated in his trust in Fox 
News and thus his climate science denial. This fact makes his belief  based on his implicit 
trust understandable, but does it also mean that Joe is not the appropriate target of  
evaluations on that basis of  beliefs with that source? Not at all. The only way that our 
upbringing can exempt us from evaluation is if  it radically alters our capacity to become 
epistemically competent. That is, if  our experiences and upbringing proscribe the 
development of  the cognitive abilities necessary and sufficient for epistemic competence, 
then, and only then, can we be exempt from epistemic reactive attitudes due to lack of  
competence.297 This would require a radical alteration of  one’s interpretation of  reality. 
Because our basic cognitive processes are automatic and subpersonal, the only way to derail 
the natural development of  those processes into cognitive abilities (in individuals without 
                                                 




prior mental disorders) would be through radical and persistent manipulation. So, the fact 
that Joe believes as he does on the basis of  an implicit trust in an unreliable source that he 
innocently acquired does nothing to undermine his epistemic competence, and therefore the 
aptness of  our evaluations directed at him.298  
The preceding discussion about Joe also shows why negative doxastic omissions do not 
exempt us from evaluations. As in the case of  positive doxastic omissions, the reason why 
individuals are the appropriate targets of  evaluations is that they failed to exercise or 
manifest abilities that they have (and that they should have exercised or manifested). When 
an individual does not believe something they should, they have not exercised their 
competence. Joe’s implicit trust in Fox News is a good example. Joe should believe that Fox 
News is not very reliable. Unless Joe has been sequestered for his entire life and exposed 
only to Fox News and nothing else at all, his implicit trust is unfounded. But, of  course, he 
has multiple reasons to think that Fox News is unreliable. Or, at the very least, to realize that 
it is really bad policy to use only one source for information. This is especially true when the 
information you are trying to get has important implications. To return to the present point, 
though, the indoctrination that resulted in Joe’s implicit trust in Fox News was not so radical 
as to sufficiently derail Joe’s normal cognitive development. If  this is right, then Joe has the 
cognitive abilities—the epistemic competence—to realize that one should not trust only one 
source of  information, especially if  one does not understand the subject matter sufficiently 
enough to judge the veracity of  the claims. Hence, Joe is the appropriate target of  epistemic 
reactive attitudes directed at him. 
Each of  these cases—Lunar Skepticism, Bipolar Belief, and Climate Science 
Denial—illustrate both the importance of  thinking about general epistemic competence as 
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well as why that competence is constituted by the ability to believe for normative reasons—
by knowing how to know. Lunar Skepticism highlights the fact that some individuals are 
the appropriate targets of  epistemic reactive attitudes and some are not. Bipolar Belief 
shows us that the issue concerns more than the child/adult divide since some otherwise 
competent individuals may have that competence undermined in particular instances. Finally, 
cases like Climate Science Denial point to the fact we often rightly evaluate individuals for 
omissions and that an ability-based account of  epistemic competence explains why this 






When we evaluate individuals on the basis of  their beliefs, we make salient the fact that 
epistemic agents are the objects of  evaluation. Put differently, we do not appraise or assess 
the beliefs of  others as abstract propositions, but rather, we appraise and assess individuals; 
we highlight the fact that beliefs reflect our abilities and evaluative judgments. As such, when 
we seek to understand the conditions under which those appraisals and assessments are 
appropriate, we must look to deep features of  our cognitive lives. For in accounting for our 
epistemic competence in this way we are able to avoid otherwise troubling puzzles.  
Prima facie, the appropriateness of  the participant reactive attitudes we direct at others 
seems to be grounded in the control over, or awareness of, our beliefs. It is thought that 
something must connect the believer to the belief  in such a way as to explain why the belief  




we could easily explain why certain of  our evaluations are apt. Likewise, one might think that 
conscious awareness of  one's beliefs plays this role. But neither control nor awareness, once 
properly understood, could possibly serve as a ground. On the one hand, we simply do not 
have the kind of  control over belief  that we would need. On the other hand, we are rightly 
evaluated on the basis of  doxastic omissions. What is needed is something that could fulfill 
the role(s) control and awareness are thought to have without falling into the same problems. 
Thinking of  doxastic omissions highlights the fact that whatever story we give must also 
explain the omission; why did S fail to believe that P when she should have? This question 
suggests that the aptness of  evaluation, thus epistemic competence, is grounded in how an 
individual believes and that competent individuals know how to know.  
An immediate worry arises as to the nature of  know-how. When we know how to do 
something do we simply have knowledge-that or is know-how something different? I argued 
that the choice is not binary. There are some kinds of  knowledge-how that are nothing over 
and above having certain abilities; there are other kinds of  knowledge-how that do require 
corresponding propositional knowledge. Of  particular interest, is the claim that lower-level 
cognitive abilities are a kind of  knowledge-how. From here we can develop which of  those 
abilities are necessary and sufficient for epistemic competence. Of  all the various cognitive 
abilities that we acquire and develop throughout our lives, three suggest themselves. First, an 
individual must be able to recognize reasons that count in favor of  believing. Second, an 
individual must be able to assess those reasons. Finally, she must be able to revise and adjust 
her belief  on the basis of  that assessment. Together, these abilities comprise the ability to 
believe for normative reasons and constitute epistemic competence. 
Grounding epistemic competence in cognitive ability situates my theory within virtue 




the centrality of  epistemic agents. If  we want to understand an epistemic phenomenon we 
should start with knowers. Most discussion of  this has focused on traditional 
epistemological questions about the nature of  knowledge and justification,299 though, some 
has instead centered on non-traditional questions.300 This work can be seen as an addition to 
the latter. By focusing on the epistemic agent, we can go beyond seeking to understand 
questions about when individuals are justified or warranted in their belief, by seeking to 
explain the appropriateness of  applying norms and standards to individuals in general. 
Perhaps most importantly, in understanding that epistemic competence is constituted by 
cognitive abilities, we use our epistemological theorizing to investigate those abilities. In so 
doing, we can resurrect the ancient idea, though expressed differently, that in knowing about 
knowledge, belief, and our intellectual capacities and abilities, we can regulate our epistemic 
endeavors in such a way as to become better knowers. In other words, perhaps our 
epistemological theories might make us better at knowing how to know. 
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